MEMOIRS

OF

GENERAL DUMOURIER.

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.

..... ET VITAM IMPENDERE VERO.
Juv. Sat. IV.

TRANSLATED BY JOHN FENWICK.

PART II.

DUBLIN:

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CONTENTS

OF THE

SECOND PART.

CHAP. I. Page

Plan of the Campaign. - - - 1

CHAP. II.

Preparations for the Expedition againſt Holland. Orders to the grand Army. Advice given by General Dumourier to the Miniſter of War. General Thouvenot and the Commiſſary Petit-Jean at Antwerp. Orders for the raiſing of Battalions in Belgium. General Valence at Antwerp. Loan. Manifeſto. - 11

CHAP. III.

Aſſembling the Army. Its Amount. Firſt Movements. General Dumourier's meeting with the Swediſh Ambaſſador. Taking of Breda, Klundert, and Gertruydenberg. Siege of Williamſtadt. Blockade of Bergen-op-Zoom, and Steenberg.

berg. Summons given to Heuſden. General Dumourier at the Moor Dyke. Preparations for paſſing to Dort, by the Moor-Dyke and Roowaert. Second Project of paſſing by Gertruydenberg. The General receives Orders to join the Grand Army: Departs. Inſtructions given to General de Flers. - 25

CHAP. IV.

The General arrives at Antwerp. Sends the Agents of the Executive Power from that Town. Arrives at Bruſſels. Addreſſes the Repreſentatives of the People. Writes to the Convention. Arreſts Chepy, and Eſtienne. Several Proclamations. Arrives on the 13th of March at Louvain. The Commiſſioners of the Convention come to that City to meet the General. - - - - 51

CHAP. V.

State of the Army. Its Poſition. The General's Orders to the different Diviſions. He reſolves to give Battle to the Enemy. - - 66

CHAP. VI.

Battle of Nerwinde. - - - 80

CHAP. VII.

Retreat of the 19th of March. Action of Gotzenhoven. - - - - 90

CHAP.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. VIII.

Retreat of the 20th and 21ſt of March. Engagement of Neerwelpe. La Croix and Danton at Louvain. Engagement of the 22d of March. - - - - 96

CHAP. IX.

Retreat to Bruſſels. Evacuation of Bruſſels. Camp of Enghien. Camp of Ath. Conference at Ath with Colonel Mack. The Arreſt of General Miranda. - - 106

CHAP. X.

Camp of Tournay. - - - 114

CHAP. XI.

Retreat to the Camp of Maulde. - - 120

CHAP. XII.

Arreſt of the Commiſſioners of the Convention, Camus, La Marque, Bancal, and Quinette; and of Beurnonville, Miniſter of War. - 133

CHAP. XIII.

Attempt to aſſaſſinate General Dumourier on the 4th of April. Events of the 5th of April. Departure of General Dumourier. 149

CONTENTS.

CHAP. XIV.

Dumourier at Mons. Eſtabliſhment of the French at Leuze. Congreſs of Antwerp. Second proclamation of the Prince of Cobourg. Departure of the General for Bruſſels. - 166

CHAP. XV.

Concluſion. - - - - 174

MEMOIRS

OF

GENERAL DUMOURIER.

FOR THE YEAR 1793.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Plan of the Campaign.

WE are now entering upon the hiſtory of a campaign, more rapid, more varied, and perhaps more important, in its events, than any of former or later times. The nature of the campaign was not foreſeen till the firſt week of February; the plan was conceived and arranged between the 7th and the 22d of that month; and the campaign finiſhed on the 5th of the following April.

The hiſtory of this ſhort period, offers to the contemplation of the military man, Cities taken in defiance of immenſe inundations, a great battle, a variety of engagements, and a retreat which excited the aſtoniſhment of the generals of the enemy, and from which they could not withhold their praiſe: It exhibits an example of the two ſpecies of war, the

offenſive, and defenſive: And it may be ſaid to have involved conſequences that will decide the fate of France, and perhaps that of Europe.

Nor is this hiſtory leſs intereſting to the philoſopher, whom it will confirm in the opinion, that the deſtiny of empires is often dependent on circumſtances that are apparently inconſiderable; and that the character and fortune of one man may decide the fate of a nation. In the preceding year, General Dumourier had preſerved the independence of France, by his ſucceſs in the Plains of Champagne, and rendered her name illuſtrious in thoſe of Belgium: for, at that period, the greatneſs of the danger which threatened France united all minds under his ſtandard, and compelled the nation to diſplay her energy under the direction of his counſels. In the period we are now conſidering, the ſituation and character of the French people were changed. The nation, or rather thoſe who governed and miſled the nation, intoxicated with ſucceſs, and blinded by their crimes, no longer liſtened to the general, who would now have ſaved his countrymen, both from a foreign yoke, and from the tyranny of their own miſtaken paſſions.

He was not ſeconded in his efforts. He was not obeyed. He was oppoſed, and betrayed; and his campaign was unfortunate, notwithſtanding his exertions to turn the fortune of war in his favour. On the point of conquering Holland, the conqueſt was ſnatched from his hands. He formed a ſecond plan, and victory was torn from him by his own troops. In the midſt of a retreat, that was as ſucceſsfully conducted

ducted as it was bloody and deſtructive, he projected another deſign, which preſerved his army, and arreſted the ruin of Belgium, which, otherwiſe, would have been complete. But this deſign fell ſhort of its greateſt object, the deliverance of France: and, in that, it was defeated by the fierce pride of the Convention, and by the fickleneſs of his troops; and General Dumourier was compelled to quit his army, and to ſeek a retreat among ſtrangers, who could not forbear to eſteem him.

Thenceforth, the French were no longer the ſame people. In the ſoldiery, ſavage rage ſucceeded valour; there was neither talent in the plan of the war, nor conduct in its execution; the French ſlew and were ſlain, without remorſe, or conſideration. It was not war they carried on; and the carnage would already have been terminated, if the force that oppoſed them were that of a ſingle people, or were not rendered ineffectual by the claſhing of various intereſts and counſels.

The ſituation of General Dumourier was embarraſſing, when he knew that England and Holland were on the point of adding their forces to thoſe of the other enemies of France. If the perſons who were at the head of affairs, had been well informed and prudent men, he directly would have adviſed them to evacuate the Netherlands, which could no longer be preſerved; and to poſt the troops behind the fortified places of the department of the North, holding for a while the banks of the Scheld, and the citadel of Namur. But this reaſonable propoſition would have been regarded as proceeding from cow-

ardice or treachery; and would have brought the general to the ſcaffold. Or, if it had been accepted, it would have delivered the general into the hands of tyrants whom it was his object to cruſh, for the ſafety and happineſs of his country. Entering France with an enemy in purſuit of him, and with the appearance of a flight, he would have inſtantly loſt his military reputation, which was only to be preſerved by ſignal ſucceſſes; and his fate would have been at the diſpoſal of the Jacobins of Paris, whom this retreat would have reinforced with the whole amount of his army. He could not therefore extricate himſelf from this deſperate ſituation, but by the hardieſt and moſt deciſive means. His military fame and the celerity of his movements, could alone open him the way to the ſupply of all that was wanting to his army. Clothing, accoutrements, horſes, arms, proviſions, money, all were to be found in Holland; and there, he was compelled to ſeek them. He conceived the deſign of conquering Holland by a daring blow; and we will now rapidly review his plan, and his reſources.

The Dutch refugees had formed a ſmall revolutionary committee at Antwerp, where was alſo the Dutch legion. The committee poſſeſſed more zeal than ability; and, although they expended conſiderable ſums of money in maintaining a ſecret correſpondence with the different Provinces of the Dutch Republic, the information which the general received through their means was extremely deficient, eſpecially reſpecting the military ſtate of that country. All that could be relied on with certainty

was, that the party of the patriots was very conſiderable: particularly at Amſterdam, Haerlem, Dort, and throughout Zealand. The general pretended to reaſſume the conſideration of the plan, which the committee had laid before him at Paris, of making an irruption into Zealand. He affected to examine it minutely in preſence of the committee, and feigned to give it his approbation; in order to cover a plan more bold in appearance, but in truth more certain of ſucceſs, becauſe it appeared to be more impracticable. He did not diſcloſe that deſign to any other perſons than to Mr. Koch, and Mr. De Niſs, whom he thought deſerving of his entire confidence; and whoſe zeal, probity, ſtrength of mind, and love of their country, entitled them to be the deliverers of their fellow citizens.

The plan for the invaſion of Zealand, was as follows: The refugees had learnt that the Stadtholder had formed the deſign of fortifying the Iſland of Walcheren, as a place of retreat for the States General and the members of the government, in caſe the French ſhould enter the country, and ſhould be joined by the people, whom the government miſtruſted. The Dutch Committee propoſed that a conſiderable body of men ſhould depart from Antwerp, and proceed, with as great ſecrecy and diſpatch as poſſible, by Sandvliet to the iſland of South Beveland, and from thence to the iſland of Walcheren, and, ſeizing upon Middleburg and Fluſhing, ſhould make themſelves maſters of that latter iſland. The garriſons of thoſe two towns, it is true,

did

did not amount to more than twelve or fifteen hundred men, and were raw and undiſciplined troops. But if the inhabitants had not joined their deliverers, the French ſoldiers would infallibly have been cut off. There was nothing to prevent the iſland receiving ſuccours to double the amount of the French detachment; there were already ſeveral Engliſh frigates at Fluſhing; and the Dutch had a ſquadron of armed veſſels in the Scheld, lying under the fortreſs of Batz, a league below Lillo, which would entirely have cut off the retreat of the detachment to the main land.

No ſucceſs could be expected in this expedition, without ſuch promptitude and exactneſs in the execution, as the general could not expect either from his own troops, or thoſe of the Dutch patriots. He had not a ſingle general officer under his command to whom he could confide ſo dangerous an enterprize. He could not abandon the command of the main army, to undertake the expedition himſelf. Had he yielded to the opinion of the Dutch patriots, he would certainly have been led into an unſucceſsful enterprize; and this unfortunate check in the beginning of the campaign would have compleated the ruin of his ſmall army, conſiſting of new troops, that had already ſuffered much by his abſence, and were ſhortly after beaten, diſcouraged, and almoſt diſperſed on the Roer and the Meuſe.

But if, by the chance that belongs to military movements, this expedition had been ſucceſsful, however brilliant it might have been, it would have produced no real benefit to the general. On the

contrary,

contrary, it would have deprived him of five or ſix thouſand of his troops, who would have been ſeparated from him by an arm of the ſea, and all the places of Dutch Flanders: leaving him without a force ſufficient to undertake any thing further.

The better to conceal his real deſigns, however, he profeſſed to adopt that plan of attacking Holland, and he made ſome diſpoſitions as if he was about to undertake it ſeriouſly. He had, at Antwerp, ſome ſmall veſſels under the command of captain Moultſon, an American officer in the French ſervice, who had aſſiſted in the taking of the citadel of Antwerp. This ſmall ſquadron conſiſted of the Ariel of 24 guns, a brig of 14 guns, and three gun-boats. He ordered theſe veſſels to be fitted out, to proceed to fort Lillo, and there to caſt anchor. He directed a furnace to be conſtructed on each of the gun-boats, for the purpoſe of heating balls. He commanded the fort of Lillo, and that of Liefkenſhoeck, and the citadel of Antwerp, to be furniſhed with proviſions, and put in a ſtate to ſuſtain a ſiege. He aſſembled, at Antwerp, all the Dutch veſſels that on the declaration of war had been detained in the canals of the Scheld, and ordered them to be prepared to ſerve as fire-ſhips.

He wiſhed it to be believed that his object was to burn the Dutch veſſels lying at anchor under the fort of Batz; and to ſeize upon that fort, which mounted forty guns. The Dutch veſſels retired to Ramekens. In ſhort, every thing ſeemed to indicate, during ſeveral days, that the general's movements were directed againſt Zealand; and he gave

the

the enemy reaſon to imagine that the campaign would open by the invaſion of that country. Meanwhile, the general's thoughts were wholly occupied with his own plan; which was extremely ſimple, although, had it never been attempted, it muſt have appeared wholly impracticable. This plan was, to make his way with a body of troops to the Moor Dyke, deceiving and evading the garriſons of Breda, and Gertruydenberg, on his right; Bergen-up-Zoom, Steenberg, Klundert, and Williamſtadt, on his left: and, paſſing the arm of the ſea which runs between the Moor-dyke and Dort, and which is about two leagues in breadth, to land at Dort: where being arrived he ſhould be in the heart of Holland, and would have no obſtacles to encounter in marching by Rotterdam, Delft, the Hague, Leyden, and Haerlem, to Amſterdam. By this plan, he would take all the ſtrong places of Holland in the rear. Meanwhile, General Miranda, with a detachment of the grand army, was to bombard Maeſtricht, and Venloo; and, as ſoon as he ſhould know that General Dumourier had reached Dort, he was to leave General Valence to continue the ſiege of Maeſtricht, and to march with 25,000 men againſt Nimeguen, where General Dumourier was to join him by the route of Utrecht.

This plan, executed with rapidity, would have had little ſerious difficulty to encounter, ſince the Stadtholder neither had an army aſſembled, nor had adopted any ſettled plan of defence; and ſince, of all the enterprizes that might be undertaken by Dumourier, this was the leaſt to be expected: for it

ſeemed

ſeemed to be no better than an attempt to march an army *through the eye of a needle* *.

Dumourier's next deſign was, as ſoon as he ſhould be maſter of Holland, to ſend the battalions of National guards back into Belgium; to aſſemble an army entirely compoſed of troops of the line, and commanded by generals of whoſe fidelity he was aſſured, and to compel the States General of the United Provinces, to order a ſurrender of all their towns; to make no changes in the government, but ſuch as ſhould be indiſpenſibly neceſſary; to diſſolve the Dutch Revolutionary Committee, to the members of which he had already ſignified that, in caſe of ſucceſs, they might be ſeverally appointed to the public ſituations of their reſpective Provinces, ſuppoſing them to poſſeſs the confidence of their fellow citizens; to preſerve the Dutch Republic from the tyranny of the commiſſioners of the National Convention, and from the influence of Jacobiniſm; to fit out a fleet with all poſſible expedition at Rotterdam, in Zealand, and in the Texel, in order to ſeize upon the Dutch ſettlements in India, and to ſecure the poſſeſſion of them by ſtrong garriſons; to offer a perfect neutrality to the Engliſh; to ſtation, in the country of Zutphen and Dutch Guelders, an army of obſervation conſiſting of 30,000 men; to furniſh money and arms for the raiſing a body of 30,000 men in the countries of Antwerp, the two Flanders, and Campine, on whoſe attachment he could rely; to permit the French to occupy

* Theſe are the words of Dumourier.

no other part of the Netherlands, than the country of Liege; to annul, throughout Belgium, the decree of the 15th of December; to invite the people of that country to aſſemble at Aloſt, Antwerp, or Ghent, for the purpoſe of forming on a ſolid baſis ſuch a government as ſhould be agreeable to them; and after that to aſſemble an army of Belgians of 40,000 men, compoſed of battalions of 800 men each, together with a body of cavalry. Dumourier further deſigned to offer a ſuſpenſion of arms to the Imperialiſts; and, in caſe of its being rejected, to raiſe an army of 150,000 men in order to drive them beyond the Rhine; but if it were accepted he hoped to gain time and means to execute the reſt of his plan, which was, either to form a Republic of the eighteen Provinces of the Netherlands, if that ſhould be agreeable to the people, or to make an offenſive and defenſive alliance between the Republic of the Seven United Provinces and that of Belgium, and to raiſe an army of 80,000 men in the two countries for their joint defence, till the concluſion of the war; to invite France to enter into an alliance with the two Republics, and to put an end to her anarchy by re-adopting the conſtitution of 1789; and, in caſe of France refuſing to accede to this propoſal, to march to Paris with an army compoſed of the French troops of the line, and a body of 40,000 Dutch and Belgians, in order to diſſolve the National Convention, and annihilate the power of the Jacobins.

Such were the outlines of General Dumourier's plan, which was communicated only to four perſons.

It

It will appear viſionary to the reader; but, being founded on the circumſtances of the times, and on well combined calculations, it could not have failed of ſucceſs, if the moſt diſaſtrous events, entirely unconnected with the conduct and arrangements of General Dumourier, had not broken all his meaſures, and forced him to ſacrifice all his hopes to the immediate ſafety of the grand army, on the point of being entirely deſtroyed, by the miſmanagement of the officers who commanded under him.

CHAP. II.

Preparations for the Expedition againſt Holland. Orders to the grand Army. Advice given by General Dumourier to the Miniſter of War. General Thouvenot and the Commiſſary Petit-Jean at Antwerp. Orders for the raiſing of Battalions in Belgium. General Valence at Antwerp. Loan. Manifeſto.

GENERAL DUMOURIER, having taken his reſolution, may be ſtill ſaid to have had all his means to create. At Antwerp, there were two battalions of national gendarmerie, conſiſting of 350 men each, who were dangerous only to their officers and the peaceable inhabitants of the city, being the moſt deteſtable and undiſciplined ſoldiers that ever entered the field of battle. Theſe ferocious Janiſſaries received each 40 ſols per day in ſpecie without de-

duction; appointed their own officers; and committed every kind of crime. The general, after paſſing them in review, declared in the ſtrongeſt terms, that, ſhould they continue to commit the exceſſes of which they were accuſed, or to be guilty of any diſobedience of orders, he would inſtantly ſend them back to France. This body of gendarmerie was compoſed of the ancient French guards. There were alſo, at Antwerp, one hundred and fifty dragoons of the 20th regiment; three battalions of national guards; and about two thouſand of the Dutch legion, two hundred of which were horſe. Twelve battalions of national guards, newly raiſed, and having neither fuſees, accoutrements, nor ſhoes, were quartered in the cities and villages of Weſt Flanders; and had no idea that they ſhould be obliged to take the field till the month of May.

Cannon, mortars, magazines, money, commiſſaries, together with their aſſiſtants, were altogether wanting. But there was not a moment to be loſt. The raſhneſs of the national convention, in declaring war againſt Holland, had warned the Dutch to prepare for their defence; and, unleſs the general had attacked them with the utmoſt celerity, the enterprize would have become utterly chimerical. And, indeed, had the Dutch prepared for their defence with as great activity as the general uſed for attacking them, the project muſt have been unſucceſsful.

General Miranda had remained at the head of the army of the North during the whole winter. This general was a Peruvian by birth; and was a

man of capacity, and extenſive information. He was better verſed in the theory of war than any other of the French generals, but he was not equally well verſed in the practice. His intimacy with Pethion had been the cauſe of his entering the ſervice the preceding year, as major general. He joined Dumourier at the camp of Grandpré; and had been of great ſervice to him, in the different attacks of the Pruſſians, particularly in the retreat of the 15th of September. But he had a haughtineſs of diſpoſition, and a bluntneſs of manner, which begat him many enemies; and he was unfit to command the French, whoſe confidence it is impoſſible to gain but by good humour and a conduct expreſſive of reſpect for them.

Dumourier had procured him the appointment of lieutenant-general, in the month of November 1792; had conferred upon him the command of the army of the North, and had promiſed to obtain him the rank of general, on the firſt opportunity. Miranda was afterward offended that Valence, an older lieutenant-general than himſelf, (having commanded with great reputation general Kellermann's advanced guard, and ſeveral detached corps, during the campaign of 1792) ſhould have been raiſed to the rank of general on the recommendation of Dumourier. He never forgave this preference; but his reſentment, unfortunately for France, did not diſplay itſelf till the day of the battle of Nerwinde. At the time we now ſpeak of, he ſtill appeared full of attachment to Dumourier. And that general had written to him from Paris to make preparations

for

for the opening of the campaign, very early in the ſpring, by the ſiege of Maeſtricht, in caſe a rupture ſhould prove to be unavoidable with England and Holland.

Dumourier's own army was then under the command of general Lanoue, who was a very brave and honeſt man. Fifty years paſt in the ſervice had rendered him reſpectable; but had alſo diminiſhed his vigour. He was aſſiſted by general Thouvenot, an officer of very uncommon merit.

The army of general Valence was commanded, in his abſence, by lieutenant-general Le Veneur, a man of great courage, but of a limited capacity.

Dumourier ordered General Miranda to preſent himſelf before Maeſtricht with a part of his army, without too much weakening the poſts on the Meuſe; to reinforce himſelf to the number of 25 or 30,000 men drawn from the other two armies; and to communicate theſe orders to the reſpective generals, that they might contract their lines, and hold their troops in readineſs to take the field, if the Imperialiſts, whoſe numbers were daily encreaſing in their quarters on the Herfſle, and the Pruſſians who were alſo daily receiving reinforcements at Weſel, ſhould betray any deſigns of forming a junction to relieve Maeſtricht, which was to be expected. General Dumourier thought it prudent not to point out the poſition that might be proper for this army of obſervation; and he acknowledges that, in this, he committed a great error.

In the remaining part of General Dumourier's inſtructions to Miranda, he confidentially unfolded his

his plan for attacking Holland. He desired him not to open the siege regularly before Maestricht, being too early in the season for such an undertaking, but to endeavour to carry the place by a vigorous assault with bombs and red hot balls, in the same manner as the Duke of Saxe-Teschen had attempted to carry Lisle; and, when General Dumourier should have informed him that he had reached Dort by the Moor Dyke, to leave General Valence before Maestricht, and to proceed by forced marches to Nimeguen, passing by the frontier of the Dutchy of Cleves, in order to intercept the Prussians, if they should attempt to reach Holland before him: and, to this latter purpose, Dumourier desired him to send General Champmorin (a most able engineer) against Venloo, while Miranda should besiege Maestricht, and by that means to make himself master of the lower part of the Meuse as far as Genep.

General Dumourier confined the number of men that Miranda should employ in this expedition to 25,000 or 30,000, at the utmost, that he might not too much weaken the posts on the Meuse. He recommended the greatest dispatch in the preparations, so that Maestricht might be invested by the 12th or 15th of that month; and he appointed lieutenant-general Bouchet, an experienced engineer, to assist Miranda in the siege.

Dumourier wrote nearly in the same terms to Lanoue and Thouvenot; enjoining them to inform the troops, that he should review them, after having visited the quarters on the lower Meuse. He wrote to lieutenant-general Moreton, who commanded in Brussels,

Bruſſels, that he was ſetting off immediately for that city. And to General d'Harville, ordering him to aſſemble his troops at Namur on the 20th of February, as he deſigned to review his diviſion on the 22d of that month. Thus, in miſleading ſuch of his generals as were not to be employed in the expedition, he effectually deceived the enemy, who were utterly at a loſs to conjecture in what point he would begin the campaign.

Some days after General Dumourier quitted Paris, Pache reſigned the war department in order to be choſen Mayor of Paris, and was ſucceeded by General Bournonville, for whom Dumourier had procured the rank of lieutenant-general and afterward of general in a very ſhort ſpace of time. Dumourier had been uſed to call him his Ajax and his ſon. In truth he had commenced his career with great ſpirit, and had evinced a ſincere attachment to the general. Dumourier now informed him merely, that it was his deſign to attack Holland, without entering into the detail of his plan, leſt he ſhould be betrayed by the indiſcretion or the diſhoneſty of the clerks of the war office.

Pache, a little while before his quitting the miniſtry, had ordered the demolition of the ſmall part of the fortifications of Mons and Tournay which then remained. Theſe imprudent orders had diſguſted the inhabitants of thoſe two cities. General Dumourier ſuſpended the execution of the order; and, he not only deſired the new miniſter of war to revoke it, but ſtrongly recommended him to repair the fortifications of thoſe two places, with the utmoſt

moſt diſpatch. He alſo counſelled him to fortify with equal ſpeed the ſtrong place of the caſtle of Huy; to make ditches round Malines, which might eaſily be put into a ſtate of defence by inundations; to erect ſtrong batteries at Oſtend, Nieuport, and Dunkirk, in order to ſtrengthen our frontiers on that ſide, in the probable caſe of our being obliged to evacuate Belgium. General Dumourier further adviſed Bournonville to compleat the lines from Dunkirk to Bergues; to form an intrenched camp at Mount Caſſell; and to fortify Orchies between Liſle, Douay, and Condé; Bavay, as an out-poſt to Queſnoy, between Condé and Maubeuge; and Beaumont, between Maubeuge and Philippeville.

Such were the counſels reſpecting the fortifying that frontier which were given by General Dumourier, although he is accuſed of having betrayed his country. General Dumourier faithfully ſerved his country till the moment that he quitted her; and he will again ſerve her, with the ſame zeal and fidelity, if he ſhould ever ſee her governed by a King, under the ſanction of a Conſtitution. Had his counſels been followed, the combined armies would have been detained longer on the exterior frontier, by that line of poſts, and would not have penetrated ſo eaſily into France.

General Dumourier alſo requeſted Bournonville to ſend him reinforcements of men; and to order General D'Arçon to join him, with ſome able engineers, having to make a campaign that would abound in ſieges. Bournonville acceded to all Dumourier's requeſts, as far as was in his power, with great

promptitude; and General D'Arçon arrived at the army immediately afterward.

This general, although one of the beſt engineers and one of the worthieſt men in France, had been accuſed of ariſtocracy by the well known Prince of Heſſe, a contemptible Jacobin; and had been deprived of his command; but General Dumourier, who had long been acquainted with his merit, reſtored him to the ſervice of his country, and found him worthy of the truſt repoſed in him.

General de Flers commanded at Bruges. He was a brave man; but was opinionated, and did not poſſeſs much capacity. Having received a wound with a muſket ball in the camp of Maulde, Dumourier made him major-general; and afterward ſent him to Bruges, to take upon him the command in Weſt Flanders, and had given him orders to receive the reinforcement of 10,000 men, which Pache had marched into that country on the General's requeſt.

When Dumourier arrived at Bruges, de Flers laid before him a plan which he had formed for ſurpriſing the city of Sluys. The general pretended to adopt the plan; and ſent de Flers to Bournonville, with a requeſt to give de Flers a body of 5 or 6000 men and a ſmall train of artillery, to enable him to menace Dutch Flanders. The requeſt was complied with, ſpeedily and compleatly.

The general had no deſign that de Flers ſhould attack the Dutch towns in Flanders, which it was not poſſible for him to take; but he placed this ſmall body of men under his orders, to be ready to replace, on the ſide of Antwerp and Breda, the forces that

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the general ſhould march into Holland. And he knew that the aſſembling this ſmall army in the neighbourhood of Bruges would ſtill aid in deceiving the Dutch reſpecting the general's deſigns, eſpecially as de Flers was himſelf deceived, and made ſerious preparations for his expedition.

General Dumourier had left all the officers of his ſtaff at Liege, together with his Aids-de camp, and was accompanied only by his faithful Baptiſte. He had alſo left his equipage with the grand army, to favour the opinion that he deſigned to return; and had only ordered a few horſes to attend him at Antwerp, under pretence of viſiting the cantonments on the Meuſe. To form his ſtaff therefore, he ſent for four of his officers, at the head of whom he placed Colonel Thouvenot, brother to the general of the ſame name. This officer, who, under every circumſtance, has been the zealous friend of General Dumourier, abounded in courage, information, and reſources of mind. He was in an eminent degree important to the general during the campaign in Holland; and when they quitted the army together rendered the general every ſervice in his power.

The preſence of General Thouvenot was neceſſary to the grand army. He was the only officer that perfectly underſtood the details of duty in winter quarters; and was the only one that had influence enough to heal the frequent quarrels that happened among the generals. It was known that he poſſeſſed the entire confidence of Dumourier, and alſo that his merit entitled him to that confidence; and, although he was not the better beloved on that ac-

count, it obtained him a greater degree of reſpect; and, it being known that he was perfectly acquainted with the general's intentions, his opinion was received with the ſame deference that was paid to the general's orders.

There was no other Commiſſary with the army, than Petit-Jean, to provide magazines and every thing neceſſary for the ſiege of Maeſtricht, and for the cantonments between the Meuſe and the Roer, and the different quarters in Belgium. It ſeemed imprudent to take him a moment from theſe multiplied concerns, before the arrival of Malus, who was ſtill detained at Paris, although a promiſe had been made to the general that he ſhould be ſent to the army.

Notwithſtanding theſe reaſons, Dumourier ordered General Thouvenot and Petit-Jean to attend him at Antwerp; and, in two days, he ſettled with them all the neceſſary arrangements to enable his troops to take the field for the expedition.

Dumourier at the ſame time ſent to Liege for General La Fayette, and Lieutenant-Colonel La Martinière, to form his train of artillery, which indeed was very inconſiderable. Theſe two officers ſerved him with a zeal and knowledge deſerving of the higheſt eulogiums.

On the departure of Thouvenot and Petit-Jean, General Dumourier gave them inſtructions for a new levy of twenty-five battalions of Belgians, conſiſting of 800 men each, and he charged the generals and other officers commanding in the different provinces with the execution of theſe orders, and appointed

appointed Thouvenot inſpector general and Petit-Jean commiſſary general: in purſuance of a decree of the National Convention, which placed thoſe troops on the footing of French ſoldiers. Till that period, the Belgic Provinces had made levies of legions, regiments, and corps at their pleaſure. Theſe troops were filled with a diſproportionate number of officers, and were paid on the credit of the Belgic military committee, the members of which were very ignorant and diſhoneſt, and were governed by General Roziere, who had formerly been an officer in the ſervice of France, and was neither a man of honour nor talents.

General Valence, on his route from Paris, paſſed through Antwerp to take Dumourier's orders. Dumourier communicated his entire plan to Valence; and informed him that he was to cover the ſiege of Maeſtricht, with the army under his command, till Miranda ſhould depart for Nimeguen, and afterward to continue the ſiege, if the town ſhould not be then taken. He recommended to the general to viſit all the winter quarters of the army, to chooſe a proper poſition for the covering army, to watch the motions of the enemy, and to hold himſelf ready to engage them if they ſhould endeavour to relieve Maeſtricht, which was reaſonably to be expected. Above all things, he recommended him to act with promptneſs and vigour; to concert meaſures ſincerely and cordially with General Miranda; and to conſult General Thouvenot, whoſe knowledge could not fail to be of infinite ſervice to him. At the ſame

ſame time, he ſent orders to Lanoue to obey General Valence.

The Committee of Finance of the Convention, miſtruſting the generals, or being deſirous of counteracting and inſulting them, had ordered the treaſury to furniſh no more money to the troops than their pay, and not to appropriate ſums for the other expences, although the troops were in want of ſhoes, cloaths and arms. The paymaſter of the army ſupplied no more for the troops deſtined againſt Holland, than the pay of fifteen days, which amounted only to 240,000 livres; and the troops did not even coſt the nation that ſum, ſince they lived at the expence of the country. The expedition however was attended with prodigious incidental expences.

Notwithſtanding the rapacity and unjuſt conduct of the French in Belgium, the whole of that nation rendered juſtice to the conduct of General Dumourier. In no city of Europe are there a greater number of wealthy inhabitants than at Antwerp. After the commerce of that city had fallen into decay, the inhabitants had ſubſtituted the moſt rigid œconomy in the place of that reſource. Their expences were uſually confined within the bounds of a part of their revenues, ſo that their fortunes could not but accumulate greatly. General Dumourier aſſembled the magiſtrates and principal citizens, and opened a loan of 1,00,000 florins. A merchant named Verbrouck was charged with the receipt of the money, and the commiſſary Petit-Jean with the ſuperintendance of its expenditure. The loan produced 200,000 florins, which in the end was an in-

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eſtimable reſource. It ſerved to cloath and arm the legion of the North, the huſſars of the Republic, and ſeveral other French and Belgic corps. General Dumourier, who never had leiſure even to examine the accounts of the expenditure, and who was in Holland while it was received and expended, has been calumniated on this ground alſo. He was charged in the Jacobin Society, and afterward in the Convention, with having appropriated this ſum to his own uſe. But he whoſe mind is occupied with great and intereſting concerns, is not liable to be greatly tempted by the love of wealth.

General Dumourier, before he entered Holland, publiſhed a manifeſto, with which the Houſe of Orange has been juſtly offended. That declaration, it is true, in a war of ordinary circumſtances had been very unjuſt and unwiſe, although we have been accuſtomed to ſee hoſtilities between the moſt civilized nations preceded by mutual abuſe and accuſations. But it would be a wrong done to General Dumourier, to impute, to his moral character, actions that were impoſed upon him by his public ſituation. He was called upon to give encouragement to a very conſiderable party in the Dutch nation, who were diſpirited by former misfortunes; and to terrify the partizans of the Stadtholder. It became him, in the ſtation he filled, to ſeparate the people of Holland from the cauſe of the Stadtholder, ſince the Dutch nation, had it been left to her to determine, would have avoided the war, dreading it as altogether contrary to her intereſts. Dumou-

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rier's declaration reſulted from theſe circumſtances; and, beſide, it was neceſſary to ſcreen the general from the cenſure and reſentment of the National Convention, till he ſhould be able to penetrate with ſucceſs into Holland.

The preparations of which we have ſpoken were made, and the army aſſembled with every neceſſary, in ten days; and the advanced guard entered Holland, on the 17th of February. The moſt important difficulty was, to conceal the inconſiderable amount of this ſmall army. And, in that, the general ſucceeded ſo perfectly, that the troops themſelves were perſuaded that they were not leſs than 30,000 ſtrong; while the Dutch imagined they had to contend with an immenſe army; in which opinion, they were confirmed by the inhabitants of Antwerp, who extremely exaggerated the number of troops, which paſſed through that city.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Aſſembling the Army. Its amount. Firſt movements. General Dumourier's meeting with the Swediſh Ambaſſador. Taking of Breda, Klundert, and Gertruydenberg. Siege of Williamſtadt. Blockade of Bergen-op-Zoom, and Steenberg. Summons given to Heuſden. General Dumourier at the Moor Dyke. Preparations for paſſing to Dort, by the Moor-Dyke and Roowaert. Second project of paſſing by Gertruydenburg. The General receives Orders to join the Grand Army: Departs. Inſtructions given to General de Flers.

THE greater part of the army entered the Dutch territories on the 17th of February, and were ſtationed in cantonments, cloſely connected with each other, and extending from Bergen-op-Zoom, to within a league of Breda. The artillery was not yet ready; and the general, having various orders to give relative to his expedition, to the army of the Meuſe, and the affairs of Belgium, was detained at Antwerp till the 22d, when he departed with the artillery and the remainder of the troops.

The army was compoſed of twenty-one battalions, beſide the cavalry and light troops. Theſe twenty-one battalions, if compleat, would have amounted to near 14,000 men; but there were not above 10,000 under arms. Of theſe, there were only two battalions that were troops of the line, the 90th regiment formerly the regiment of Conti, which

had never ſeen any ſervice, and the National gendarmerie.

Three battalions of the volunteers had ſerved in the preceding campaign in Flanders. The reſt were new levies, the greater part of whom were boys of thirteen and ſixteen years of age. There were but eight battalions that had cannon. The cavalry amounted to a 1000 men, conſiſting of a 100 excellent troopers of the 20th regiment; 500 of the 6th regiment; the 8th regiment of huſſars, amounting to nearly 300 men, who were new levies, and were ill armed and ill mounted; a hundred Belgic huſſars, that were very good ſoldiers; eighty Dutch dragoons; and 300 horſe of the legion of the North, commanded by Colonel Weſtermann. Theſe laſt were new levies, and altogether undiſciplined. The light troops were, three Dutch battalions making about 1500 men, and who conducted themſelves with great bravery during the expedition; a corps of 1000 Belgians, raiſed at Bruges and Ghent, of which 200 were light horſe diſmounted; and the infantry of the legion of the North, to the number of 1200, who were by no means good ſoldiers, and were very much given to marauding. This army, which amounted to 18,000 men, muſtered no more than 13,700 men fit for ſervice. The artillery conſiſted of four 12 pounders, eight 8 pounders, four mortars of 10 inches, twenty hand-grenades, and four howitzers.

General Dumourier divided this little army into four diviſions. The advanced guard, commanded by General Berneron, was compoſed of two battalions

lions of National guards, two battalions of Dutch refugees, the Belgic corps, a party of the legion of the North, the fifty dragoons of the 6th regiment, the eighty Dutch dragoons, and the cavalry of the legion of the North. The right diviſion conſiſted of nine battalions of National guards, and the two battalions of Gendarmerie, (which could not be reckoned as making more than one battalion), with the half of the French huſſars, and was commanded by General d'Arçon, aſſiſted by Colonel Weſtermann. The left diviſion, commanded by Colonel Le Clerc, colonel of the regiment of Bouillon, was compoſed of nine battalions, (one of which conſiſted of troops of the line,) and the remainder of the 8th regiment of huſſars.

It is to be obſerved that this regiment of huſſars remained behind for want of horſes and arms, and afterward joined the army at Breda, in a ſtate almoſt unfit for ſervice; and the general was obliged to break the colonel named Dumont, who had been a taylor of Liſle, (a drunken, ignorant, and diſhoneſt man, but a vehement Jacobin) and to give the regiment to lieutenant-colonel Morgan, one of the general's aids-du-camp.

The rear-guard of the army was compoſed of a battalion of National guards; a Dutch battalion; two hundred Belgians; a hundred troopers of the 20th regiment; and a hundred of the Belgic huſſars; and was commanded by Colonel Tilly, an aid-du-camp of the general. A part of the artillery was attached to each of theſe diviſions.

With this ſmall army, the general undertook the conqueſt of Holland. But he had a powerful party in the country, who expected him with impatience, and were ready to declare themſelves on his penetrating into the country. He had neither time, on account of the neceſſary rapidity of his movements, nor means, for want of good officers in the different corps, to form and diſcipline theſe troops. But they were ardent, courageous, and impatient for action; and the enterprize they were undertaking had a boldneſs in it, that extremely well ſuited the genius of the nation. The general informed this little army of the rigour of the climate into which they were going; the number of ſtrong places, ſurrounded by inundations, to be taken; and the canals and arms of the ſea to be croſſed. But while he told them of theſe obſtacles, he declared to them that, being once arrived in Holland, they would be joined by numerous friends, and would find proviſions, money, and every thing they wanted, in abundance.

The French ſoldier poſſeſſes great ſenſibility and underſtanding; and is not to be conducted with ſucceſs by the ordinary means of military men. If his general have the good ſenſe to unfold to him the obſtacles of an enterprize, he thinks no longer of any thing but conquering them, and actually makes the enterprize an affair of pleaſure. But if the danger be concealed from him, he is confounded in diſcovering it; and if he be once diſpirited, or rather diſguſted with being led blindly to a deſperate taſk, he gives way to miſtruſt, and it becomes impoſſible

impoſſible to rally him; or afterward to controul him *.

Dumourier had cauſed General Berneron to march forward, on the 16th, with the advanced guard; promiſing that he ſhould be ſupported ſhortly by the reſt of the army. In written inſtructions which he delivered to General Berneron, he ordered him inſtantly to ſend a detachment, conſiſting of 800 infantry and 100 cavalry, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Daendels, a Dutch refugee, to the Moor Dyke, in order to ſeize upon all the veſſels he ſhould find there, or at Swaluve, or Roowaert: to poſt the remainder of his diviſion along the little river of Merck, from Oudenboſch and Sevenbergen to Breda: and to throw a bridge over the river Merck, in order to ſecure a communication with lieutenant-colonel Daendels, and to be able to ſupport him againſt any ſorties that might be made by the neighbouring garriſons.

In Bergen-up-Zoom, Gertruydenberg, and Breda, there were three regiments of dragoons, amounting to more than all the cavalry of General Dumourier, and a ſufficient number of infantry to act with them. It is certain that if theſe had been aſſembled together, and had been joined by the cavalry of Bois-le-Duc, and Heuſden, they would have been ſufficiently ſtrong to have compelled the advanced guard to retire, and thereby to have ruined the expedition. But Dumourier knew that there was not any one of of the Dutch generals charged with the defence of

* This is a divine picture of a ſoldier.

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the country, or who had authority to draw all the cavalry together; and he was certain that the officers who commanded in the different towns, having no plan of general defence, would attend only to the danger which threatened them reſpectively, and would not hazard any part of their garriſons, againſt an army, which each of them believed to be very ſtrong, and which appeared by the extent of its cantonments to menace ſeveral cities at once. Beſide, that the commanding officers of the garriſons were ſufficiently embarraſſed in preparing means for their defence; not having expected ſo ſudden an attack, and in this early part of the ſeaſon.

On the 22d, the general arrived at his firſt poſt; and was aſtoniſhed and afflicted to find that his orders had not been executed. No part of the advanced guard had yet paſſed the Merck; by which neglect, time was given to the Dutch to withdraw all their veſſels from the Moor Dyke to the ſide of Dort, and place them under the protection of three guardſhips, which were on that ſtation. This firſt error rendered the general's paſſage to Dort extremely difficult and almoſt impracticable, unleſs he could obtain other boats in the place of theſe he had expected to ſeize.

He inſtantly commanded Berneron and Daendels to puſh forward; and General d'Arçon to inveſt Breda with the right diviſion; and colonel le Clerc cloſely to blockade Bergen-op-Zoom, and Steenberg, with the left. The officers who commanded in thoſe two laſt places abandoned all their outpoſts. Colonel le Clerc made himſelf maſter of the

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ſmall fort of Blaw-ſluys, at a little diſtance from Steenberg, which place he ſummoned to ſurrender. The garriſon of Bergen-op-Zoom, made two or three inconſiderable ſallies; which produced no other effect than the deſertion of ſome of their men, who entered into the Dutch legion.

General Dumourier proceeded, with his rear guard, between the two diviſions of his army, to Sevenbergen; ſending his advanced guard forward to Klundert and Williamſtadt, with orders to beſiege thoſe two places. And he commanded Lieutenant-Colonel Daendels to poſt himſelf at Nordſchantz, in order to cut off the communication between Williamſtadt and Klundert. This officer ſeized three veſſels at Nordſchantz.

The general appointed Meſſrs. Koch and De Niſs to be colonels. The former of them, who was an eloquent ſpeaker, and a man of enterpriſing character, was ordered to aſſiſt Daendels; and the latter, a man of information and temperate courage, accompanied the general.

Dumourier did not conceal from himſelf the difficulty of paſſing to Dort, by the Moor Dyke. The following was the plan firſt projected for that purpoſe. Koch and Daendels, according to the inſtructions given to Berneron, were to proceed by the 17th to the Moor Dyke with 900 men, ſupported by the whole of the advanced guard, poſted on the Merck. They were to collect all the veſſels they could find on that ſide; and, on the 21ſt or 22d at the furtheſt, embarking all the men they could crowd into theſe veſſels, were to paſs to Dort, which they

they had reaſon to hope would join them; and, aided by the inhabitants, were to diſarm the garriſon, conſiſting of 250 men, unleſs they ſhould be willing to incorporate themſelves with the army. There were more than a hundred veſſels lying at Dort. Theſe they were to conduct to the Moor Dyke; and, arming three or four of the largeſt with cannon, were to ſend them forward to drive off the three ſmall guard ſhips. Indeed it was propoſed to make themſelves maſters of theſe veſſels by boarding them, they being both ill-armed and ill-manned.

The plan thus far accompliſhed, the main body of the army was to proceed to Sevenbergen, Oudenboſch, Moor Dyke and Swaluve; and, from thence, to paſs to Dort, in one or two diviſions: Their embarkation being protected, by the rear guard, who were to deſtroy the bridge that ſhould be thrown over the Merck, and to prevent the garriſons, that might attempt to haraſs the army, from paſſing the river. The army being once arrived at Dort there was no longer any obſtacle to be feared.

On the evening in which General Dumourier quitted Antwerp, he met, at a little village on his route, the Baron de Stael, who formerly had been Ambaſſador from Sweden to France, and was now going to Paris. The Baron ſupped with Dumourier, and informed him that every part of Germany and Holland through which he had paſſed was friendly to the General's enterpriſe; and that at Utrecht he was impatiently expected. He alſo confirmed the intelligence, which the General had already received,

ceived, that the party of the Stadtholder were in the greateſt conſternation. Without endeavouring to diſcover the object of the Baron's journey, the General counſelled him to wait the iſſue of the preſent expedition before he ſhould explain himſelf confidentially to the French Miniſtry, that he might not too haſtily pledge his court to any certain line of conduct, or expoſe his meaſures to be afterward diſowned; and he adviſed him by all means to be ſilent, at Paris, on every ſubject but ſuch as he was willing ſhould be known to the whole world. This Miniſter aſſured the General that he was going to Paris on his private concerns. Dumourier before his departure from Antwerp, had given the ſame counſel to a perſonage from Poland, of very high rank and conſequence; who, being on his route, had paid a viſit to the General at his quarters. Indeed, the General's maxim uniformly was to take every opportunity of preventing foreign courts from pledging themſelves to a miniſtry, the ſlave of an aſſembly of 700 men without prudence, experience or honor.

Dumourier's original plan was totally deranged by the negligence of the officers, to whom he had entruſted the advanced guard, and the execution of his firſt operations. But he did not abandon his hopes of ſucceſs. He concerted new means. In the canals between Oudenboſch and Sevenbergen, he found 23 veſſels from 20 to 70 tons. He ordered one of his Commiſſaries, named Bourſier, an indefatigable and intelligent man, to make them fit to carry 1200 men; and to mount four of them with

 cannon,

cannon, for the advanced guard of this little ſquadron. He impreſſed all the carpenters and ſailors of the ſmall ports that are to be found in that part, and aſſigned them very conſiderable pay, on the funds already raiſed by the Dutch Committee, on the credit of the property of the Prince of Orange and his known partizans.

From the moment that Dumourier entered Holland the army no longer coſt the French treaſury any thing more than the daily pay. The inhabitants, of their own accord, furniſhed proviſions and forage, as well as money to forward the expedition. Never was army received with ſuch cordiality; nor ever did ſoldiers leſs merit ſuch reception; the Gendarmerie and light troops indulging themſelves in rapine and every ſpecies of oppreſſion. But, from the diſgrace of this conduct, the troops of the line and national guards are to be wholly exempted; ſince, on all occaſions, theſe conducted themſelves with urbanity and juſtice.

As it demanded time to prepare the veſſels, the general made another important change in his firſt plan. According to that, he meant to deceive and evade the ſtrong places; and, ſtealing as it were between them, to embark directly at the Moor Dyke. After that he would have had time to harraſs thoſe places; and, relying on the weakneſs of the garriſons, and inexperience of the commanding officers, he calculated on making himſelf maſter of at leaſt one of them, which event would give great relief to his arms and furniſh him with artillery and ammunition, in both of which he was extremely ill provided.

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He reſolved to undertake no one ſiege in form.—To preſs a regular ſiege forward with vigour, he muſt have aſſembled his little army in one point, and thereby have given the enemy an opportunity of knowing its weakneſs; and, being no longer maſter of the country, it would have been eaſy for the garriſons that were not attacked to recover from their ſurpriſe, aſſemble troops to cut off his communication with Antwerp, drive away his workmen, and deſtroy his little fleet, without which he had nothing to hope. Wherefore, while Colonel Le Clerc continued to blockade Bergen-op-zoom and Steenberg, he ordered General d'Arçon to attack Breda, and his advanced guard at the ſame time to fall upon Klundert.

Breda is a town celebrated for its ſtrength. It was furniſhed with two hundred pieces of cannon, was well paliſadoed, and protected by an inundation. Twelve hundred infantry, and a regiment of dragoons, garriſoned the place; but the Governor, the Count de Byland, was a courtier, and had ſeen no ſervice. The troops bought their bread at the bakers, their meat at the butchers, without having any magazines. The Dutch towns are moſt of them well protected by inundations, and abound with ſtrong exterior works; but are greatly deficient in caſemates, and the inhabitants are greatly diſaffected to the government.

General d'Arçon, without opening any trenches, erected two batteries of four mortars and four howitzers, extremely near the town, on the ſide of the village of Hage. The enemy anſwered by a very

briſk fire, during three days; on the fourth, General d'Arçon had no more than ſixty bombs left, and muſt have been under the neceſſity of raiſing the ſiege after throwing them into the place. At this moment, Colonel Philip de Vaux, an Aid-de-Camp of General Dumourier, entered the place to ſummon it for the ſecond time, and repreſented to the Count de Byland, that General Dumourier was on the point of arriving with his whole army, and that then no quarters would be given to the garriſon, which ſo alarmed the Governor that he capitulated with the conſent of his officers. The honors of war and all the Governor's demands were granted him. The French entered the place; which, excepting ſome few houſes, was not at all damaged. They found two hundred and fifty *bouches à feu**, near three hundred thouſand weight of powder, and five thouſand fuſees, of which they were in great want. This ſiege did not coſt more than twenty men on each ſide. The French carried their temerity ſo far as to dance the *Carmagnole* on the glacis, on the ſide which was not inundated. Thirty dragoons of the regiment of Byland ſallied out upon theſe men, killed ſome, and returned with ſix priſoners, having loſt two or three men and ſome of their horſes.

The beſieging army amounted to no more than five thouſand men; and, of theſe, twelve hundred were detached to ſeize upon ſeveral forts on the ſluices, on the ſide of Hueſden.

* The tranſlator does not know what thoſe are.

Klundert was taken two days after the ſurrender of Breda. The works of this ſmall fort were extremely regular, and the place was protected by inundations that entirely ſurrounded it. It was defended with great vigour, but with little judgment, by a lieutenant colonel in the Dutch ſervice, who was a Weſtphalian. He had no more than a hundred and fifty men in the place. General Berneron had erected a battery of four cannon and a number of ſmall mortars cloſe behind the dyke, at a hundred and fifty toiſes from the place; ſo that the houſes of that ſmall city were almoſt entirely deſtroyed. The commanding officer, after keeping up an almoſt inceſſant fire during ſeveral days with little effect, and having no longer any ſhelter for his troops, reſolved to ſpike his cannon, and to endeavour to retreat with the remainder of his garriſon to Williamſtadt. He was intercepted by a detachment of the Dutch refugees, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hartmann, whom he ſhot dead, receiving at the ſame time a ball which killed him on the ſpot, and his men were made priſoners. The French carried the body of this officer to Klundert, after having taken the keys of the town, which were found in his pocket.

In this place were found fifty-three pieces of cannon, ſome mortars, a great quantity of bombs and ſhot, and about eighty thouſand weight of powder.

General Dumourier loſt no time in ſending Berneron to beſiege Williamſtadt. And it was with the ammunition and artillery of Klundert that the new ſiege was undertaken.

Dumourier

Dumourier alſo ordered General d'Arçon to commence the ſiege of Gertruydenberg. This ſmall town was ill defended on the ſide of Ramſdoneck, having in that quarter only a ſlight palliſadoe along the river, and being commanded by neighbouring heights. But on the left ſide of the Donge, it was protected by an extenſive inundation, and by two lines of extremely ſtrong outworks, which could not have been carried in three weeks, had they been ably and vigorouſly defended. The garriſon was compoſed of the regiment of Hirtzel, amounting to between eight or nine hundred men, and of a fine regiment of dragoons belonging to the Stadtholder's guard. The governor, named Bedault, a major general in the ſervice, was an old man of eighty. General d'Arçon began the attack with cannon and mortars that he brought from Breda. All the outworks were carried, or abandoned by the enemy, on the ſecond day. D'Arçon erected batteries on ſome of them; and after a few ſhot were exchanged, Colonel de Vaux entered the place, the capitulation was ſettled, the honors of war were granted, and General Dumourier, who had arrived mean while, dined with the old General Bedault, who acknowledged to him that he had ſurrendered becauſe he had been diſappointed in his expectations of receiving veſſels from Dort or Gorcum, to enable him to evacuate the place. A few bombs had fallen on the city and one on the general's houſe.

During dinner, a meſſenger came to inform the governor that the terms of the capitulation had been violated by a lieutenant-colonel of the National guards, who, being drunk, inſolently inſiſted on

entering the city in ſpite of the centinels, and had attempted to diſcharge a piſtol at the lieutenant-colonel of the regiment of Hirtzel. General Dumourier ordered the drunkard to be brought into the room, tore the epaulet from his ſhoulder, and reduced him to the ranks, to the great aſtoniſhment of the officers of the garriſon, who interceded for his pardon.

General Dumourier converſed much with this garriſon, which conſiſted of exceeding fine troops. He has frequently ſince thought of an expreſſion of the lieutenant colonel of the regiment of Hirtzel, who, walking with him on the ramparts, ſaid, *Hodie mihi, cras tibi.* The honeſt Swiſs ſpoke prophetically.

This new conqueſt gave us a hundred and fifty *bouches à feu*, two hundred thouſand weight of powder, a quantity of bombs and ball, twenty-five hundred new fuſees, and what was moſt eſſential an excellent port, and more than thirty veſſels of various ſizes. We had alſo taken five veſſels at Breda.

This was in the beginning of March. While theſe ſieges were carrying forward, the general paſſed the greater part of the time at the Moor Dyke, whence, it being in the centre of his operations, he directed the ſieges on his right and left, and ſuperintended the fitting out of his ſquadron. His commiſſary Bourſier having, with incredible exertions, found means to arm twenty-three veſſels, and to victual them for twelve hundred men, the general ſent them down the canal of Sevenbergen to Roowaert, which is a ſmall creek, lying a quarter of a league weſt of the Moor Dyke.

On

On the day the general eſtabliſhed his quarters in this village with an hundred Dutch chaſſeurs and fifty dragoons, he was cannonaded the whole day, by the three guard ſhips. Having poſted his chaſſeurs along the Dyke, by which two men were killed on board the veſſels, he compelled them to abandon their ſituation. A few days after, he ordered twelve twenty-four pounders from Breda, together with ammunition, and conſtructed ſeveral batteries, one of which was at Roowaert, to protect the ſailing of his ſquadron, and the reſt at the Moor Dyke to cover his embarkment. He was perſuaded that his cannon would carry more than half way over the canal; and indeed the enemy's armed ſhips did not again approach the ſide occupied by the French.

He cauſed huts covered with ſtraw to be raiſed along the ſands from Roowaert to Swaluve. There the ſoldiers amuſed themſelves and were extremely happy, but impatient to croſs to Dort. Dumourier jeſtingly told them that they reſembled beavers; and he named this aquatic cantonment, the camp of Beavers. Proviſions were in plenty; the water was not bad; and brandy was diſtributed to the troops every morning. The general gave his troops an example of firmneſs; and was lodged, and lived like the reſt.

In this expedition, the general chalked himſelf out a ſyſtem for carrying on war in countries overflowed by water. It would not be impoſſible, by means of dykes, to march over any part of Holland, to conduct artillery, and eſtabliſh batteries at pleaſure: excepting in the caſe of being oppoſed by gun-

boats,

boats, when it would be neceſſary to have an adequate force of the ſame nature.

General Dumourier had, among his battalions of volunteers, ſeveral men from Gaſcony, Brittany, Normandy, and Dunkirk. Of theſe men he formed a body from four to five hundred ſailors, giving them twenty ſols per day in addition to their pay. The general's ſquadron at Roowaert was deſigned to carry his advanced guard, and he appointed an Engliſh naval officer, and a lieutenant of the Dutch navy, to command it; with the aſſiſtance of ſome pilots belonging to the country. But the neceſſary delays had given time to the Dutch to augment conſiderably their ſquadron in the *Biſbos*, which is the ſmall ſea of the Moor Dyke. That ſquadron conſiſted already of twelve armed ſhips, one of which carried twenty guns; and theſe veſſels were diſpoſed of with great judgment for oppoſing the general's paſſage, and acting in concert. But Dumourier calculated, in caſe the wind ſhould be ſettled, that not more than half the ſquadron could engage him, as thoſe which ſhould be to leeward of him would not, in that caſe, be able to reach him.

The Dutch had alſo erected batteries at Stry, and all along the coaſt of the iſland of Dort; which it was ſaid was reinforced by 1200 of the Engliſh guards, who had landed ſince the declaration of war at Helvoet-Sluys. The general however was convinced that the enemy had no certain intelligence of his plan, becauſe the Prince of Orange was making his greateſt preparations for defence at Gorcum, and had aſſembled an army there to oppoſe his march:

this army was as yet inconſiderable; the re-inforcements of the Engliſh and emigrants augmenting it to no more than 4000 men.

Dumourier, ſtill to deceive the enemy reſpecting his real deſign, continued the blockade of Bergen-op-Zoom and Steenberg. General de Flers was returned from Paris, and had obtained the re-inforcement that he demanded, which arrived with great diſpatch. Dumourier ordered him to occupy the cantonments of colonel Le Clerc at Roſendael, and round Bergen-op-Zoom with 6000 men, which orders were rapidly executed. He ordered the left diviſion to approach Oudenboſch, and Sevenbergen. He ſent the national gendarmerie, with ſome cavalry, from his right, to ſhew themſelves on the ſide of Heuſden. A lieutenant-colonel of the gendarmerie ſummoned that place; and, ridiculouſly enough, addreſſed the governor by the phraſe of citizen governor, inſtead of the uſual appellation.

General Berneron continued the ſiege of Williamſtadt; but with very ill ſucceſs. He had commenced his attack at too great a diſtance; and conſumed a great quantity of ammunition, without making any progreſs. There was but one front of this town which was open to attack, and that was extremely narrow: and the Dutch had thrown re-inforcements into the town by ſea. Dumourier ſent to the aſſiſtance of General Berneron, Dubois de Crancé, (an engineer of great merit, and very different in character from his unworthy brother, the member of the national convention, and another engineer named Mareſcot. Theſe two valuable officers reſolved

to draw nearer the town; and, while they were erecting a battery at the diſtance of 200 toiſes from the place, they were abandoned by their ſoldiers, and were ſlain in a ſortie, that the enemy made on the workmen. General Berneron, notwithſtanding, continued the ſiege obſtinately, which was not raiſed till after the departure of General Dumourier for the grand army.

The general having found a conſiderable quantity of ſhipping at Gertruydenberg, he reſolved to uſe them in facilitating his paſſage to Dort. He had a ſufficient number of veſſels at Roowaert for his advanced guard. Maſter of Breda, Klundert, and Gertruydenberg, and leaving the corps under General De Flers to continue the blockade of Steenberg and Bergen-op-Zoom, he had ſecured his rear from being harraſſed. He therefore cauſed his rear guard to advance to Swaluve, at which place there were veſſels for its embarkation; and he reſolved to embark his right diviſion in the veſſels of Gertruydenberg.

The paſſage from Gertruydenberg to the iſland of Dort is ſomewhat longer than that from the Moor Dyke. To the right, and even in front of this port, the *Biſbos* is filled with ſand banks, and numerous ſmall iſlands detached from the main land of Gorcum; moſt of which are covered with trees and underwood. The armed ſhips of the enemy drew too much water to approach theſe iſlands. There were, however, three barks each carrying four cannon, and thirty men, ſtationed at different points to guard the paſſage. Beyond theſe ſmall iſlands, many of

which are covered by the tide at high water, was ſituated an iſland much more elevated above the water than the reſt, on which, was a ſmall farm belonging to an inhabitant of Gertruydenberg. This iſland, which the enemy's largeſt veſſels could not approach by ſeven or eight hundred toiſes, was ſeparated from the iſland of Dort only by a ſpace of ſix hundred toiſes, which was guarded by a battery mounting ſix cannon, ſtanding on a low and muddy ſoil on the iſland of Dort, and by a frigate of fourteen guns, ſtationed under the battery.

The general reſolved to land two battalions, with ſix four and twenty pounders in this iſland; and to erect a battery to drive off the frigate, whoſe guns appeared to be ſmall. Having done this, he deſigned to embark with his right diviſion in the ſmaller veſſels belonging to Gertruydenberg and to paſs over in the ſame route.

As he might be compelled to engage one of the veſſels of four guns, in his paſſage to the iſland, he deſigned to fill ſeveral large ſhallops with choſen men to board that veſſel, and ordered two veſſels each carrying two cannon to be ready to precede him, giving the command of one to an Engliſh naval officer named White, and of the other to Lieutenant Colonel La Rue, an aid-de-camp of the general, who had been in the ſea ſervice. Every preparation was made with ſuch celerity that it was the general's deſign to have attempted the paſſage on the night of the 8th or 10th. But events of a very different nature were arriving, and the rapidity of his firſt ſucceſſes were followed by a ſtill more rapid

pid ſucceſſion of evils which decided the fate of the war.

Dumourier in the midſt of his plans, and notwithſtanding his ſucceſſes, had for ſome days been a prey to the greateſt uneaſineſs. The ſiege of Maeſtricht had been commenced on the 20th of February; but, although General Miranda had ſet fire to ſeveral quarters of the city, it was defended with extreme obſtinacy, by reinforcements of the emigrants, who aſſembled there in great numbers, headed by M. d'Autichamp, a lieutenant-general in the army of the Prince de Condé, and an excellent officer; to whom it is ſaid the Dutch owe the ſafety of the city of Maeſtricht.

General Champmorin had, without any oppoſition, made himſelf maſter of the fort of Stevenſwaert, on the Meuſe; and alſo of fort St. Michael, which commands the entrance, the left ſide of that river, of the bridge of Venloo. But he had not been able to take poſſeſſion of Venloo, the Pruſſians having already entered it.

General Valence, although he poſſeſſed military talents, had not acquired ſufficient authority over the troops effectually to compenſate for the abſence of Dumourier. He remained at Liege; and had neither raiſed the winter quarters of the troops, nor drawn them cloſer together. And great miſunderſtandings exiſted among the generals.

General Stengel occupied the quarters round Aix-la-Chapelle. He was an officer well verſed in the diſcipline and duties of light troops, and was excellently calculated to command an advanced guard.

General Dampierre commanded in Aix-la-Chapelle,

pelle, where he was entirely taken up with his pleaſures, and the means of gratifying his rapacity. He was a man of a fierce, and ambitious ſpirit; raſh in the extreme, but was without talent, and was even timid at times through his exceſſive ignorance. He hated his ſuperiors; and machinated with the Jacobins of Paris, for the fabrication of calumnies, by which he aimed at the command of the armies.

The Prince of Cobourg, who had arrived at Cologne, was acquainted with the miſunderſtandings of the generals, and the injudicious, and feeble diſpoſition of the troops. Aſſembling his army he marched to Aldenhoven, where he penetrated into the French quarters without obſtacle. The French inſtantly abandoned all their poſts, without making the leaſt ſtand againſt the enemy; and fell back upon Liege in the greateſt confuſion. General le Veneur, who commanded the attack of Maeſtricht on the ſide of Wyck, had the good fortune to have ſufficient time to paſs the Meuſe with his cannon. The Imperialiſts entered Maeſtricht. Miranda, notwithſtanding, ought to have continued the bombardment from the left ſide of the river; and, collecting his army between Tongres and Maeſtricht, which was a tolerable poſition, he might then have prevented the further progreſs of the Prince of Cobourg.

Theſe were the orders given to Miranda by General Dumourier, on his receiving news of the diſaſter. This was alſo the advice of General Valence. That General a few days afterward ſaved a column conſiſting of twenty-ſeven battalions on their

retreat

retreat from Liege, by making a vigorous charge on the enemy, at the head of his cavalry, on the plains of Tongres; and Lieutenant-General Lanoue diſplayed the greateſt bravery, in his retreat from Aix-la-Chapelle.

But Miranda was diſconcerted, and loſt all preſence of mind. On his own authority, he ordered the troops to abandon the Meuſe. The Imperialiſts followed up their victory, paſſed the Meuſe, entered Liege, and took poſſeſſion of the French magazines, which were conſiderable, eſpecially in the article of clothing. So great was the conſternation in the French army, that, excepting the heavy artillery which was carried off to Louvain, and from thence to Tournay, every thing was abandoned, including even the baggage of the troops.

The two generals, Miranda and Valence, aſſembled their forces in the camp of Louvain. Champmorin, who could no longer maintain his poſition on the left ſide of the Meuſe, evacuated Stevenſwaert, and Fort St. Michael, (in which places he ought to have left garriſons) and retreated to Dieſt. General la Marlière, who was at Ruremonde, fell back to the ſame place. This retreat left the Pruſſians maſters of the Lower Meuſe. They had it in their power inſtantly to have croſſed the country of Campine; and, by the route of Antwerp or Bois-le-Duc, might have fallen on the rear of the French army in Holland. Prince Frederick of Brunſwick loſt this important opportunity; and General Dumourier, availing himſelf of the neglect, afterward placed his army in ſecurity.

The

The troops under Miranda and Valence, were utterly diſcouraged. They openly blamed and menaced their general officers, more eſpecially Miranda, who was in conſiderable danger of his life. At length however General Valence, aided by the prudence of General Thouvenot, reſtored ſome degree of order in the army. But the deſertion of the troops was enormous. More than 10,000 men abſolutely returned to France. The army loudly demanded the preſence of General Dumourier. The commiſſioners of the Convention diſpatched courier after courier, urging his departure for Louvain. The general conſtantly anſwered them, that they might maintain the army in its preſent poſition ; and that ſtill there was nothing to be feared if they gave him time to accompliſh his preſent object. This was true. General Valence, and General Thouvenot, were of the ſame opinion. But now Miranda now betrayed a terror altogether proportioned to the raſhneſs which had hitherto governed him, which juſtified the diſpatches of General Valence, who from the firſt predicted this check, while Miranda's letters uniformly aſſerted, that the army of the Imperialiſts was not to be feared. And certainly his opinion would have been juſt, if the French had taken a judicious poſition, with an equal force, which they might and ought to have done. It was to be preſumed that the Prince of Cobourg would not have choſen to hazard a battle ; or, if he had, the French had no reaſon to fear the iſſue.

The commiſſioners of the Convention hurried precipitately to Paris. They made a report ſo alarming,

alarming, and painted the conſternation of the ſoldiers in ſuch ſtrong colours, that it was univerſally acknowledged, that General Dumourier could alone ſtop the progreſs of the diſaſter, and ſave the army. He was commanded, in the moſt abſolute terms, to abandon the expedition of Holland, and inſtantly to put himſelf at the head of the grand army. He received the order on the evening of the 8th of March, and departed on the 9th, in a ſtate bordering on deſpair.

Dumourier gave the command of his army to General de Flers. He knew the capacity of this general to be inadequate to the taſk; but he had not another general officer he could put in his place. General d'Arcon was extremely afflicted with the gout, and could not keep the field, and had even refuſed the rank of lieutenant-general, which Dumourier would have obtained for him, as a reward for the taking of Breda. He retired to Antwerp. Lieutenant General Maraſſé, an old ſoldier, who commanded at Antwerp, could not, on account of his great age, be entruſted in an active ſituation, although he was a man of courage and experience. And it was Dumourier's deſign to ſend General Miranda into Holland, on his arrival at the grand army.

Dumourier left Colonel Thouvenot, who was the ſoul of his little army, with General de Flers. He gave the colonel a copy of the inſtructions he had delivered to General de Flers, whom he recommended to undertake no enterprize without the concurrence of Colonel Thouvenot. He ordered him inſtantly to attempt the paſſage of Gertruydenberg; and, in caſe of ſucceſs, to forward diſpatches to Dumourier,

and to remain at Dort till he ſhould receive his further inſtructions.

But the departure of General Dumourier, utterly diſpirited this army. Thoſe who had been moſt forward, impatient, and daring, on every occaſion, now conſidered the undertaking to be impracticable. In truth, it became ſuch ſhortly afterward. The Dutch ſquadron being reinforced, and the Pruſſians being on their march by Bois-le-duc, de Flers, in purſuit of his inſtructions in the caſe of the paſſage to Dort not taking place, threw himſelf into Breda, with ſix battalions and two hundred horſe. Colonel Tilly into Gertruydenberg, with three battalions, and fifty horſe. The remainder of the army returned ſafely to Antwerp, owing to the good conduct of Colonel de Vaux, and Colonel Thouvenot. Thoſe officers withdrew from the batteries of the Moor Dyke, with the greateſt prudence, and conſtancy; and although the army was thrown into diſorder, they effected the retreat without loſs. The fortifications of Klundert were blown up by Thouvenot, who had not time to put that ſmall fort in a ſtate of defence.

And thus terminated Dumourier's enterprize againſt Holland. An enterprize, projected and begun in ten days, which did not burthen France with the additional charge of one ſol, and which probably had ſucceeded, but for the unfortunate retreat of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Two ſtrong places were acquired in this expedition, by which the progreſs of the enemy might have been arreſted; and which might have ſerved as ma-

gazines, and a place of arms, if the deſign of entering Holland had been reſumed. In a word, France reaped no diſgrace in this quarter. But now Dumourier's proſpects were once more changed; and he was again compelled to form new plans, as well reſpecting the interior ſituation of France, as with reſpect to her enemies.

CHAP. IV.

The General arrives at Antwerp. Sends the Agents of the Executive Power from that Town. Arrives at Bruſſels. Addreſſes the Repreſentatives of the People. Writes to the Convention. Arreſts Chepy, and Eſtienne. Several Proclamations. Arrives on the 13th of March at Louvain. The Commiſſioners of the Convention come to that City to meet the General.

NOTWITHSTANDING the importance of the concerns which had occupied General Dumourier's mind, ſince his departure from Paris, he had not overlooked, nor failed to lament as much as the Belgians themſelves, the deteſtable tyranny exerciſed over them by the National Convention, and by the agents of the Executive Power. The inſolence of theſe latter, the Satellites of avarice and oppreſſion, was not exceeded even by their atrocious villainies.—Their conduct was a tiſſue of ridiculous circumſtances. Moſt of them aſſumed the military honors,

and never walked the ſtreets without a guard. They ſet all rules at defiance; and, finding that they were not ſufficiently numerous to ſpread their extortions through the whole extent of thoſe rich provinces, they augmented their means by iſſuing commiſſions to other perſons like themſelves.

In paſſing through Bruges the General was invited to a ball. One of theſe gentlemen, who was dancing, accoſted the General on his entering the room; and announcing himſelf as a Commiſſioner of the Executive Power, he acquainted the General that he was on his road to Oſtend and Nieuport, to put thoſe places in a proper ſtate of defence. The General ſternly commanded him to confine himſelf to the functions of his office; to execute thoſe with modeſty; and, thenceforward, to forbear intruding himſelf into military concerns.

Another of theſe perſonages, named, as I think, Lieutaud, who was ſtationed at Ruremonde, as a taſk-maſter to General la Marliere, wrote a long letter to Dumourier, *Thouing* and *Theeing* him throughout, and commanding him to abandon every other enterprize, in order to march to the aſſiſtance of Ruremonde. The General ſent this letter to Le Brun, contenting himſelf with adding by way of poſtſcript, *This letter ought to be dated*, CHARENTON.

A third, named Cochelet, who reſided at Liege, having received notice of the declaration of war decreed on the firſt of February, ordered a detachment of troops to attend him, and, marching on the Dutch territory before Maeſtricht, proclaimed the war, tore

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up the poſts on which were the arms of the States General, and took poſſeſſion of the Seven United Provinces, in the name of the French Republic.

This impertinent parade ſerved as a warning to the Governor of Maeſtricht to withdraw his cavalry cantoned round the city, (together with a conſiderable quantity of forage) which General Miaczynſky was on the point of ſurpriſing. General Miranda naturally condemned this conduct, becauſe he was not yet prepared to act againſt Maeſtricht. Cochelet ſent the General a written order to take Maeſtricht before the 20th of February, on pain of being denounced as a traitor; and he ſent a copy of the letter to the National Convention, who applauded his Roman firmneſs. Cochelet, however, was recalled; becauſe, intoxicated with the honors of his proconſulſhip, he had treated contemptuouſly the authority of the deputies of the Convention.

When General Dumourier arrived at Antwerp on the ſecond of February, he found that city humiliated and terrified by the preſence of one of theſe ſubaltern tyrants, whoſe name he has forgotten, and whom he cauſed to be recalled. Every city in Belgium was governed by one or more of theſe execrable Proconſuls. They entered on their office by ſequeſtring the ſilver of the churches, the revenues of the clergy, and the eſtates of the nobility. They then pillaged, or ſold to their accomplices at an exceſſively inferior price, the furniture of the nobles and clergy. They ſuppreſſed the national impoſts to flatter the people, degraded the magiſtrates from their ſeats, erected clubs, and exerciſed an arbitrary authority,

authority, by the aid of the military, who blindly obeyed them.

Throughout the provinces of Belgium this wild tyranny was become inſupportable. Dumourier had made reiterated complaints of this tyranny to the Convention, as well as to the Commiſſioners of the Convention, Camus, Treilhard, Merlin and Goſſuin, whom he met at Ghent; but theſe latter either were not willing, or had not authority to redreſs the evil. He repreſented to them, that on the Prince of Cobourg's appearing in force on the frontier, a general inſurrection of the Belgians was to be expected, that our weakened garriſons would be maſſacred, and our crimes puniſhed by the hands of thoſe we had oppreſſed; and that this war was, in a manifold degree, more dangerous than the war with the Imperialiſts.

The route of the troops at Aix-la-Chapelle, their precipitate flight to Louvain, their confuſion, terror, and deſertion, greatly increaſed the danger, which Dumourier had foreſeen, of a general inſurrection in Belgium.

The danger was aggravated by the conduct of the Commiſſioners of the Convention. They called on the provinces to expreſs their reſolution of being united to France. The people were aſſembled in the churches without any order or decency. A French Commiſſioner, ſupported by the commanding officer of the place, by ſoldiers, and by French and Belgic Clubiſts, read the act of union, which ſeldom was underſtood by any perſon preſent, any more than the harangue made on the occaſion; the

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act was notwithſtanding ſigned by the audience, generally with trembling hands; reports of the proceedings were printed, and ſent to the Convention, who forthwith created another department.

Theſe fraternal proceedings were often effected by violence. At Bruſſels and at Mons, muſkets and ſabres were employed in the aſſembly, and ſeveral perſons were wounded. Proteſts were formally made againſt the union. Partial inſurrections took place at Wawres, Hall, Braine, and Soignies. The moſt dangerous was at Grammont. Ten thouſand peaſants aſſembled in arms, and had poſſeſſed themſelves of ſeveral cannon. They impriſoned the Commiſſioners, and drove back detachments of the garriſon of Ghent. Theſe tumults increaſed hourly. The French army, ſcarcely in force to reſiſt the Imperialiſts, could not ſpare troops to put an end to theſe cruel conteſts, which were ſpreading over the whole of Belgium; and it had been eaſy for a few Flemiſh officers belonging to the Imperial army, with ſome choſen ſoldiers, to have inſinuated themſelves into the French quarters, by means of their knowledge of the language, and to have given a regular form to this inteſtine war.

Dumourier hated the injuſtice of the National Convention, and reſiſted every attempt to make him the inſtrument of its tyranny and the ſcourge of Belgium. A two-fold intereſt therefore directed his conduct at preſent. His objects were, to deliver this unhappy country, and to ſave his army. As to his ſucceſs in the former, he invokes the teſtimony of the Belgiums, from whom he received the moſt honourable

honourable marks of eſteem and gratitude, in travelling through that country, when he no longer poſſeſſed the influence of ſtation.

Arriving at Antwerp on the 11th, he found that city in the greateſt confuſion and alarm. A Commiſſioner of the Executive Power, named Chauſſart, who modeſtly ſurnamed himſelf Publicola, had recently removed the magiſtrates, and had iſſued orders to arreſt them, and the other principal citizens, to the number of ſixty-ſeven. General Maraſſé eluded the execution of this order, with which he was charged by *Publicola;* but the biſhop of Antwerp, and the other proſcribed perſons were either fled or had concealed themſelves. Dumourier ſent a written order to Chauſſart and his colleagues, to quit Antwerp, and to go to Bruſſels inſtantly, declaring, in caſe of diſobedience, that he would give orders to General Maraſſé to take them there by force. Chauſſart came to the General with much dignity, or inſolence, and complained of this order, ſaying, that it ſeemed to be dictated by a Vizir. The General anſwered with good humour, *I am certainly as much of a Vizir, as you are of Publicola.*

General Dumourier compelled Chauſſart to quit the town immediately. He reinſtated the magiſtrates, and reſtored the peace of that important city. He iſſued an ordinance, prohibiting the Jacobin club in any degree to interfere in public affairs. He commanded General Maraſſé to wall up the door of the hall where the club aſſembled, to impriſon every member that diſobeyed this ordinance, to print the order

order in both languages, and to poſt it up and publiſh it throughout the city.

Dumourier afterward departed for Bruſſels. Having received complaints, from that city, of the atrocious conduct of General Moreton, he had a few days previous to his departure removed him from the command; which he had conferred on Lieutenant-General Duval. Moreton at firſt refuſed to obey the general; but in conſequence of an order from the miniſter of war, he took upon him the command at Douay, where he had an opportunity of purſuing his former ſyſtem of conduct till his death.

General Duval was an extremely good officer, and it was the ill ſtate of his health alone which prevented his being with the army. He had ſerved the preceding year with great reputation and ſucceſs. His judgment was clear, he abounded in the qualities that beget eſteem, and was perfectly calculated to heal the wounds inflicted by Moreton's tyranny.

Duval gave the general a more particular account, than he had hitherto received, of the diſorder and conſternation that reigned among the troops aſſembled at Louvain, from which place Duval had recently arrived. Almoſt all the tents had been loſt in the retreat. There was not left a ſufficient number to encamp half the army; yet it was impoſſible to reſtore any degree of courage to the troops, or to make any movement with ſafety, without encamping them for a while. A great part of the field pieces belonging to the army, had been alſo loſt.

The general officers commanding the artillery, receiving no orders during the confuſion of the re-

treat, nor indeed demanding any, held a council of war among themſelves, in which it was reſolved to carry off the whole park of artillery, and conduct it into France. All the twenty-four pounders, the ſixteen pounders, the mortars, and pontoons, were already at Tournay, on their route to France; fortunately, however, the lighter artillery, and the howitzers, were ſtill at Anderlecht. Theſe latter the general ordered to join the army at Louvain; and thoſe at Tournay not to proceed on their route to France.

Bruſſels was filled with officers and ſoldiers of the army, who were on their return to France. The general ſent them back to the camp at Louvain; and diſpatched orders to Tournay and Mons, and the cities in the department of the north, to arreſt and ſend back to the army all the fugitives returning into France.

Dumourier ordered General Stengel, who had retired to Namur, with two ſquadrons of huſſars, to join the army. General Neuilly, who was in his winter quarters in the country of Stavelo, with the half of the advanced guard of the army of the Ardennes, at the time of the flight from Aix-la-Chapelle, had alſo retired to Namur, and the general ordered him to poſt his troops at Judoigne, to ſecure the communication between the grand army, and the corps commanded by Lieutenant-general d'Harville. To General d'Harville, he ſent repeated orders to encamp his troops, or, if he had not a ſufficient number of tents for the purpoſe, to make his cantonments as connected and compact as poſſible,

ble, in order to prevent the Prince of Hohenloe and General Beaulieu, from forcing the paſſage of the Meuſe, or turning the right of the army, and ſo falling upon Bruſſels and Mons. The garriſon of Bruſſels was by no means ſtrong, yet the general was obliged to ſelect ſome of its beſt battalions to reinforce the army.

Ten thouſand men haſtily raiſed in the department of the north were ſent to the army. This reinforcement was greatly boaſted of. The name of centurions had been given to theſe troops. They conſiſted of companies which were nominally a hundred men each, but were, in fact, much below that number, compoſed of old men and children, armed with pikes, cutlaſſes, fowling pieces, and piſtols. They had been promiſed twenty ſols per day, and were deſigned to garriſon the towns of Belgium, but not, as they themſelves ſaid, to defend them, or to fight *. This militia, the offspring of a plan of Goſſuin and Merlin, ſerved only to heighten the embarraſſment, confuſion, and want of diſcipline, which already prevailed, and the general was impatient till he had ſent them back to France.

But an object even more important to General Dumourier, than theſe military concerns, was to calm the minds of the Belgians, and to reſtore public confidence throughout the country, by putting a final period to the ſyſtem under which they had ſuffered. He was not ignorant that in this attempt he ſhould excite the Jacobins, and the Convention, to

* ——*de garder les places de la Belgique, mais non pas, diſaient ils, de les défendre, ni de faire la guerre.*

proceed to extremity with him. The time, however, for conciliatory meaſures, as well as for deliberation, was entirely paſſed: ſo great were the evils to be remedied, ſo enormous the wrongs that had been done to the Belgians, and ſo immediate was the danger of vengeance being taken by that people.

A few days before Dumourier arrived at Bruſſels, Chepy had urged general Duval to order ſeveral executions. He threatened to fire Bruſſels, or to put it to the ſword. He had arreſted ſeveral of the wealthieſt citizens, and had ſent them to be confined in the fortreſſes of the department of the north. General Dumourier now arreſted him, and ſent him, under a guard, to Paris.

The legion of *Sans-culottes*, raiſed by General Moreton, and compoſed of the loweſt of the populace, held the city in awe, and daily committed unheard of cruelties and extortions. A Frenchman, a man of abandoned character, named Eſtienne, commanded it, with the title of general. Dumourier threw him into priſon, and publiſhed an ordinance, breaking this corps, and forbidding all perſons to diſtinguiſh themſelves by the denomination of *Sans-culottes*.

He aſſembled the magiſtrates of the city. He beſought them, before all the people, not to attribute to the French nation, crimes committed only by individuals. He ſolemnly promiſed to puniſh the guilty, and to reſtore to their families, peaceable citizens, who had been torn from them, under the pretence of ſerving as hoſtages to France. The re-

preſentatives of the people, ſhed tears of gratitude, and cauſed accounts of theſe intereſting proceedings to be publiſhed.

General Dumourier iſſued a proclamation to authoriſe the citizens to deliver complaints to the magiſtrates, reſpecting vexations committed by the French, and empowering the magiſtrates to verify and give a legal form to theſe complaints. By another proclamation, he prohibited the clubs from interfering in public affairs, and by another, he commanded all the ſacred vaſes, to be reſtored to the churches, enjoining the magiſtrates and military officers to aid in reſtoring them.

Theſe proclamations were printed in both languages, and ſent into every part of Belgium. Their effect was immediate. The inhabitants of Grammont wrote to the general, that they laid down their arms. Peace was reſtored between the French and the Belgians. Theſe worthy people forgot the evils they had ſuffered, and again embraced the French as their brethren and defenders. Indeed it is but juſt to ſay, the garriſons had always conducted themſelves in a manner, no ways diſcreditable, eſpecially in the great cities; and, had it not been for the decree of 15th of December, and the conduct of the agents of the executive power, the French character would have been eſteemed and beloved in that country.

On the 12th of March, Dumourier wrote a letter to the National Convention, which appeared ſo deplorably true in its contents, that the preſident and the committee to which it was referred, did not dare

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to read it in the Tribune. A copy of this letter ſtole abroad, and was printed at Antwerp. In it, the general frankly ſtated to the convention, the meaſures he had been compelled to purſue, in order to ſave Belgium, and the French army. He referred the Convention, for minute information on each point, to the miniſter, to whom he ſent copies of the proclamations, and on account of his proceedings, demanding of him, that he ſhould produce the whole to the convention, without reſerve or diſguiſe.

He ſent for the commiſſary Petit-Jean, and, aſſembling all the adminiſtrators of proviſions, &c. he informed them, that he was on the eve of making a great movement, with the army, and in a few days would engage the enemy; and he made ſuch arrangements with them as were neceſſary to his purpoſe. He almoſt immediately procured proviſions for fifteen days, and prepared his travelling hoſpital to attend the army.

The pay-maſter of the army had retired to Liſle, with two millions of livres in ſpecie, and the general wrote to the Commandant of Liſle, to ſend him back to the army with a ſtrong eſcort.

General Dumourier harangued the garriſon at Bruſſels, with ſuch effect, that the different corps demanded leave to follow him againſt the enemy. He departed on the evening of the 12th of March, for Louvain.

Before we enter on the hiſtory of the military operations that follow, and that we may not be obliged to interrupt them, it will be neceſſary to

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ſpeak here of the viſit which the general received at Louvain from the commiſſioners of the National Convention. When the diſaſter befel the army, Camus, Treilhard, Merlin, and Goſſuin, retired to the frontiers of France, while La Croix, and Danton, went to Paris. When the former knew of the general's arrival from Holland, they proceeded to Louvain to meet him, having miſſed him at Bruſſels.

Camus and Treilhard complained of the general's proclamations, eſpecially that which ordered the ſilver to be reſtored to the churches. They told the general that he ought not to have acted with ſuch precipitation, but have waited their arrival, and that it was beyond the bounds of his authority to interfere with the adminiſtration of the civil government. The general anſwered, that the firſt of all duties was that of attending to the public ſafety; that the Convention might be deceived, as indeed they had been, by their emiſſaries; that the whole weight of the war, the honour of the nation, and the preſervation of the army, reſted upon him; that for theſe he was reſponſible, not only to his ſuperiors, but to poſterity; that he had undertaken no meaſure inconſiderately, but after the matureſt deliberation; that, had they been preſent, he ſhould not have conſulted them, although he ſhould have endeavoured to have won them to act with him, in putting an end to the crimes, which had long oppreſſed the Belgians and diſhonoured France; and, had they oppoſed his intentions, he would, notwithſtanding, have iſſued the proclamations.

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He appealed particularly to Camus, who was religious and ſuperſtitious, on the proclamation that reſpected the churches. He expreſſed his ſurpriſe, that a man, who profeſſed a zeal for religion, ſhould be the advocate of a ſacrilege committed on a people, whom the French conſidered as allies and friends. *Go to the church of St. Gudule*, Dumourier ſaid to him, *ſee the hoſt trodden under foot, and waſted on the pavement; the altars broken; and paintings, the maſter pieces of art, torn into ſhreds; and juſtify theſe profanations, or rather own the neceſſity of puniſhing the agents of your criminal orders. If the Convention applaud theſe crimes, if ſhe have no feeling of their enormity, ſhe is to be pitied; and, ſtill more, my unhappy country. Know, that if my country cannot be ſaved without the commiſſion of crimes, I will not commit them. But here, the crimes of France are ready to turn upon herſelf; and I ſerve her in endeavouring to deſtroy them.*

Camus obſerved the great difficulty there would be in reſtoring the ſilver veſſels to the churches, ſince they had been broken, to be heaped in coffers. *No matter*, the general ſaid; *ſince the metal remains, it will not coſt us much to have them remade.*

Camus and Treilhard perſiſted in ſaying that the general had failed in the reſpect and obedience due to the Convention. Merlin and Goſſuin, more reaſonable, acknowledged that the general's conduct had been juſt, and a violent altercation aroſe between the two parties. Camus ſaid, that it was a duty he muſt not decline, to report the general's conduct, to the convention. The general exhorted him

him to do ſo, and ſaid that he had already, himſelf, rendered an account of his conduct. The general produced his letter of the 12th, which became a new ſubject of contention.

It was during this interview that Camus, the moſt iraſcible of men, ſaid with an air, partly ſmiling and partly ſerious, *General you are accuſed of deſigning to become Cæſar: and I deſign to become Brutus.* The general anſwered, *Dear Camus, neither am I Cæſar, nor you Brutus, and your threat is the beſt aſſurance I have of immortality.*

Theſe commiſſioners, after three or four hours converſation with the general, departed the ſame night for Bruſſels. Camus was faithful to his promiſe. He drew up his report to the Convention, with all the bitterneſs of a perfidious and malignant mind; and, thenceforth, he became the decided enemy of Dumourier.

The general, on his part, returned to the conſideration of the means left him to repair the faults of his officers, and to reſtore vigour to an army that no longer poſſeſſed the ſpirit which conducted them in the former campaign.

CHAP. V.

State of the army. Its poſition. The general's orders to the different diviſions. He reſolves to give battle to the enemy.

THE troops appeared to reſume all their courage at the ſight of their general. Joy and confidence ſhone in the eyes of the ſoldiers. They embraced the general. They called him their father. They diſcovered ſhame and ſorrow for their diſgrace, and loudly demanded to be led againſt the enemy.

Dumourier reproached them with their want of diſcipline, but above all with their miſtruſt of generals, who, till this fatal diſaſter, had conducted them to victory, and who were his ſcholars and companions. He repreſented to them, that their impatience, their want of ſubordination, and the fatal conſequences of theſe in their retreat, had wreſted the conqueſt of Holland from his hands, and perhaps had determined the fate of the campaign. They appeared extremely affected by their diſgrace, and diſpoſed to repair their faults, on condition that he would not abandon them, but would inſtantly lead them to recover their honour.

This diſpoſition greatly aided the general in reſtoring order in the army. But he was alſo greatly aſſiſted by General Thouvenot, who, with every other military talent, had that alſo of conciliating the minds of the ſoldiery, and infuſing order into all the

the parts of a great army. With great pleaſure, Dumourier rendered this teſtimony of the merit of his friend, who may one day become one of the beſt generals of France, if he ſhould return to the ſervice of his country, and prejudice do not prevent his riſing to the command.

The army amounted to near forty thouſand infantry, and near five thouſand horſe; and this was excluſive of the garriſons of Belgium; of a diviſion of 5000 men (800 of whom were horſe) under the orders of General la Marliere; the diviſion of Namur, under General d'Harville, conſiſting of 12,000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry; and of the corps of the army employed in the expedition againſt Holland, which amounted to 18,000 foot, and 2,000 horſe, after the junction of General de Flers.

The infantry, conſiſting of ſixty-two battalions, were formed into four diviſions. The right was commanded by General Valence; the centre by the Duke de Chartres, who at that period, was named Egalité; and the left by General Miranda. Each of theſe diviſions conſiſted of eighteen battalions, and amounted to ſeven thouſand men. The reſerve, conſiſting of eight battalions of grenadiers, commanded by General Chancel, was placed under the orders of the Duke de Chartres.

Miranda had under his orders General Miaczinſky, who commanded the left flank of the army, conſiſting of two thouſand infantry, and one thouſand horſe; and General Champmorin, who commanded a body of five thouſand foot and one thouſand horſe. General Valence had under his orders

General Dampierre, who commanded the right flank, conſiſting of an equal force with that of General Miaczinſky; and General Neuilly, who commanded a body of three thouſand foot and one thouſand horſe.

The advanced guard was compoſed of ſix thouſand men, fifteen hundred of which were horſe, commanded by General la Marche. He was an old officer, who had ſeen a great deal of ſervice, and had been an excellent colonel of Huſſars. He was forward to undertake an enterprize, but eaſily diſcouraged. He was aſſiſted by two excellent officers, although they were very young, who counſelled him with great ſucceſs, when he would ſuffer himſelf to be counſelled. Theſe were Colonel Montjoye, who was adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Colonel Barois, who commanded the horſe artillery. But the ill health of this old general, and ſtill more his want of capacity, rendered him very dangerous.

The rapidity with which, in this war, officers roſe to the higheſt ranks in the army, inverted the order of every thing. The corps and regiments loſt officers that commanded them with effect, and the army acquired inexperienced generals. Yet the army was really in want of generals. At this period it had no more than five lieutenant-generals, and twelve major-generals, ſix of which commanded detached corps: ſo that there were but ſix remaining to command in the line.

When General Dumourier arrived at Louvain, on the morning of the 13th, he found that the three diviſions of his infantry were encamped on the heights

heights behind Louvain, having the canal of Malines in front. The reſerve, with a ſmall body of horſe, was at the diſtance of two leagues, beyond Bautersem; and the advanced guard at more than two leagues beyond the reſerve, at Cumptich, having a ſmall force of four hundred men in Tirlemont.

The enemy advanced and occupied all the villages between Tirlemont and Tongres. The deſign of the enemy was to turn our right on the 16th; and if that had been executed on the 13th or 14th, the advanced guard would have fallen back on the reſerve, and the reſerve on the main body, and the whole army would have been defeated and diſperſed having no known point at which to rally.

On the 14th Dumourier viſited his advanced guard; and he inſtantly ordered ſeveral movements, by which the poſition of his army was much more firm and ſecure. He placed General Dampierre with the troops under his command at Hougaerde to the right of Cumptich, and ordered General Neuilly to advance from Judoigne to Lummen, in order to ſtrengthen this right wing of the army and to extend the line beyond that of the enemy.

He commanded General Miaczinſky to take a poſition to the left, between Dieſt and Tirlemont, on the ſide of Halen, and having the river Gette in front of him. He ordered General Champmorin to occupy Dieſt, with his diviſion. This general, having informed him that Dieſt was a ſmall city with walls, which might be made a ſtrong poſt, Dumourier ordered him to add as much as poſſible to its ſtrength, and to leave in it two battalions and fifty horſe,

horſe, when he ſhould receive orders to march forward with his troops.

He commanded General la Marlière to leave a ſmall body of troops at Aerſchette, in order to keep open the communication with Dieſt; and to proceed with the reſt of his troops to Liers to overawe the country of Campine, to check the Pruſſian column who might advance in that quarter, and to cover the retreat of the army of Holland, whom Dumourier concluded had abandoned the project of paſſing to Dort, and which indeed was the caſe.

He ſent orders to General de Flers to throw himſelf with all poſſible diſpatch into Breda; to ſend Colonel Tilly to Gertruydenberg, with the garriſons named in the orders, and to ſend back the remainder of that army to the lines of Antwerp, to be placed under the orders of General Maraſſé. Dumourier ordered Colonel Weſtermann to take poſt at Turnhout, with the gendarmerie and the legion of the north, in order to protect this retreat, to check the enemy in that quarter, and to keep open the communication with General la Marlière, and by his diviſion, with the grand army.

On the morning of the 15th of March, the advanced guard of the enemy attacked Tirlemont, and the 400 men who were poſted there fell back, without engaging but with a loſs, having ſuffered themſelves to be ſurpriſed. General Dampierre, accuſtomed to retreats, took upon him, on hearing the firing at a diſtance, to abandon his poſt of Hougaerde, where he guarded one of the paſſages of the Gette, and fell back upon Louvain, at the ſame time ordering

ing General Neuilly to retire on his ſide to Judoigne. Dumourier had not time to examine whether it were fear or treachery which cauſed this dangerous movement on his right. Had it been known to the enemy the French army might have been overthrown. Dumourier contented himſelf with repairing this fault, which was ſo much the more weighty, as it accuſtomed the troops to give way on the firſt appearance of danger; and on that ſame night he cauſed theſe two diviſions to return to their former poſts.

It was very ſingular, that on the left General Miaczinſky committed the ſame fault, and withdrew into the wood near Louvain, and was not to be found for two days. But the poſition he had quitted was occupied by the body of troops under General Champmorin, whom the General ordered on the 15th to proceed with the greateſt diſpatch to occupy the heights of Oplinter, on the left of Tirlemont. Champmorin took that poſition on the evening of the 16th.

Fortunately the enemy, who had fixed the 16th for their march, diſcovered nothing of the retrograde movements of the 15th, and were not prepared to profit by them. On the ſame day, the General advanced with the whole of his army beyond Bauterſem and near to Cumptich, to prepare for his revenge on the following day, and not to leave the enemy the advantage they had gained. It was abſolutely neceſſary for him to take Tirlemont; ſince, otherwiſe, he muſt have fallen back, and again have ſubjected his troops to be diſcouraged and terrified.

The

The Imperialiſts, with a conſiderable advanced guard, occupied Tirlemont, and the ſpace lying between the two Gettes, from the cauſeway of St. Tron, to the ground oppoſite the poſt of Hougaerde.

On the morning of the 16th, the General made a vigorous attack upon the Imperialiſts. As the heights of Oplinter commanded the high road of St. Tron, when the general had made himſelf maſter of Tirlemont, (which he gained after ſome reſiſtance) the Imperialiſts finding their right flanked by the troops under Miranda on the heights of Oplinter, made a precipitate march, to paſs a ſmall arm of the Gette, to retire to the heights of Neerlanden, Nerwinde, Middlewinde and Oberwinde.

Between the two Gettes, at a league and a half on the right beyond Tirlemont, was a village named Gotzenhoven, which commanded the whole plain. It ſtood on a ſmall hill; having hedges along the front, and ditches filled with water on the right and in the rear.

The Imperialiſts did not appear to perceive the importance of this poſt, till Dumourier had ſent General la Marche, with his advanced guard ſupported with cannon, to take poſſeſſion of it. At that time the Imperialiſts were ſtill in poſſeſſion of the two villages of Meer and Hattendover, and Dumourier cauſed theſe to be attacked by his columns as quickly as they could form after filing through Tirlemont. The Imperialiſts committed a great error in not occupying Gotzenhoven in ſufficient force, as that poſt might have defended, or might have laid in aſhes, the two villages of Meer and Hattendover.

The

The Imperialiſts collected a ſtrong body of infantry and horſe, to endeavour to diſlodge the French from Gotzenhoven. They performed prodigies of valour in this attack, although without ſucceſs. The cuiraſſiers charged the French infantry with the greateſt intrepidity, even among the very hedges of the village, and their loſs was very great. The attack was recommenced ſeveral times. The enemy attempted in vain to turn Gotzenhoven on the right, for General Neuilly, having paſſed the greater Gette at Lummen, had opportunely arrived in this quarter, with his diviſion to take the poſition of Neerhelyſſen. The engagement did not finiſh till four o'clock in the afternoon, when the Imperialiſts were in full retreat. It laſted at leaſt eight hours between the advanced guards of the Imperialiſts and the French, which were nearly of equal force, and were both of them ſupported by the main bodies of their reſpective armies. The loſs of the Imperialiſts was much greater than that of the French. The advantage remained with the latter, but they were on the point of loſing their general at the attack of Gotzenhoven.

This engagement, which coſt the Imperialiſts more than 1200 men, entirely reſtored the courage of the French troops. Dumourier formed his army into two diviſions, extending from Gotzenhoven to the high road, among the villages, which had been the field of battle. General Neuilly, ſtationed near Neerhelyſſen ſupported the right. General Dampierre, having arrived on the evening of the engagement, was poſted at Eſemael, in front of the centre.

General Miaczinſky arriving with his cavalry (his infantry conſiſting of eight battalions being left near Louvain), was poſted at the bridge of the leſſer Gette, oppoſite to Orſmael. A part of the diviſion of General Miranda remained behind the great Gette, to the left of Tirlemont, extending to Oplinter; at which laſt place General Champmorin arrived with his troops during the night.

After this firſt ſucceſs, Dumourier ſaw that it was neceſſary to take a deciſive ſtep. Troops were continually on their march to reinforce the Imperialiſts, and the French army had very inconſiderable or no reinforcements to expect. The Imperial cavalry was double the number of that of the French, and in every reſpect greatly ſuperior. It was impoſſible for the French to contend with a diſciplined army, for the poſſeſſion of the Netherlands, foot by foot; being in want of generals, incapable of executing prompt marches of bold important manœuvres, in face of a numerous and experienced cavalry, and having behind them no ſtrong and fortified places.

There was, however, a neceſſity for ſtopping the progreſs of the enemy, which could not be done without hazarding a battle. Under theſe circumſtances ſound and true prudence called on Dumourier to riſk every thing, before the Prince of Cobourg ſhould have received the remainder of the reinforcements for which he waited to begin the campaign. The two armies were of equal force. That which ſhould attack would have the advantage in ſpirit and confidence, which always belong to the party beginning the attack. This advantage had, during

during fifteen days, been in the hands of the Prince of Cobourg; but General Dumourier had regained it by the iſſue of the engagement of Tirlemont.

If General Dumourier ſhould have the good fortune to gain a deciſive battle, and ſuch he reſolved this to be, his ſituation would be entirely changed: for firſt, it would reſtore him in the opinion of his army to his former ſuperiority, and would intimidate the enemy; ſecondly, it would have ſecured the Belgians in his intereſt, and would have greatly forwarded the levies of twenty-five battalions which that nation had undertaken, and ſo would have ſtrengthened his army by the acquiſition of twenty thouſand infantry, at the leaſt; thirdly, he would have regained the ground loſt on the ſide of Liege, for the Auſtrians would not have been able to have held that city, nor even Aix-la-Chapelle, and would have been compelled to have intrenched themſelves under the protection of Maeſtricht; and laſtly, it would have compelled the Prince of Cobourg to have repaſſed the Meuſe, and would have ſo greatly weakened his army, as to prevent his retaking the field before the month of May.

General Dumourier's deſign was, in caſe of ſucceſs, to have formed an entrenched camp, in a ſtrong poſition, between the two Gettes, under the command of General Valence, who in that ſituation might have watched the enemy and might have received the different reinforcements arriving from France and Belgium; while General d'Harville might have been equally reinforced on the ſide of Namur. General Valence would have been maſter of the country, and would have held the

Prince of Cobourg in check, Miranda would have been poſted with an army at Antwerp, and General Dumourier advancing with 30,000 men, againſt Bois-le-duc, would have reſumed his project againſt Holland, and would at once have forced the paſſages of the Moor Dyke, and Gorcum. But if he could not have penetrated into Holland, he might at leaſt have made himſelf maſter of Dutch Flanders, by which means he would have covered his left, and would have procured arms, clothing, money, and proviſions.

In that caſe, he would have been independent of the National Convention, and probably might have been able to give it law, for the repoſe of his unhappy country, for the avenging of the death of Lewis XVI. and for the re-eſtabliſhing of the Conſtitutional Monarchy.

On the contrary, ſhould the general be defeated, he deſigned, in the firſt place, to take a poſition behind the canal of Louvain, in order for a while to cover Bruſſels, and to reinforce his army; ſecondly, to maintain the poſition of Namur, raiſing the corps of General d'Harville to the amount of 25,000 men, and to place the diviſion of General Neuilly at Judoigne, to cover Dumourier's retreat by the foreſt of Soignies, for the purpoſe of ſupporting Bruſſels; thirdly, to aſſembly a body of 25,000 men near Antwerp, and, ſtill holding Breda and Gertruydenberg, to keep the communication open to theſe places by means of the poſts of Liers and Dieſt; fourthly, to aſſemble a body of 14 or 15,000 men on the ſide of Bruges, to cover Maritime

Maritime Flanders; fifthly, to negotiate with the Imperialiſts for a ſuſpenſion of arms, and mean while to endeavour to convince the troops in the different camps, that their want of ſubordination, together with the diſaſters reſulting from it, was one effect of the abſurd government of the Convention, that it was high time to put an end to the anarchy which would otherwiſe cauſe the entire ruin of France, and that on the army alone reſted the hopes and fate of the Country. When the minds of the troops ſhould have been ſufficiently prepared, his next deſign was to reinforce the army with battalions of Belgians, who held the Convention and Jacobins in abhorrence, to declare openly in favour of a limited Monarchy, to lay hold of hoſtages for the ſecurity of the priſoners in the Temple, and to march to Paris.

Theſe were General Dumourier's objects previous to the battle of Nerwinde, and it will be ſeen how urgent his motives were for riſking a deciſive battle, and for uſing every effort to gain the victory. He never had the baſeneſs to wiſh to be beaten. He earneſtly ſtrove to maſter events. Although he held the Tyrants of France in deteſtation, although he viewed with horror the cruelties that diſhonored France, he was not the leſs ſolicitous to maintain the honor of his country, and to prove himſelf worthy of her confidence. In every caſe, and in every moment till the laſt, the end of his meaſures was to prevent a foe from giving law to France, and to ſave his country from inſult or injury, and it is this which has drawn upon him the ill founded reproach,

proach, from miſinformed perſons, and in particular from the Elector of Cologne, of having changed his party only when he was vanquiſhed.

Had he not previous to the loſs of the battle of Nerwinde openly declared his hoſtility to the Jacobins by his proclamations at Antwerp and Bruſſels? Had he not impriſoned or driven out of the country the rapacious agents of the Convention? Had he not written his letter of the 12th of March? Had he not compelled the ſilver of the churches to be reſtored? Had not his correſpondence with Pache, Bournonville and Le Brun, (which was printed and which appeared alſo in the Monitors of March and April) declared the firmeſt truths and the freeſt opinions, reſpecting the authors of the miſeries of France. If in thoſe he did not ſpeak of the royal family, it was that he feared his mention of them would become a ſignal for their death.

He who reads theſe Memoirs, and calls to remembrance the circumſtances and the public documents of thoſe times, will ſee that the opinions of General Dumourier have been conſiſtent. He has been the zealous defender of his country. Her enemies have been his enemies, but the war he has made upon them has been open and generous; for his love of his country was neither fanatical, unjuſt, nor ſavage. The Emigrants, by whom he is deteſted as greatly as by the Jacobins, have, on all occaſions, found him humane and liberal. In a war, differing from all others in character, a war of opinion, in which inſtability of principles and conduct might find excuſe, he has no ſhifting of opinion

wherewith to reproach himſelf, no perfidy, no cruelty, no inſolence in ſucceſs, nor weakneſs in misfortune and diſgrace. In a word, moved only by humanity, he reſtored the Netherlands to the Emperor, as was acknowledged by the Archduke Charles, by the Emperor's Miniſters and Generals, by his Army, and by the people of the country. Nor did he make conditions or reſerves for himſelf. He did not demand an aſylum in the Emperor's dominions. He demanded nothing of the Prince of Cobourg but his marching to Paris, with the object, and in the hope, of delivering his country.

Baſely miſrepreſented to the emperor, denied a place of ſafety in the Emperor's dominions, which ought to have been free to him, though all others had been ſhut againſt him, he expects juſtice from time, which unveils the truth; and conſoles himſelf in ſaying with Valerius Maximus,—*Perfecta ars, fortunæ lenocinio defecta, fiducia juſta non exuiter, quamque ſcit ſe laudem mereri, eam etſi ab aliis non impetrat, domeſtico tamen acceptam judicio refert.*

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Battle of Nerwinde.

THE Prince of Cobourg advanced between Tongres, St. Tron, and Landen; and the two armies were in ſight of each other. General Dumourier paſſed the day of the 17th in reconnoitring the poſition of the enemy, in forming his troops in order of battle, and in preparing his plan of attack. He had, in his front, the Leſſer Gette, which riſes in the townſhip of Jaudrain, and runs almoſt parallel with the greater Gette, into which it falls below Leaw. This river ran between the two armies. Both ſides of the river were extremely hilly; and the ground, on the ſide occupied by the Imperialiſts, formed an amphitheatre riſing from the river to the more elevated ſituations of Landen and St. Tron.

Dumourier judged that the poſition of the Prince of Cobourg was by much the ſtrongeſt on the ſide of Tongres and St. Tron; becauſe of the neceſſity of his drawing his proviſions from Maeſtricht and Liege; and that conſequently his left, which was conſiderably extended on the ſide of Landen, muſt be more weak, and more liable to be turned, or broken.

Dumourier knew alſo, that the Prince of Cobourg had neglected to occupy the little city of Leaw, which was a very important poſt, and which might either ſerve as a centre to the motions of the army

making the attack, or a point of reſiſtance for the army that ſhould be attacked.

In the front of that part of the enemy's line, which extended from Landen towards Leaw, were the three villages of Oberwinde, Middlewinde, and Nerwinde. Near Middlewinde was an eminence, called the Tomb of Middlewinde, which commanded the three villages, and a valley which ſeparates them from the city of Landen. He, therefore, who ſhould occupy this place, muſt be maſter of all the plain, and muſt neceſſarily, in caſe of an attack, repulſe his enemy.

On theſe facts, Dumourier laid down his plan for the battle, which was as follows. The firſt column, forming the right flank of the army, compoſed of the advanced guard, under General la Marche, proceeding by the bridge of Neerhellyſſen, was to enter the plain between Landen and Oberwinde; and to extend itſelf beyond the left of the enemy, in order to harraſs that flank. The ſecond column, compoſed of the infantry of the army of the Ardennes, commanded by Lieutenant-general le Veneur, and ſupported by a ſtrong body of cavalry, entering the plain by the ſame bridge, was to gain the tomb of Middlewinde by a rapid movement, and to attack the village of Oberwinde, which could not withſtand a diſcharge of 12 pounders that were to be planted on the tomb. And while this attack ſhould take place, the third column under the command of General Neuilly, entering the plain alſo by the ſame bridge, was to fall on the right of the village of Nerwinde.

Theſe three columns formed the right wing of the army, commanded by General Valence, who, in caſe of ſucceſs, wheeling to the left, and driving the left wing of the enemy before him, was to continue his march in order of battle, leaving Landen behind him, and having his front facing St. Tron.

The centre, commanded by the Duke de Chartres, was compoſed of two columns. The firſt, (which was the fourth column in the order of attack) commanded by Lieutenant-general Dietman, paſſing the river by the bridge of Laer, and rapidly croſſing the village of the ſame name, which was only occupied by a few indifferent troops belonging to the Imperialiſts, was to preſs forward, and fall directly upon the front of the village of Nerwinde. The fifth column, commanded by General Dampierre, was to paſs by the bridge of Eſemael, and to attack the left of Nerwinde. Theſe two columns were afterward to follow the right wing, forming a diagonal line with the point of their departure.

The left wing, under the command of General Miranda, was compoſed of three columns. The firſt (being the ſixth in the order of attack) under General Miaczinſky, paſſing the river at Over-helpen, was to charge ſtraight forward proceeding toward Neerlanden, but being careful never to preſs beyond the head of the fifth column. The ſeventh column, under General Ruault, was to paſs the river at the bridge of Orſmael, and engage the enemy by the high road of St. Tron. The eighth column, under General Champmorin, was to paſs the river below Neerlinter, at the bridge of Bingen, and to throw

throw itſelf into the Leaw, which it was to occupy till the end of the battle.

In caſe of compleat ſucceſs, the army at the end of the action would be ranged in order of battle, with the left wing at Leaw, and the right at St. Tron, and having its front toward Tongres: which was the only point by which the Imperialiſts could retreat. And batteries were erected on the banks of the Gette, within reach of the bridges, to protect the retreat of the columns, in caſe of their being repulſed.

On the morning of the 18th of March, between ſeven and eight o'clock, the ſeveral columns began to move in the ſame inſtant, in great order, and paſſed the river without obſtacle. General la Marche committed the firſt error of that day. He entered the plain of Landen according to his inſtructions, but finding no enemy there, he made a movement to the left, to fall upon the village of Oberwinde, and thence was thrown into confuſion by the ſecond column. Although the troops of the ſecond column were retarded in their march by their artillery, yet they attacked the village of Oberwinde, and the tomb of Middlewinde, with ſuch vigour, that by ten o'clock they had carried thoſe poſts. But General le Veneur did not take ſufficient precautions to ſtrengthen himſelf in the latter poſt. It was ſoon after re-taken by the Auſtrians, and the poſſeſſion of it diſputed the whole day. General Neuilly briſkly entered Nerwinde with the third column, and drove out the Imperialiſts; but, almoſt immediately abandoning the village, he advanced into the plain toward the ſe-

cond column. General Neuilly aſſerted, that he received an order to that effect from General Valence, who on his ſide declared, it was a miſunderſtanding of General Neuilly.

In a ſhort time, the Imperialiſts re-entered Nerwinde; from which they were again driven, by the fourth and fifth columns, under the command of the Duke de Chartres. In this attack General Desforêts, an excellent officer, received a wound in the head with a muſquet-ball. This part of the army fell into confuſion. The infantry crowded in too great numbers into the village, and were in ſuch complete diſorder, that on the appearance of a ſecond attack from the enemy they abandoned the place.

General Dumourier arriving in this moment, cauſed the village to be once more attacked. It was again carried; but the troops preſently quitted the village again, and all the efforts of Gen. Dumourier prevailed no further than to rally them at a hundred paces from Nerwinde, which was filled with the dead and wounded of the two parties. But the Imperialiſts did not re-enter the village until the evening.

It was during the diſorder in this quarter, that the Imperial cavalry ruſhing into the plain between Nerwinde and Middlewinde, charged the French cavalry; at the head of which was General Valence, who fought with great intrepidity, was wounded, and obliged to retire from the field of battle to Tirlemont. The Imperial horſe were, however, repulſed with great ſlaughter.

While the horſe were thus engaged, another body of cavalry entered the plain on the left of Nerwinde,

and

and threw themſelves with great fury upon the infantry of the fourth column. General Thouvenot, who was at the head of that column, opened his ranks to the Imperial horſe, and immediately cauſed the regiment of Deux-ponts to make ſo timely and well directed a diſcharge of grape ſhot and muſquetry upon that body of horſe, that almoſt the whole of it was deſtroyed.

From that inſtant, the fate of the battle ſeemed determined in favour of the French, on their right and in the centre. The troops were again in perfect order, were full of confidence and courage, and paſſed the night on the field of battle, preparing to compleat their victory the following morning. The Imperialiſts have acknowledged that they were on the point of retreating, and that orders had been actually given to their baggage to retire to Tongres.

But it was quite otherwiſe with the French troops on the left. The ſixth and ſeventh columns had attacked the enemy with great vigour; but, when they were already maſters of Orſmael, a panic ſeized upon the battalions of Volunteers, and they fled, leaving the troops of the line expoſed. The Imperialiſts, ſeeing the diſorder, charged the two columns with their horſe, which put it entirely to the rout. Guiſcard, Major-General of the artillery was killed, as well as great numbers of the Aids-de-camp and officers of the ſtaff; and General Ruault and General Ihler were wounded.

Still, however, great opportunity remained of reſtoring the fortune of the day in that quarter. It was not more than two o'clock in the afternoon, when

the

the columns fled. They repaſſed the bridge of Orſmael, and were not purſued further by the Imperialiſts. At that moment, General Miranda was informed, that the eight battalions of Miaczinſky's corps were arrived at Tirlemont. Theſe troops were quite freſh, and General Miranda might have reinforced himſelf, by placing them on the heights of Wommerſem, on the ſide of the Gette next Tirlemont. But General Miranda, either being diſconcerted, or, which is more probable, ſeeing the ſucceſs of the right wing, commanded by his rival General Valence, he yielded to his reſentment, and reſolved to ſacrifice him, ordered his troops to retreat; and retired behind Tirlemont, at more than two leagues diſtance from the field of battle. Whatever be the caſe, his conduct was perfidious in ſending no advice of his retreat to General Dumourier, which expoſed the right and centre of the army to the whole weight of the enemy. But the enemy did not avail themſelves of this cowardly retreat; neither to cut off the left wing, which they might have compleatly done by continuing the purſuit to Tirlemont, nor to renew the attack upon the centre and the right, whoſe flank was entirely expoſed to them.

General Champmorin, who had made himſelf maſter of Leaw, and had remained in that poſition, till he ſaw the retreat of General Miranda, did not abandon it till late in the day, when he repaſſed the river by the bridge of Bingen, which he cut down after him, and returned to his former poſition of Oplinter. And, perhaps, it was owing to the poſſeſſion of this poſt at Leaw, that the Imperialiſts did not purſue

purſue their advantage againſt the left wing of the French, on the retreat of Miranda; ſince, in that caſe, General Champmorin might have taken their right in flank.

General Dumourier paſſed the whole time of action in regarding the movements of his centre and right wing, in re-eſtabliſhing order in the different parts that gave way, and enſuring ſucceſs in that quarter, which was the more eſſential, as it was charged with the whole weight of the manœuvres. At two in the afternoon, he obſerved that the firing on his left, which till then had been very briſk, was ceaſed; but he attributed this ſilence to ſucceſs.—The nature of the ground prevented his ſeeing the ſixth and ſeventh columns; and, during the firing of theſe columns, he could perceive they were advancing forward. He had, therefore, reaſon to ſuppoſe that, the enemy being driven in that quarter, the ſixth and ſeventh columns had halted, that they might not over-run the head of the columns on their right. But no circumſtances could lead him to conjecture the incredible retreat of General Miranda; and he was, perhaps, happy in being ignorant of it, while he was repairing the diſorders of his right and centre.

Toward the cloſe of the day, he obſerved, that ſeveral columns of the Imperialiſts moved from their right to reinforce their left, which led him to ſuſpect the truth; but it was as yet only ſuſpicion, having received no meſſage from General Miranda. In this ſituation, he paſſed the greater part of the evening before the village of Nerwinde. At length,

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his ſuſpicions, which he had communicated to no other perſon than General Thouvenot, were ſucceeded by the livelieſt inquietude. He departed for his left, accompanied by General Thouvenot, two aids-de-camp, and two domeſtics. Arriving at the village of Laer, at ten at night, he was utterly aſtoniſhed to find that it had been abandoned by order of General Dampierre, who after conducting himſelf with great valour during the engagement, had in the cloſe of the evening without orders repaſſed the Gette with his diviſion, and retired to his former poſition at the village of Eſemael.

General Dumourier, continuing his route, arrived near the bridge of Orſmael, which he ſuppoſed to be occupied by part of Miranda's troops, but found it was in poſſeſſion of the Auſtrian Hulans, by whom he was on the point of being taken. He turned back; and proceeded, by the high road of Tongres, and Tirlemont: aſtoniſhed with the ſilence and ſolitude that reigned around him, till he arrived within half a league of that city. He then learnt from three or four battalions, that were ſcattered in diſorder, and without cavalry, along the ſide of the high road, the diſaſter and diſgrace of his left wing.

In Tirlemont, he found General Miranda writing to his friends with great compoſure. General Valence had already uſed every effort to induce Miranda to return to the attack, aſſuring him that the French were victorious on their right, and in the centre; and that, by his return, ſucceſs would be altogether inſured. General Dumourier commanded

manded him, in very ſevere terms, to aſſemble his troops immediately, even during the night, and to poſt them on the heights of Wommerſem, on the high road, and on the bridge of Orſmael, as well as that of Neerhelpen, for the purpoſe of, at leaſt, ſecuring the paſſage of the Gette, and the retreat of the right and centre, now in the midſt of the enemy's army, with a river behind them.

Such was the fate of the battle of Nerwinde; which had been entirely ſucceſsful on the part of the French, if General Miranda, inſtead of retreating, on perceiving the firſt diſorder in his two columns, had lined the Gette with his troops, and had maintained the two bridges of Orſmael and Neerhelpen. This retreat was the more unfortunate, as the two columns loſt above two thouſand men, while the reſt of the army did not loſe more than ſix hundred, after a ſevere and obſtinate conteſt, which coſt the Imperialiſts more than fourteen hundred men. The French had about three thouſand killed or taken, and more than a thouſand wounded, and loſt great part of their cannon.

In this engagement, faults were committed on both ſides. The French did not attack the town of Middlewinde, which was the deciſive point of the action, with ſufficient vigour, and afterward abandoned that poſt without any viſible neceſſity. General Neuilly, after the firſt ſucceſs, put every thing again to hazard by abandoning the village of Nerwinde, on an uncertain order. Miranda, having already made himſelf maſter of the village of Orſmael, turned the fate of the day, by yielding to the terror

of his troops, and commanding a retreat that became an abſolute flight.

The Imperialiſts committed ſeveral errors: in not diſputing the paſſage of the Gette; in not falling upon the three columns of the right, both in front and in flank, while they were marching forward to the attack, and were expoſed to the fire of the villages of Laer, of Nerwinde, Middlewinde, and Oberwinde; in abandoning the elevated and advantageous poſt of the tomb of Middlewinde, and in not erecting a battery on it previous to the engagement; in neglecting to occupy Leau, on their right; and, finally, in not having availed themſelves of Miranda's retreat, either in falling upon his troops, or attacking the left flank of the columns belonging to the centre of the French army, that were in the heat of the action before Nerwinde, by the whole of their right wing which no longer had an enemy in front of theirs.

CHAP. VII.

Retreat of the 19th of March. Action of Gotzenhoven.

GENERAL DUMOURIER now ſaw the neceſſity of ſecuring his retreat. The poſt of Leaw, on which the poſſeſſion of the field of battle depended, was abandoned by his troops; and, in the diſmay which had ſeized upon the other two columns of his

left wing, the moſt he could hope was to lead them back to the banks of the Leſſer Gette, to induce them to paſs the river, and return to the field of battle was impoſſible. Theſe two columns had loſt part of their cannon in their flight; the Generals, and ſuperior officers of theſe troops, were in no condition to undergo the fatigues of a freſh combat; and, independent of the real loſs of theſe columns by the ſword of the enemy, more than 6000 men had deſerted, and were on their road to Bruſſels and France.

Dumourier paſſed the remainder of the night in giving orders for the retreat of his centre, and right wing, which was then commanded by the Duke de Chartres, who conducted himſelf with coolneſs, courage, and judgment.

The Imperialiſts had in truth gained a great victory, but they were not certain of their ſituation. They had been ſo diſconcerted with the important advantages gained by the right and centre of the French army, that they made no attempt to purſue their advantage over the left. They ſaw the French ſtill in order of battle and ready to recommence the action, and they really imagined that the left wing of the French was about to return to its former poſition. Hence they threw no more obſtacles on the French in their retreat, than the day before on their advancing to the attack.

This retreat was effected in open day-light, the columns repaſſing the river in the order in which they had advanced, and altogether with the ſame ſteadineſs. Dumourier ſent General Thouvenot to

the right, to receive the columns, and place them in order of battle from Gotzenhoven to Hackendower, while he took upon himſelf to aſſemble the columns of the left wing, and to poſt them on the heights of Wommerſem, and at the bridge of Orſmael. The enemy's troops were already maſter of this bridge; and Dumourier, to prevent their advancing further on the cauſeway, ſent orders to General Dampierre, poſted at Eſemael, to make a movement to the left with half of his diviſion, for the purpoſe of flanking the cauſeway, and to maintain that poſition till the centre ſhould have repaſſed the river, and then to retreat ſlowly to the new poſition that the troops were taking, with their right at Gotzhoven, their left at Hackendower, and having the Leſſer Gette in their front.

This order, completely executed by General Dampierre, preſerved the army from deſtruction; for the two columns that had fled had acquired ſuch apathy from the ſhame of the preceding day, and were ſo ſcattered, that it was ten in the morning before Dumourier could form them, ſo as to march with good order to take poſt at Hackendower, on the right and left of the high road.

The firſt column of the Imperial army had paſſed the bridge of Orſmael, and had already formed with its artillery in the heights of Wommerſem. But Dumourier could never prevail on his troops to attack that poſt, which commanded the ground on which they had formed, although they were extremely harraſſed by the artillery on theſe heights, and ſuſtained this inceſſant firing with unſhaken conſtancy.

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On this occaſion Dumourier had nearly fallen. His horſe was killed under him by a cannon ball. The readineſs with which he recovered from this ſituation was the means of preventing new diſorder, and probably a ſecond flight which this circumſtance was on the point of occaſioning.

The troops, which in the action of the preceding day, had fled with ſuch precipitation, now endured the terrible diſcharge of the Imperialiſts, with great intrepidity. But in this conduct General Dumourier perceived nothing more than a blind obſtinacy, altogether deſtitute of the daring courage that he wiſhed to excite in them. He exhorted them to charge with bayonets the enemy on the heights of Wommerſem, and ſeveral times he put himſelf at their head, without being able to make them advance; too happy, indeed, in ſeeing them continue firm in their poſition, which was eminently more dangerous than a vigorous attack on thoſe troops, who, being ſeparated from the reſt of the imperial army, and having the river in their rear, might have been totally overthrown.

The left wing of the Imperialiſts betrayed the ſame diſpoſition, occaſioned by the ſame cauſe, as that of the French. Theſe troops ſuffered the right and centre of the French to repaſs the river without moleſtation, and even to range themſelves in order of battle in the poſition of Gotzenhoven, before they could reſolve to paſs the river in order to attack them. Thus, the whole day paſſed on both ſides in manœuvring, with the exception of ſome cannonading and diſcharges of muſkets. The two

armies

armies reſted on their arms, in order of battle, the whole night, very near to each other.

This cool and ſteady retreat was the more admired by the Imperialiſts, becauſe the troops did not fall back more than three quarters of a league, and ſeemed to be only returning in great order to the ground they occupied before the battle. During the evening of the 19th, however, General Dumourier perceived by the apathy which pervaded his troops, that, ſhould he make a ſtand the next morning againſt the enemy, he would be infallibly beaten.

There has been no period when the French ſoldiery could be conducted ſucceſsfully without great regard being paid to their temper and their feelings; and the importance of this circumſtance, in conducting them in battle, has been eminently heightened by the revolution, which, having entirely deſtroyed military diſcipline, has increaſed the force of the intractable and capricious ſpirit belonging to the national character. The active and impetuous diſpoſition of the French is calculated to carry them forward to conqueſt, but not to preſerve conqueſts. A defenſive and methodical war does not diminiſh their bravery, but it wearies and contradicts their impatient ſpirit. When once wearied and diſpirited, the French troops being no longer reſtrained by the ſeverity of military laws, abandon their leaders and their colours, and deſert without the leaſt thought of the conſequences.

The troops of the line, ſtill influenced by a remnant of their former military ſpirit, an attachment

ment to their colours, and the fear of diſgrace, continued firm, and were yet to be relied on by the General; but the national guards, compoſing three-fourths of the army, declaring loudly that it was fruitleſs to laviſh their lives in Belgium, and that they ought to return and defend their own frontiers, departed by whole companies and battalions. To have attempted to retain them by force would have been ineffectual, as well as dangerous.

No courſe was now left to Dumourier but to retreat with the troops, in good order, for the purpoſe of concealing their defections, and to prevent their being maſſacred by the Imperialiſts and peaſants of the country. In this ſad condition the General was conſtrained to paſs the Greater Gette during the night, and to retire to the heights of Cumptich, behind Tirlemont. All his movements for this purpoſe, being performed with a preciſion that ſcarcely could have been expected from more diſciplined, and even victorious troops, were attended with the greateſt ſucceſs. The Imperialiſts, deceived by the fires that were carefully kept up, and reſtrained by the vigour of the rear guard, did not put themſelves in motion till the 20th, when they reconnoitred Tirlemont, from which the French had had time to withdraw their magazines. However, General Miaczinſky, who was charged with the evacuation of that city, loſt one of his cannon by the precipitation of his retreat.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Retreat of the 20th and 21ſt of March.—Engagement of Neerwelpe—La Croix and Danton at Louvain.—Engagement of the 22d of March.

DUMOURIER's poſition at Cumptich had the advantage of being conſiderably elevated above the Gette. In this camp his front faced Tirlemont; his left was ſecured by the river Welpe, which turning ſhort ran upon his rear by Bauterſem and Wertryk; his right, poſted behind Hougaerde, was not ſo well defended. The General, however, could not maintain himſelf long in this poſition, nor was it any protection to Louvain if the Imperialiſts ſhould paſs by Dieſt; nor to Bruſſels if they ſhould turn by Judoigne. He, therefore, availed himſelf of the 20th of March, while the enemy were before Tirlemont, to paſs the Welpe, and encamp near Bauterſem, having his right at Op and Neerwelpe, and his left on the heights and in the woods in front of Zuellenberg.

He ſent General Neuilly, with his diviſion increaſed to 6000 men, toward Judoigne, with orders to prevent detachments of the Imperialiſts from penetrating on that ſide, to watch their motions, and, if they ſhould appear with a force greatly ſuperior, to fall back to Bruſſels by the foreſt of Soignies. Dumourier gave General Neuilly inſtructions reſpecting the means of defending this foreſt, and wrote to Gen. Duval to reinforce Neuilly with as many men as he could

could ſpare from the garriſon of Bruſſels, and the new levies which might arrive there. He alſo ordered General Duval to arreſt the deſerters and ſend them back to his army.

He commanded General d'Harville to place a garriſon of 2,500 men in the citadel of Namur, and to hold himſelf in readineſs to march with the remainder of his troops, either toward Bruſſels, or in ſuch other direction as ſhould be rendered neceſſary by the motions of General Beaulieu, who was advancing with 8000 or 10,000 men by the route of Huy.

Dumourier threw into Dieſt a garriſon, which appeared to him to be ſufficient; General Champmorin having inaccurately reported this place to be ſtronger than in fact it was. He poſted General Miaczinſky at the abbey of Gemps, in communication with Dieſt. He reinforced the garriſon of Malines. He ſent General Ruault to Antwerp, to aſſiſt Lieutenant-General Maraffé, and to take the command of the army in that quarter, which reinforced by the diviſion of General La Marlière, amounted to more than 20,000 men. He recommended to General Ruault to hold the poſt of Liers as long as it was poſſible, and to fall back within the lines of Antwerp, if the Pruſſians and Dutch ſhould advance upon him in too great force.

On the ſame day, the 20th of March, a detachment of the enemy without cannon, and inferior in numbers to the garriſon of Dieſt, appearing before that place, the garriſon fled in a cowardly manner as far as Malines. But the advanced guard of the

Imperialiſts making an attack upon the villages of Op and Neer-welpe was repulſed.

While Dumourier was engaged in repulſing this attack, the commiſſioners of the Convention, La Croix and Danton, arrived in his camp, but he ſent them to Louvain, where he followed them on the evening of that day. They appeared extremely affected with the recent defeat of the army, but in a ſtill greater degree with the deſertion of the troops; having met at Bruſſels and in various parts of their route, entire corps returning to France. But, whatever was their concern on theſe ſubjects, their minds were much more engaged, as they ſaid, in the execution of the commiſſion with which they were charged: to prevail on the general to retract his letter of the 12th of March; which, by its too great frankneſs, had ſtirred up the bittereſt reſentment of the Convention againſt him.

Dumourier anſwered that he had expreſſed no more in his letter than his real ſentiments; that the diſaſters to which they were witneſs were the neceſſary conſequence of the evils of which he had complained; that he ſought only to remedy thoſe evils by putting an end to the tyranny and injuſtice exerciſed in Belgium; that the neceſſity which they muſt perceive of his retiring from a country in which he had no means of defence ought to convince them of the prudent tenor of his proclamations, againſt which, the convention were prejudiced, only, becauſe they were miſinformed and betrayed; that thoſe proclamations had induced the peaſants of Belgium to lay down their arms, and had reſtored a

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degree of confidence between the French and Belgians, and were, therefore, the means of ſaving the troops who diſorganized, beaten, diſguſted and diſpirited, were altogether incapable of defending themſelves againſt the Imperialiſts, more numerous than themſelves and flushed with victory, and at the ſame time againſt the people of the country, ſhould the reſentment of theſe latter be again excited.

The commiſſioners were conſtrained to acknowledge the juſtice of theſe repreſentations; but ſtill continued to inſiſt on the general's retracting his letter. The general, after reviewing before them all the ſubjects of his complaints, and ſetting forth in the ſtrongeſt manner, the misfortunes that were on the eve of reſulting from the unwiſe and unjuſt conduct of the convention, made a poſitive declaration to the commiſſioners that he would in no part retract his letter, ſince the loſs or the gain of a battle could not effect any change in his principles, opinions, or character. The Commiſſioners conducted this conference with much addreſs and energy, and endeavoured to win Dumourier by the moſt flattering conſiderations. At length, after a very long conteſt, the general conſented to write a few lines to the preſident of the convention, in which he requeſted, *that the convention would poſtpone their judgment on his letter of the 12th of March, till he ſhould have had an opportunity of ſending them an explanation of the reaſons of that letter.* The two deputies departed with this unimportant declaration.

On the 21ſt, the general being informed of the loſs of Dieſt, reſolved to take a poſition nearer Lou-

vain, leſt the enemy, paſſing the canal, ſhould cut off his communication with Malines, or fall upon Louvain itſelf. He poſted the diviſion of General Champmorin on the heights of Pellenberg, flanking his left by that of Miaczinſky, poſted at St. Peterſroede: General Le Marche with the advanced guard on the heights of Corbec, ſkirting the high road: eighteen battalions of the army of the Ardennes, commanded by General Le Veneur, on the heights, and in the woods of Mezendael: and the diviſion of General Dampierre at Florival, in communication with General Neuilly's diviſion, which fell back toward Tombeck, at the entrance of the foreſt of Soignies.

During theſe movements, the troops were harraſſed by the Imperialiſts, who cannonaded them the whole day. On the morning of the 22d, the enemy made a general attack on the poſts of Pellenberg, Corbec and the woods of Mazendael. Blierbeck was between the enemy and General Le Veneur, and he had thought proper to occupy it. A column of Hungarian grenadiers made themſelves maſters of this village but were driven out with great ſlaughter, and with the loſs of two pieces of cannon, by the regiment of Auvergne, commanded by Colonel Dumas. The attack on the advanced guard was leſs vigorous, but that on the poſt of Pellenberg was extremely bloody. General Champmorin defending himſelf with equal courage and ability. He received a ſtrong reinforcement during the attack, and the enemy were unable to make any impreſſion on his lines. This action was extremely hot, and laſted

laſted the whole day. The Auſtrian columns ſuffered great loſs, and were compelled to retire.

On the evening preceding this brilliant action, General Dumourier had occaſion to ſend Colonel Montjoye to the head quarters of the Prince of Cobourg, to treat reſpecting the wounded and the priſoners. He then ſaw Colonel Mack, an officer of uncommon merit, who obſerved to Colonel Montjoye, that it might be equally advantageous to both parties to agree to a ſuſpenſion of arms. Dumourier, who had deeply conſidered the dangerous ſituation of his army, ſent Montjoye again to Colonel Mack on the 22d, to demand if he would come to Louvain, and make the ſame propoſition to Dumourier. Colonel Mack came in the evening. The following articles were verbally agreed to: Firſt, that the Imperialiſts ſhould not again attack the French army in great force, nor General Dumourier again offer battle to the Imperialiſts. Secondly, that on the faith of this tacit armiſtice, the French ſhould retire to Bruſſels ſlowly, and in good order, without any oppoſition from the enemy. And laſtly, that Dumourier and Colonel Mack ſhould have another interview after the evacuation of Bruſſels, in order to ſettle further articles that might then be mutually deemed neceſſary.

This ſtipulation, the firſt that was entered into between the two generals, became hourly of more importance to Dumourier. His army was greatly diminiſhed, eſpecially in officers. He had ſcarcely ammunition for a battle; and unfortunately, he was well

well perſuaded that, in caſe of a ſerious attack, he ſhould be abandoned by his army.

He had ſufficient proof of this on the following day. The Imperialiſts thought themſelves ſo little bound by the articles agreed to by Colonel Mack, that General Clairfayt (who was ignorant of theſe articles) fell upon the advanced guard and the troops poſted at Pellenberg. The action became general along the whole front of the army. Champmorin defended himſelf with the ſame obſtinacy as before; but toward the cloſe of the action, when the Imperial infantry were actually retiring, and there was no longer any enemy before the army, excepting ſome light troops, old General La Marche became ſuddenly terrified; and, notwithſtanding the intreaties of Montjoye, De Barois, and other officers of diſtinction, he retired in great confuſion, firſt, to the abbey of Duparc, and afterwards to the other ſide of the river Dyle, behind Louvain.

The Imperialiſts, who acknowledged a loſs of 700 men, (that is to ſay 2000 in both actions) were ſo much diſcouraged that they took no advantage of this cowardly retreat, which left a very dangerous interval between General Le Veneur and General Champmorin.

General Le Veneur had fought with great vigour during the whole action, but, ſeeing himſelf abandoned by La Marche, he alſo paſſed the Dyle, without waiting for any orders, and poſted himſelf between Coorbeeck and Heverle.

After the defection of theſe two diviſions, Dumourier was compelled to order General Champmorin

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to abandon Pellenberg, and to retreat alſo behind Louvain, paſſing through the city, and by the abbey of Vlierbecke.

General Miaczinſky retired by a bridge on the high road of Dieſt, being protected by a battery of cannon placed on the heights above.

Dumourier availed himſelf of theſe two days, to remove his wounded, and the flour for his army, in boats, to Malines. Other articles belonging to the troops were thrown into the river; but the confuſion attending the evacuation of Louvain, and the avarice of individuals, cauſed a great quantity of theſe articles to fall into the hands of the enemy, who entered Louvain that very evening, as the general retired with the garriſon, conſiſting of five battalions, which formed his rear guard. The Imperialiſts alſo took ſome boats laden with wounded, which the eſcort abandoned on ſight of a few huſſars. Theſe wounded ſoldiers were treated with great humanity, notwithſtanding the atrocious calumnies of the Jacobins, ſpread with a deſign of irritating the French troops, and of inſtigating them to make war without quarter, and with greater barbarity.

The diſgraceful retreat of the French from Louvain, is among the inſtances that prove how delicate and dangerous is the ſituation of the generals commanding the French armies. Having determined on their plan of attack or defence, and having given their orders for its execution, they will be continually ſubject to defeat and ruin, if they have not other plans in reſerve to ſtand in the place of orders

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ill executed or diſobeyed: they can have no reliance on the generals under their command, who are frequently the firſt to give the example of diſobedience, and ſometimes of cowardice: they can never depend for a moment on the real ſtrength or poſition of the corps that are not in their ſight, ſince officers, as well as men, deſert or change their poſition at pleaſure: they have no means of remedying theſe ills, ſince they dare not puniſh, being certain of making moſt dangerous enemies of thoſe whoſe faults they do but reprove: they are ever in danger of wanting even food for their troops, becauſe the ancient ſyſtem of providing neceſſaries for the army has been changed, to ſerve the purpoſes of ignorant and ſelfiſh men: and, they will ſeldom dare to hazard the great movements that decide the fate of war, with ſoldiers, who, though preſumptuouſly brave, are deſtitute of good officers, are ill armed, inexperienced, eaſily diſcouraged, mutinous, fond of reaſoning, and altogether let looſe from military law.

But, if a General be notwithſtanding ſucceſsful, the calumnies of the Journals and Clubs await him, and he is ſure of being accuſed before the ſuſpicious, blind, and imprudent Convention. If he be unfortunate, the whole weight of reſponſibility is thrown upon him, and he is branded with the name of coward or traitor.

Such is the ſituation in which the Republic of France places her generals in a war, on which depends, not only the political exiſtence of the nation, but the individual liberty of every citizen.

Dumourier

Dumourier has been replaced by Dampierre, who had the good fortune to be killed in battle; Dampierre by Cuſtine, who periſhed on a ſcaffold; the latter by Houchard, who was diſgraced the moment that he had defeated the Duke of York, and raiſed the ſiege of Dunkirk; and it is the deteſtable Jourdan * who now commands the army, which alone ſtands between Paris and the vengeance of the powers of Europe.

In Alſace, on the ſouthern frontier, and in the interior part of France, we have ſeen the ſame ſucceſſion of generals. Every old and experienced officer has been driven from the ſervice; and phyſicians, painters, and poſtilions command armies. It is ſaid that Caligula made his horſe conſul. People of France, become as degenerate as you are cruel, you yourſelves prepare the inſtruments of your deſtruction!

* We are aſſured by emigrants, arriving here from the army, that it is not Jourdan, of Avignon, who commands the armies. ——*Note of the Editor* §.

§ By the above note it appears that Dumourier had miſtaken General Jourdan, who defeated the barbarians at Maubeuge, for Jourdan the Aſſaſſin of Avignon. T.

CHAP. IX.

Retreat to Bruſſels.—Evacuation of Bruſſels.—Camp of Enghien.—Camp of Ath.—Conference at Ath with Colonel Mack.—The Arreſt of General Miranda.

THE diſorder accompanying the retreat from Louvain utterly checked the energy the army had diſplayed in the two preceding combats. Happily, night concealed this univerſal defection of the troops from the enemy, who, notwithſtanding the verbal ſtipulations agreed to by Colonel Mack, would probably have ſeized upon this opportunity to deſtroy or entirely diſperſe the French army.

Dumourier with great difficulty prevailed on the troops to halt on the heights of Coztenbergue, half way on the road to Bruſſels. And this new calamity induced him to make an entire change in the diſpoſition of the ſeveral corps under his command. He ſent an order to General Duval to prepare for the evacuation of Bruſſels. He removed old General la Marche from the command of the advanced guard, which he gave to General Vouillé. He formed this advanced guard, which was now become the rear guard, of a ſtrong body of the artillery, of all the cavalry of the army, and of twenty-five battalions, almoſt the whole of which were troops of the line. He himſelf took poſt in this rear guard which amounted to near 15,000 men, and which indeed

indeed might be ſaid to be his army. The other part of the troops marched under the protection of this choſen body, which behaved in a manner worthy the importance of its ſtation.

Dumourier eſtabliſhed his camp under the walls of Bruſſels, by the ſide of the little river of Woluwe, having his right at San-peters-woluwe, and his left at Vilverde. Having taken the precaution of tranſporting his park of artillery to Anderlecht, he ſent it off on the 23d to Tournay, by the road of Enghien and Ath, keeping only the cannon neceſſary for his rear guard.

The Prince of Cobourg, who was ignorant of the deplorable condition of the French troops, no doubt deemed himſelf happy in the ſuſpenſion of arms which procured him poſſeſſion of the Netherlands, without further combat. But reſiſtance on the part of Dumourier could only have tended to lay waſte the country without enabling him to keep his footing in it. Since the Emperor Joſeph demoliſhed the ſtrong places of thoſe Provinces, they are deſtitute of any point that can reſiſt an invading army; a battle gained gives the conqueror fifty leagues of country, or perhaps drives the vanquiſhed to the extreme frontier.

The engagements entered into by Colonel Mack were faithfully obſerved by the Prince of Cobourg, who remained three days at Louvain, ſending only ſmall detachments to hang upon Dumourier's rear guard. The General was therefore at liberty to provide for the ſafety of Bruſſels, and of the other great cities through which the French army were

compelled to paſs on their retreat. Juſtice and humanity demanded that the Belgians ſhould not be pillaged, and it was eſſential to avoid every means of irritating them. They had pardoned the exceſſes committed by the French, and had rendered them new ſervices, and it was a duty to avoid opening the recent wounds of the country, ſince in that caſe deſpair would have again driven them to arms, and the French, ſurrounded by the Auſtrians and Belgians, had been entirely ſacrificed.

On the 25th, the army paſſed through Bruſſels, obſerving the greateſt order and good conduct, and proceeded to Hall, from whence the General deſigned they ſhould march in two columns to the frontiers of France. No pillage was committed by the troops, nor were any inſult offered, or reproaches made on either part. The inhabitants of Bruſſels did not forgive this ſervice rendered them by General Dumourier. They have expreſſed their remembrance of it by marks of public eſteem *. Dumourier reflects on the juſtice they have done him with pleaſure, and he would not have been proſcribed, and a fugitive, had he every where found equal juſtice.

The General's object now was to provide for the ſafety of the different detached forces, and to con-

* Dumourier will be ever reſpected and beloved by the Belgians. It was in the attempt to ſave them from the decree of the 15th of December that he fell. They will never forget the courage and humanity he exerted in their behalves. The EDITOR *ventures to make this promiſe in the name of his country.* Note by the Editor.

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cert ſuch movements as that their retreat might keep pace with his.

While General Beaulieu was penetrating with ſeven or eight thouſand men by Huy, the Prince of Hohenloe was advancing by the province of Luxemburg againſt Namur, which was occupied by 15,000 men, under the command of General d'Harville. But this diviſion had been formed at the expence of the garriſons of Givet and Maubeuge; and the Prince of Hohenloe, turning by one of theſe places, might make himſelf maſter of it, and penetrate into France.

Dumourier commanded General d'Harville to leave 2500 men with proviſions and ammunition in the citadel of Namur; and, dividing the remainder of his troops in two columns, to ſend one to Givet under the command of Lieutenant-general Bouchet, and to retire with the other toward Maubeuge; halting firſt at Charleroy, and afterward poſting himſelf on the heights of Nimy above Mons. In this poſition General d'Harville would cover Maubeuge, la Queſnoy, Condé and Valenciennes; and, as he would be reinforced at Mons with the diviſion of General Neuilly, conſiſting of 6000 men, his diviſion would be augmented to 12,000 men, beſide the reinforcements daily arriving.

In anſwer to theſe inſtructions, General d'Harville informed Dumourier, that he had neither proviſions, ammunition nor money ſufficient to provide for the citadel of Namur ſcarcely for fifteen days order; that he muſt either abandon the citadel or defend it with the whole of his diviſion; and demanded of General Dumourier determinate orders in what

what manner to conduct himself. With these dispatches from General d'Harville, came also letters to the same effect from General Bouchot, and documents from the Commissary Barneville that justified his statements.

Dumourier had no need to deliberate upon the orders it was necessary to give General d'Harville. To leave this division at Namur, was to risk the loss of Givet or Maubeuge, both in want of troops, and had either of them fallen into the hands of the enemy, the division of Namur would have been easily surrounded; and to leave 2500 men in the citadel, without money and ammunition, was in effect to deliver them to the Austrians. He therefore ordered General d'Harville entirely to evacuate Namur, and retire in good order to Givet and Maubeuge.

Dumourier considered the six battalions posted in Breda, and the three in Gertruydenberg, as lost, yet their having provisions for four or five months, and great store of ammunition, would, he knew, enable them a considerable time to stop the progress of the Prussians and Dutch. In order to keep open a communication with this division of his army, Dumourier saw it was necessary to secure the citadel of Antwerp, and commanded General Berneron to post himself in that citadel with 2000 men, and six months store of provisions.

Dumourier appointed Lieutenant-general Omoran to the command at Dunkirk, and along the sea coast of the department of the North; and ordered him to repair the lines and forts of the intrenched camp between Dunkirk and Bergues; to form an intrenched

ed camp on Mont-Caſſel; to go in perſon to Courtray to take upon him the command of the army of Holland, and to poſt it in the camp of Haerlebecke, having the Scheldt in front.

He ſent orders to General Maraſſé and General Ruault, to make their retreat, paſſing the Scheldt by the extremity of Flanders through Ghent, to the camp of Courtray, or Haerlebecke, while the garriſon of Malines ſhould retire to the ſame place by Dendermonde along the Scheldt; being careful not to precipitate their retreat, and to cut down the bridges after them.

General Dumourier's deſign was, if he could have held the citadels of Namur and Antwerp, to have formed a ſtrong line, without the territory of France, running from the right to the left by Namur, Mons, Tournay, Courtray, Antwerp, Breda, and Gertruydenberg. In this ſituation, if the ſuſpenſion of arms ſhould have continued, he hoped to have greater influence on the re-eſtabliſhment of order in France. In the caſe of the ſuſpenſion of arms being broken, the Imperialiſts finding themſelves in the centre of a ſemicircle, would be compelled to commence their attack at the two extremities to proceed with ſafety, which would turn the campaign into a war of ſieges on their part, carried on at the expence of their own territory. Thus Dumourier would have gained time to re-organiſe and reinforce his army: which, having the ſtrong places of France behind it, might have been reſtored to its former confidence.

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On this ſuppoſition Dumourier would have occupied the city of Tournay, and the camp of Antoing; from which place, if the enemy had been greatly ſuperior, he could have retired to a very ſtrong poſition in his former camp of Maulde.

In purſuit of this plan (which had undergone no other change, than that of the evacuation of the citadel of Namur) he marched on the 26th to Enghien, and on the 27th to Ath, while the diviſion of General Neuilly marched to Mons by Hall and Braine.

At Ath, he received orders from the Convention, to arreſt the colonel of the 73d regiment of infantry, (who had abandoned the army without orders, taking with him his two battalions, and returned to France,) and alſo General Miranda. Dumourier executed the order that reſpected General Miranda with regret, ſince he was perſuaded, that this rigorous meaſure was leſs an act of juſtice, than the effect of the hatred of the Jacobins againſt Pethion and the Girondiſts, who were the friends and protectors of Miranda. This general found means to eſcape the danger in accuſing Dumourier, after his quitting the army; an event which was extremely favourable to Miranda.

On the ſame day Colonel Mack arrived at Ath; a verbal agreement was again entered into between that officer and Dumourier; but this was in much more formal terms than the former. The colonel began by expreſſing the acknowledgments of the Imperialiſts, for the peaceable manner in which the retreat of the French troops was conducted, in conſequence

ſequence of the prudence of General Dumourier's orders; by which means the country was ſpared the moſt frightful diſaſters. On the other hand, he noticed the moderation ſhewn by the Imperial general, who, while he forbore to haraſs the French troops on their retreat, took care, nevertheleſs, to conceal from both armies the connivance between the two generals.

It was agreed upon by Dumourier, and Colonel Mack, that the French army ſhould remain ſome time longer in the poſition of Mons, Tournay, and Courtray, without being haraſſed by the Imperial army; that General Dumourier, who did not conceal from Colonel Mack his deſign of marching againſt Paris, ſhould, when their deſigns were ripe for execution, regulate the motions of the Imperialiſts, who ſhould only act as auxiliaries in the execution of their plan; that, in the caſe of Dumourier's having no need of aſſiſtance, which was to be greatly deſired by both parties, the Imperialiſts ſhould not advance farther than the frontier of France, and that the total evacuation of Belgium ſhould be the price of this condeſcenſion; but if Dumourier could not effect the re-eſtabliſhment of a limited monarchy, (not a counter revolution,) he himſelf ſhould indicate the number and the kind of troops which the Imperialiſts ſhould furniſh, to aid in the project, and which ſhould be entirely under Dumourier's direction.

Dumourier made Colonel Mack acquainted with his deſign of marching the following day to Tour-

nay, with the march of General Neuilly to Mons, and of the army of Holland to Courtray.

It was finally decided, that in order to combine the operations of the Imperial troops under the Prince of Cobourg, and thoſe under the Prince of Hohenloe, at the time when Dumourier ſhould march to Paris, Condé ſhould be put into the hands of the Auſtrians, as a pledge; that the Auſtrians ſhould garriſon the town, but without any pretenſions to the ſovereignty, and on the condition that it ſhould be reſtored to France, at the concluſion of the war, and after an indemnity ſhould have been ſettled by the two parties; but that all the other towns belonging to France, ſhould, in the caſe of the conſtitutional party needing the aſſiſtance of the Imperialiſts, receive garriſons, one-half of which ſhould be French troops, and the other half Imperialiſts, under the orders of the French. General Valence, General Thouvenot, the Duke de Chartres, and Colonel Mountjoye, aſſiſted at this Conference.

CHAP. X.

Camp of Tournay.

ON the 28th, Dumourier marched to Tournay, and took the poſition of Antoing, having his advanced guard in Tournay, and the flanking corps of the left, commanded by General Miackzinſky, on Mount Trinity. He ſent General le Veneur with

with the army of the Ardennes, to occupy the camp of Maulde.

In this was Madame de Sillery, with Mademoiſelle d'Orleans, whom the general had never till then ſeen. Theſe ladies had taken up their reſidence at Tournay, on the advice which Dumourier had before this given to Lieutenant-General Omoran, who then commanded in the Tournaiſis; becauſe Mademoiſelle d'Orleans, who was no more than fifteen years of age, was proſcribed in France by the decree againſt the Emigrants. This young Princeſs (who as well as her brothers, the Duke de Chartres, and the Duke Montpenſier, is perfectly well bred, and well informed) is an example of virtue, reſignation and conſtancy.

The Duke de Chartres, who had ſerved the preceding campaign with diſtinguiſhed valour, and a pure and diſintereſted patriotiſm, and who had recently diſplayed a degree of courage, and civiſm, reflecting honour on the French name, was included in the decree of baniſhment, rendered againſt the houſe of Bourbon, and would have been ſubject to the cruelſt vexations the moment that he ſhould enter France.

Dumourier, during the two days that he paſſed at Tournay, teſtified by every circumſtance in his power the lively concern that he took in the fate of this unfortunate and amiable princeſs. As both ſhe and Madame de Sillery were greatly in dread of falling into the hands of the Imperialiſts, becauſe of the influence which they ſuppoſed the emigrants to poſſeſs with the Emperor, Dumourier on his departure from

Tournay, cauſed them to be conducted to St. Amand. When the general's protection, far from ſerving, might have been fatal to thoſe ladies, they accepted of an aſſylum in Mons, offered them by the Imperial generals. If the virtues of Mademoiſelle d'Orleans do not find their recompenſe, at leaſt, may ſhe find protection from the hands of a beneficent Providence.

While Dumourier remained in the camp of Tournay, he received intelligence, that General Neuilly's diviſion, on arriving at Mons, inſtead of encamping on the heights of Nimy, had pillaged the magazines, and afterward fled in total diſorder (without, however, being attacked by the enemy,) to Condé, and Valenciennes. The cavalry only remained with General Neuilly, and Dumourier commanded him to retreat with thoſe to Condé, ſpreading over as much ground on his march as he could between Binche, Roeux, Soignies, and Leuſe; carrying off with him the forage, horſes, and carriages, and cutting down the bridges behind him.

The evacuation of Mons rendered Dumourier's ſituation at Tournay very dangerous, his right being altogether unprotected; but, independent of the ſuſpenſion of arms, his knowledge of the country made him ſecure of his retreat, which he was unwilling to undertake, till he ſhould have known what movement was made by his left. He, therefore, only took the precaution of commanding General d'Harville to confine himſelf within the camp of Maubeuge and Givet, in order to prevent the enemy

my from penetrating on the French territory, on that ſide.

On the 29th of March, three deputies from the Jacobins arrived at Tournay. They introduced themſelves to the general by ſaying, that they bore a commiſſion from Le Brun; and, preſenting a letter from that miniſter, conceived in vague and uncertain terms; they declared they had communications to make to him reſpecting the affairs of Belgium. Theſe three men were Proly, a contemptible adventurer born at Bruſſels; Desjardines, a writer of little note, who had been formerly driven from Bruſſels; and Péréira, a Portugueſe Jew. The firſt of theſe we have ſeen was already known to the general; the ſecond called himſelf a man of letters, and the third was a furious Jacobin. They were offended that the general refuſed to enter on the ſubject of their embaſſy, before Mademoiſelle d'Orleans, to whoſe apartments they had expreſsly come to utter a Philippic againſt the General. He made an appointment to meet them at his own quarters.

The converſation that took place between Dumourier and theſe men, is pretty nearly ſuch as they have reported it to be. They agreed with him in his opinion of the imbecility of the convention, and on the neceſſity of diſperſing that aſſembly, and eſtabliſhing ſome other legiſlature. After that, they ſounded the general reſpecting the perſons who ſhould ſucceed the convention in their authority; and one of them ventured to ſay, that the Jacobins had their preſident, regiſters, tribunes, orators, as well as the habit of diſcuſſing or determining great con-

concerns; and that, therefore, there was no need to look further. Dumourier, in his uſual ſincere and deciſive manner, utterly rejected this idea; grounding his objection on the immorality, raſhneſs, cruelty, and incongruous qualities of that ſociety; to which all the misfortunes of France, he declared, were to be attributed.

Proly ſaid, *how then will you be able to replace the preſent repreſentatives of the people, and at the ſame time avoid the delays and other defects of the mode of election by primary aſſemblies?* The general anſwered, *nothing is more ſimple, or more eaſily accompliſhed. The patriotiſm of the adminiſtrators of the departments and diſtricts is, at preſent, well tried and approved. For this one time, it is but to take all the procureurs-general of the departments and diſtricts; and to complete the number by members of the departments and diſtricts. Theſe will form a very competent legiſlature; they will re-eſtabliſh the conſtitution of* 1789; *all diviſions will be healed in France; the Royaliſts will lay down their arms; foreign powers will no longer have any colour for carrying on the war, and France, having a ſolid government with which they can treat, will liſten with readineſs to terms of peace: for do not imagine,* the general added, *that the Republic can continue to exiſt; your crimes and your ignorance have deſtroyed its poſſibility.*

Theſe three men made ſome objection to the general's propoſitions, but they liſtened very tranquilly to thoſe *blaſphemies* of the general, of which they afterward gave ſo dreadful an account. Deſjardines, who proceeded further than the reſt in his addreſs

addreſs and artifice, ſaid, that he ſhould return to Paris to give an account of his miſſion; and that he hoped ſoon to ſee the general again. They took their leave of Dumourier without moleſtation; and certainly, he never thought of arreſting emiſſaries of ſuch little conſequence.

General Dumourier has no doubt that, had he ſeconded their idea of replacing the National Convention by the ſociety of Jacobins, he had entirely gained the confidence of that ſociety; but he acknowledges that his temper, perhaps too ſincere in this inſtance, robbed him of the poſſibility of ſeeming to yield to their meaſures. He inſtantly perceived that he could not turn this inſtrument to his purpoſes, but by plunging into a ſeries of horrid crimes; and the events that have ſucceeded, have proved to him, that his judgment was not erroneous.

On the ſame day, he received a letter from the ſeven commiſſioners of the convention, met at Liſle, who commanded him to appear in that city, to anſwer to the charges alledged againſt him. He anſwered, that being in ſight of the enemy, employed in re-organizing his army, and reſtoring its courage, (which was indeed true) he could not quit the army for an inſtant; but if the commiſſioners would come to him at Tournay, he would anſwer every accuſation with his uſual frankneſs; that when he ſhould have accompliſhed his retreat, and the army ſhould be ſafe in the French territory, he would have more leiſure to take into conſideration his perſonal affairs; in a word, that he would never enter Liſle, except-

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ing it ſhould be with troops to puniſh cowards, who had abandoned their colours and calumniated the moſt intrepid defenders of their country.

CHAP. XI.

Retreat to the Camp of Maulde.

GENERAL DUMOURIER was extremely uneaſy reſpecting the fate of the troops at Antwerp; having received no intelligence from that quarter, and fearing indeed, that General Ruault who bore his orders to General Maraſſé, had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

The retreat from Antwerp acroſs the Scheldt, by the extremity of Flanders, was long and difficult. But Dumourier knew that the enemy were leſs numerous in that quarter than the troops at Antwerp. The Pruſſians and Dutch were before Gertruydenberg and Breda; and Colonel Mylius, who preſented himſelf before Antwerp, had not more than 2000 men, and thoſe were irregular troops of the Imperial army.

But the French troops at Antwerp had fallen into ſtill greater diſorder than any other part of the army. They were ſeized with a panic, and the generals were no longer maſters of them. On the 26th, Colonel Mylius had the audacity to ſummon the city. Part of the French troops had already croſſed

croſſed the Scheldt, but, inſtead of waiting for the remainder, they precipitately retired by Bruges to Dunkirk, excepting a ſmall body of them, which Colonel Thouvenot prevailed upon to halt at Ghent. General Maraſſé had ſunk the Ariel frigate according to Dumourier's inſtructions, after ſending away her maſts, rigging, and guns, by the canals, to Dunkirk. He had alſo ſent away part of the magazines of the garriſon, but a great part ſtill remained, and more than 8000 men.

As the terror and confuſion which before had ſpread among the troops redoubled on the approach of Colonel Mylius, a council of war was held, in which it was unanimouſly decided, that it was more prudent to ſave this part of the army together with the magazines and other effects belonging to the French nation, than obſtinately to riſk the loſs of the whole.

It is impoſſible for Dumourier to form a candid judgment of this capitulation, ſince the rapid ſucceſſion of important events that followed, prevented him from any perfect knowledge of the circumſtances of the garriſon. The Imperialiſts are extremely dextrous in the diſpoſition and conduct of their advanced guards, multiplying them to the eyes of an enemy, and miſleading the enemy reſpecting their real force. It is alſo to be preſumed, that the French generals, embarraſſed and diſconcerted by the diſorder prevailing among their troops, imagined the whole Pruſſian and Dutch army to be before the place. No excuſe, however, is to be made for their having ſurrendered the citadel, which was al-

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together independant of the city, and in no one caſe ought to have been included in that capitulation.

On the 27th or 28th of March, the French troops quitted Antwerp. None of them paſſed by Courtray, and they were not at liberty to encamp at Haerlebecke, as had been deſigned. They entered the French territory in different bodies, and at different times, and part of them were diſpoſed of by General Omoran in the camp of Caſſel and the lines of Dunkirk, and the remainder helped to form the camp of Madelaine, near Liſle.

It was not till the 29th that Dumourier received intelligence of this diſperſion of more than 20,000 men of his army, and even then his intelligence was unaccompanied by any detail. The diſperſion of the body of troops under Neuilly, and the evacuation of Mons, had expoſed his right, and that of Courtray now expoſed his left to ſtill greater danger, which the enemy might turn, approaching by the left of the Scheldt, and ~~if he~~ ſhould be compelled to retreat before the enemy in the preſent diſpoſition of his troops, he had nothing to expect but to be compleatly routed.

For theſe reaſons, he reſolved to raiſe the camp of Tournay in the morning of the 30th. He had before this, ſent General le Veneur to occupy that of Maulde. He ſent the army of the North, by the bridge of Mortagne, to encamp in the ſtrong poſition of Bruille, which he ordered to be joined by three bridges to the camp. He ſent General Miaczinſky with 4000 men to occupy Orchies, to ſecure a communication with Liſle, and he eſtabliſhed his

head quarters with his park of artillery at St. Amand.

By the unexpected ſurrender of the citadel of Antwerp, the garriſons of Breda and Gertruydenberg were entirely cut off from all communication with the army. They amounted to near 6000 men, that were on the point of being ſacrificed without the hope of aſſiſtance, and without any ſervice to enſue to France. Dumourier, therefore, ſent orders, through the medium of Colonel Mack, to General de Flers, and to Colonel Tilly, who commanded in thoſe two places to capitulate, on condition of being at liberty to march to France with arms and baggage. This was accordingly done; and was an important ſervice rendered France, ſince one half of the army had already deſerted.

At this period the ſafety of the frontier towns in France was entirely owing to the ſuſpenſion of arms; for had the Imperialiſts preſſed forward, ſuch was the diſorder prevailing in the French army, they muſt have penetrated the frontiers.

In the midſt of this chaos of things, and of the diſcontents and diſorders that reſulted in the French army, the troops never ceaſed to expreſs an attachtachment to their general, rendering juſtice to his efforts to preſerve them from ruin. The rear guard, and the troops of the line eſpecially, who had always ſeen him the laſt in every retreat, in the day or at night, and always expoſed to the greateſt danger, were moved with reſpect, and even compaſſion for the general, and with extreme reſentment againſt his enemies, the Jacobins and the National Conven-

tion. A wiſh for the re-eſtabliſhment of a limited Monarchy was almoſt general in the army. A few of the battalions of volunteers only dared openly to eſpouſe the Republic. The cavalry, and the troops of the line, were altogether decided; and the artillery declared that, in every caſe, they would defend their general. It was openly propoſed to march to Paris, and to overthrow the Anarchiſts, to whom the army juſtly attributed the whole of their diſgrace and misfortunes. It being ſaid that the general was to be commanded to appear at the bar of the National Convention, their conſtant language was, that they themſelves would conduct the general to Paris, and would ſhare his fortunes.

Dumourier attentively obſerved this diſpoſition in the troops, which he ſaw was ſupported by the complaints of the generals, and of the greater part of the other officers. Theſe latter, ſeeing the generals under whom they had been conducted to victory, outraged in the Jacobin Journals, accuſed of treachery, arreſted, and treated without regard to decency or juſtice, naturally concluded, that their own elevation to the ſuperior ranks, would but expoſe them to the ſame diſaſters. Some of the generals, however, among whom was Dampierre, kept up a perfidious correſpondence with the leaders of the Anarchiſts; and, hoping to ſupplant their ſuperiors, by the aid of the preſent diſorders, they loudly proclaimed the ſame doctrines as their colleagues of Paris, and by their falſe inſinuations kept alive the Jacobin phrenzy that infected part of the army.

The

The two parties were now in the greateſt fermentation, and the conteſt tended to an iſſue which could not but be prompt and violent. Three Commiſſioners of the Convention, Lequinio, Cochon, and Bellegarde were in Valenciennes; theſe already treated the army and its generals as rebels, would not permit any communication between them and the garriſon, and ſtopt their convoys of proviſion and money. They were bold enough to hazard a manifeſto againſt Dumourier, which they ſent to the army, and the garriſon of Condé.

The garriſon of Condé, conſiſting of four battalions and a regiment of cavalry, under General Neuilly, were extremely divided in opinion, but they ſeemed to incline to ſupport Dumourier, to whom General Neuilly was altogether attached.

At Liſle, the conteſt was ſtill more marked and more violent. The Commiſſioners of the Convention, who had made this place their point of union, and the Jacobin Club inſtigated an extremely numerous populace againſt the higher rank of citizens. On the other hand the ſoldiers, eſpecially the troops of the line, broke out into tumults, and ſpoke loudly in behalf of their general, and againſt the Anarchiſts. But they were without leaders, and their meaſures were void of plan and conduct. Aſſignats were alſo ſucceſsfully diſtributed among theſe troops, and the ſame means were employed in the army under the general's immediate command, and even with thoſe neareſt to his perſon.

The Commiſſioners of the Convention alſo endeavoured to accompliſh their deſigns by aſſaſſination.

On

On the 31ſt of March, ſix volunteers, of the third battalion of La Marne, demanded leave to ſpeak to the general, who ordered them to be introduced. They entered with their hats on, the back part being placed in the front, having the word *Republic* chalked on them. They made a long and fanatical harangue to the general, the purport of which was, that they, and many others of their comrades, had ſworn to ſend him to the bar of the National Convention, or, in imitation of Brutus, to ſtab him. Dumourier anſwered with great compoſure and gentleneſs, that they were blinded by a miſtaken zeal; that they could not but perceive the unfortunate condition of France; and that the rage with which remedies were applied, ſerved only to prove the impoſſibility of maintaining the Republic, ſince an unjuſt and unreſtrained government could not long exiſt. While the general ſpoke, they approached with a deſign of ſurrounding him, which, perhaps, would have been effected, but for the intrepidity of the faithful Baptiſte, who ſeized upon the foremoſt, and called the general's guard to his aſſiſtance. The volunteers attempted to reſiſt, but they were overpowered; and the general not only ſaved their lives, but prevented their being ill treated. He contented himſelf with ſecuring their perſons in priſon.

The indignation of the army was general; and on the ſame day the different corps preſented addreſſes ſigned by individuals of every rank, profeſſing an inviolable attachment to their general; and the greater part of them expreſſing their deſire of marching to Paris to re-eſtabliſh the conſtitution.

After

After hoſtilities had been thus commenced by the Commiſſioners of the Convention, and after the troops had thus declared their wiſhes, Dumourier ſet about the means of making himſelf maſter of Valenciennes, Condé, and Liſle; without which he could ſtrike no blow of importance.

He now readily acknowledges that, although he did not for a moment loſe ſight of his object, he failed in neglecting means which, doubtleſs, were neceſſary at that period; but which he was induced to reject by his averſion to perfidy and cruelty. He relied too confidently on the ſtrength of his legitimate means, and on the good faith and conviction of his troops; and he neither counteracted his enemies by corruption, nor deſtroyed the more inveterate of them when it was in his power. A meaſure was propoſed to him that was probably eſſential to his intereſt. It was, to aſſemble the troops of the line in a camp, apart from the reſt, and to diſarm and diſband the national guard. But this could not be accompliſhed without a dreadful effuſion of blood; for there had long exiſted an extreme animoſity between the national guards, and the troops of the line. There were many of the battalions of national guards, who had ſerved under his command with great valour, and had lately preſented addreſſes to him, couched in loyal and ſtrong terms; and he could not prevail on himſelf to recompence them with diſgrace, or perhaps, with death. And, if he ſhould make exceptions in the execution of the plan, thoſe might include diſguiſed anarchiſts; and he could no longer rely with ſafety on his troops.

Hiſtory

Hiſtory preſents no example of opinion having agitated the paſſions of men to ſo exceſſive a degree, of having ſo greatly disfigured their characters, and of having ſo compleatly bereaved them of all the ſocial affections, as in the French Revolution. The love of liberty was a noble paſſion in 1789. It became licentious in 1790 and 1791. By the ſucceſſes of the year 1792, the love of freedom, inſtead of being exalted into heroiſm, degenerated into a blind, inſolent, and barbarous phrenzy; and the period that we are reviewing in theſe memoirs added to the ferocity of its ſpirit.

The ſtruggle for aſcendancy was not equal between Dumourier and the Jacobins. His means were enfeebled by his ſcruples. The crimes of the Jacobins were not to be cruſhed but by crimes more incredible than theſe; corruption was to be oppoſed by corruption, and treachery and cruelty to the atrocities and horrors of the Jacobins. The ſect of the Jacobins was not to be annihilated but by a monſter more frightful than itſelf; or by a foreign ſword. And hence the ſequel of this hiſtory, is no more than an account of the miſtakes of Dumourier; who embraced the incompatible deſigns of preſerving his own eſteem, and purging the nation of her crimes.

In a converſation he had formerly held at Louvain with Danton and La Croix, on a propoſal made by thoſe Commiſſioners relative to a conduct they wiſhed the general to adopt in Belgium, by no means very reputable; the general obſerved (and he has ſince repeated the obſervation to Camus) that he would

would never commit an action which he regarded as a crime, even for the ſalvation of his country. He has ſince been told that Danton ſaid, *General Dumourier wants energy; his mind has never riſen to the true revolutionary pitch.* The revolutionary pitch *roſe* after that period; and Dumourier, who has not changed, could not but fail in the ſtruggle, ſince to ſucceed it was neceſſary to diſplay crimes greater than thoſe with which he had to combat.

Dumourier ſent orders to General Miaczinſky, who was at Orchies, to march with his diviſion to Liſle; to arreſt the Commiſſioners of the Convention, and the leaders of the Clubs; to proceed from thence to Douay and remove General Moreton from the command of that town; to proclaim there and at Liſle the unanimous reſolution of the army to reſtore the Conſtitution; and afterward to proceed by Cambray to Peronne, where he was to take poſt.—This unfortunate general did not ſufficiently perceive the importance of his charge. He ſpoke of it to various perſons, and among the reſt to St. George, the celebrated Mulatto, Colonel of a regiment of Huſſars, who betrayed the general and drew him into Liſle with a very ſmall eſcort. The moment Miaczinſky entered the town, the gates were ſhut upon him. He was arreſted, conducted to Paris, and brought to the ſcaffold. This officer was a native of Poland, and was one of the chiefs of the confederation, at the time that Dumourier was charged by the court of France to direct its operations. Miaczinſky had been made priſoner in an engagement with the Ruſſians; and afterward, claiming an indemnity

demnity from France, in which the General could not find means to ſerve him, he had obtained for him the rank of major-general, and permiſſion to raiſe a free corps, and had afterward employed him with great utility to France and the army. Miaczinſky, brave in war, did not diſplay the ſame courage in his perſonal defence when he was taken, nor at his death. He accuſed Dumourier of various crimes againſt the nation; and even of ſome groſs frauds, that were no doubt ſuggeſted to him by the enemies of Dumourier. He alſo accuſed La Croix, which was the cauſe of his ruin.

Miaczinſky's troops, after they were quitted by that officer, wandered on the Glacis of Liſle, into which place the garriſon would not admit them. Dumourier, receiving intelligence of this, ſent one of his aids-de-camp, Colonel Philip de Vaux, to put himſelf at their head, and to conduct them to Orchies and Douay. De Vaux was arreſted through the treachery of a brother officer, taken to Paris, and executed. He died with great courage and conſtancy.

Philip de Vaux was born at Bruſſels, had ſerved in Auſtria, and had afterward taken part againſt the Emperor in the revolution of his own country. Dumourier had known him at Paris, and appointed him his aid de-camp. He was a man of capacity, of great courage, and of an exalted and feeling mind. In fine he poſſeſſed the qualities neceſſary to make a general officer.

The garriſon of Valenciennes was commanded by Major-General Ferrand, whom Dumourier had raiſ-

ed to the rank of Colonel, and afterward to that of major-general; and whom he believed to be attached to his intereſts. This officer was of an age not very liable to be heated with opinions; and, till this period, had appeared to be well informed and moderate. But characters moulder away before opinions, and Ferrand became one of the moſt intemperate of Dumourier's accuſers, and one of the firmeſt ſupporters of the anarchiſts.

The grand provoſt of the army, named l'Ecuyer, demanded of Dumourier as a favour, the charge of arreſting the Deputies at Valenciennes. He was no ſooner in that city, than he became their confident, and inſtrument; although by a ſtrange accident he periſhed afterward on the ſcaffold. While he was in Valenciennes he had written a circumſtantial letter to the general, reſpecting the arrangements he had made for arreſting the deputies, and this letter was found in the pocket of the general's great coat, on the 4th of April.

Theſe two men, Ferrand and l'Ecuyer, undermined the general's plan for making himſelf maſter of Valenciennes; theſe being at firſt confidentially communicated to them; and they effected an entire change in the diſpoſition of the troops which he had contrived to ſend there.

Dumourier's deſign on Liſle and Valenciennes, being thus ſuddenly defeated, he had no other reſource than to make himſelf maſter of Condé. The ſituation of the army, on the extreme frontier of France, was become altogether embarraſſing. The army depending upon the ſtrong towns for ſubſiſt-

ence, Dumourier was compelled either to diſband them, or to join the Imperialiſts, unleſs he could obtain poſſeſſion of one of the ſtrong towns. The firſt of theſe meaſures would have deprived him of all reſource, and given a deciſive victory to the Anarchiſts. The ſecond was repugnant to the feelings of the general, and the troops, inſpired by the laudable principle of national honour; and he could not have obtained the univerſal conſent of his army to this meaſure, ſince the opinions of the troops were divided, and ſince the indefatigable intrigues of the Jacobins had wrought ſuch a change in the diſpoſition of the ſoldiery. And the latter was impracticable, becauſe the General had no artillery to undertake a ſiege; his artillery being ſent to Liſle when he retreated from Belgium. The third of theſe meaſures alſo, muſt have produced a civil war. A regular ſiege would have demanded length of time, during which the ſoldiery would have made the ſame reflections that operated on the mind of Dumourier, and which continually reſtrained him in the plans that ſeemed neceſſary to his object: theſe reflections regarded the horror of ſeeing Frenchmen combat each other, having foreigners for ſpectators, to whom both parties would have become a prey, when they ſhould be mutually incapable of further reſiſtance.

Dumourier therefore thought of leading his army to Paris. But he could ſucceed in that, only in having the majority of opinions with him. Every other expedient was at once painful and uncertain. Every day, every hour diminiſhed his hope. He beheld

beheld his ſituation, without deceiving himſelf, and without being ſubdued by his difficulties. He regarded them under every aſpect, and he cannot now recollect the firſt five days of April without horror.

CHAP. XII.

Arreſt of the Commiſſioners of the Convention, Camus, La Marque, Bancal, and Quinette; and of Beurnonville, Miniſter of War.

ON the firſt of April, General Dumourier, in order to be nearer his army, and to favour a project of ſurpriſing Valenciennes, (which had been propoſed to him, and which failed by the miſconduct of the general officer who was charged with its execution,) removed his head quarters from the city of St. Amand to the ſuburbs; where was ſtationed a choſen body of cavalry, and where he was alſo nearer Condé. Various circumſtances had prevented his proceeding in the firſt inſtance to the latter city, but in that neglect he committed a great error, and perhaps it was the cauſe of compleating the ruin of his affairs. Perhaps it had been better if he had at firſt eſtabliſhed his head quarters at Condé; but the events that paſſed in that period were ſo ſudden and unforeſeen, he was ſo effectually ſhut out from intelligence, and was ſo compleatly ignorant of all that paſſed beyond Valenciennes and Liſle, and he

was

was ſo entirely occupied in obſerving and moulding to his purpoſe the diſpoſitions of his army, that to blame or juſtify the conduct into which he was driven by this ſtrong chain of circumſtances, it is neceſſary to have been in his ſituation.

Perhaps even it is well for him that he did not make himſelf maſter of Condé, for if the inconſtancy of the French character had then cauſed a defection in his army, being in the center of that ſtrong city, he had been delivered up to his enemies, or maſſacred by his own troops.

The commiſſioners of the Convention availed themſelves of Dumourier's heſitation in this reſpect to viſit Condé, and to iſſue proclamations, circulate aſſignats, and fill the town with emiſſaries of the Jacobins. The ſixth regiment of infantry, the only corps of troops of the line which had diſcovered a decided ſpirit of Jacobiniſm, and a battalion of National guards of Verſailles, ſtruck terror into the mind of General Neuilly, who thenceforward was no longer maſter of the place; although he perſuaded himſelf that he was, and continued to aſſert it to Dumourier, who too long relied on his ill-founded confidence.

In this battalion of Verſailles, was a captain of the artillery company, named Le Cointre, ſon of the celebrated deputy of that name of Verſailles. This young man declaimed vehemently againſt the advocates of the conſtitution; and, being rudely handled on that account by ſome dragoon officers, he quitted the garriſon to lay his complaints before Dumourier, who cauſed him to be arreſted, that he might

might have an hoſtage for himſelf, in the perſon of the ſon of one of the moſt furious among the members of the *Mountain*. Dumourier alſo cauſed to be arreſted a lieutenant-colonel, an officer belonging to the ſtaff of the army, who declaimed openly and vehemently againſt him: and having no ſecure place in which he could keep theſe priſoners, he ſent them together with the ſix volunteers, who had attempted to aſſaſſinate him, to Tournay; requeſting General Clairfait to keep them as hoſtages in the citadel.

Lieutenant-General le Veneur, who at the time of La Fayette's deſertion had followed that officer, and who was indebted to Dumourier for his pardon, and his re-eſtabliſhment in his rank, now came to Dumourier to demand permiſſion to retire from the army, on the pretence of being in an ill ſtate of health. His object was, to obtain the command of the army of the Anarchiſts. Dumourier granted him permiſſion to retire, and alſo to a general named Stetenhoffen, a foreigner whom Dumourier had made major-general. Dampierre, was at Queſnoy with his diviſion, and carried on a treaty with the commiſſioners of the Convention, as did alſo General Chancel, who was cantoned at Freſnes. And their example was followed by General Roſieres, and General Kermorvan, who had the command of the Belgians in the camp of Bruille.

Dumourier was the more affected by theſe inſtances of treachery, becauſe all thoſe officers had been indebted to him for their rank, had complained more loudly than any others againſt the anarchiſts,

and

and had preſſed with more ſeeming impatience the execution of his deſign of reſtoring order. Excepting Dampierre who died in the command of the army, and Chancel who replaced Neuilly at Condé, and was obliged to ſurrender after a long ſiege, theſe officers have been puniſhed for their ingratitude, by the ſuſpicions and diſdain of their patrons, and the loſs of their employments. This unhappy example of treachery of ſuperior officers, who were in appearance moſt attached to the cauſe of the general, could not fail to produce a pernicious effect on the ſoldiery, and add ſtrength to the party of the Jacobins.

Dumourier now ſaw that he could no longer hope to march to Paris without oppoſition from his army, as the temper of his troops at firſt ſeemed to promiſe. He ſaw that he would have to commence by a civil war, which he had always thought of with repugnance; and to compel one part of his troops to combat the other, a dreadful extremity for a general who regarded his ſoldiers as his children, and who had never conducted them but by his kindneſs, and the influence of a mutual affection.

Another circumſtance rendered him timid, and deprived all his meaſures of energy. This was, the danger of the priſoners in the temple. It was to be feared that the Jacobins would inſtantly ſacrifice theſe unfortunate victims, whom they already treated too unworthily to afford any hope that they would ſpare them in the firſt moments of their fear and reſentment. Had thoſe priſoners been ſacrificed in conſequence of Dumourier's march to Paris,

ris, he would have incurred the reproaches of Europe, and hiſtory would have conſigned him to infamy; while he would have prepared for himſelf an anguiſh, that would have endured through the remainder of his life.

General Dumourier from the time of his being at Tournay, inceſſantly meditated on this dreadful circumſtance. Beſide General Valence, the Duke de Chartres, and General Thouvenot, who partook of his councils, he alſo confided his thoughts on this ſubject to Colonel Montjoye, and Colonel Nordmann, colonel of the regiment of Berchiny. He propoſed to ſend thoſe two officers with three hundred huſſars to Paris, on the pretext of arreſting deſerters, and ſending them back to the army. He meant to have given them diſpatches to the miniſter of war, which would have juſtified their going to Paris, and would have given it a natural air, in the caſe of their being interrogated. They were to proceed as covertly as poſſible by the foreſt of Bondy; and afterward, reaching the priſon by the Boulevard of the temple, were to force the guard, making falſe attacks in ſeveral different points, carry off the four illuſtrious priſoners, placing each of them behind an huſſar, and having a voiture ready in the foreſt, to puſh forward with the utmoſt ſpeed to Pont St. Maxence, where another body of cavalry were to be poſted to receive them.

But to this end it was neceſſary to be in poſſeſſion of either Valenciennes, or Liſle; and the circumſtances that followed defeated the project, to which thoſe two worthy officers whom we have juſt named,

were altogether devoted. There remained no means of ſaving the illuſtrious priſoners from the rage of the Jacobins. To form a conſpiracy in Paris demanded time, and the emigrants had ſo ill ſucceeded in attempts of that nature, that it had been madneſs in the general to have placed any confidence in ſuch a plan. Deprived then of all hope of delivering the priſoners, the general had no other reſource in their behalf, than to poſſeſs himſelf of hoſtages for their ſafety. Hence he had ſo anxiouſly ſought to ſeize upon the Commiſſioners of the Convention at Liſle, and Valenciennes; and he was now determined to detain ſuch as might put themſelves into his power.

On the morning of the 5th of April, a captain of Chaſſeurs, whom Dumourier had poſted at Pont-a-Marque, on the road between Liſle, and Douay, with fifteen truſty and reſolute men under his command, with orders to arreſt any couriers, but above all the Commiſſioners of the Convention, if they took the road from Liſle to Paris, brought him advice that Beurnonville the miniſter of war had paſſed them on his road to Liſle, and had informed him (the captain of Chaſſeurs) that he ſhould afterward proceed to the head quarters of his friend General Dumourier. The intimacy that ſubſiſted between this miniſter and the General was known. Dumourier was aſtoniſhed that he had received no courier from Beurnonville, nor any manner of advice reſpecting his journey, at a time when the General could no longer doubt of his being proſcribed, and when the *Rubicon* was already paſſed. This was the

the firſt and the only intimation which Dumourier received to prepare him for the important ſcene that followed.

About four o'clock in the evening, two couriers came to the General to announce the arrival of the miniſter of war with four Commiſſioners of the National Convention. Terror and deſpair were painted on the countenance of theſe meſſengers. Interrogated by ſome of the ſtaff officers reſpecting the cauſe, they did not heſitate to ſay that General Dumourier was utterly loſt, that the Commiſſioners came to conduct him to the Bar of the Convention in virtue of a decree, but that the General would never reach Paris, ſince aſſaſſins were planted on the road by bands of twenty and thirty, at Gournay, Roye, and Senlis, in order to murder him. They even indicated who theſe aſſaſſins were, being Soldiers belonging to two new raiſed regiments, called the Huſſars and Dragoons of the republic. The General had broken a ſquadron of the Huſſars, for having refuſed to obey their Colonel, and had ſent them back to France on foot and without arms, which the Jacobins had reſtored them in order to aſſaſſinate their General. The regiment of Dragoons conſiſted of men who had committed numerous crimes at Paris, from which they had been ſent with great difficulty to join the army, where they attempted to repeat their crimes. Their conduct was cowardly, and attrocious, and the General was compelled to act with ſeverity toward them on his retreat from the Netherlands. They afterward deſert-

ed and fled to Paris, whence they were now diſpatched to be the accomplices of the Huſſars.

Immediately afterward the miniſter of war appeared, followed by the four Commiſſioners, who were Camus, La Marque, Bancal, and Quinette. The miniſter after embracing the General, with expreſſions natural to their mutual attachment, informed him that the Commiſſioners came to notify to the General a decree of the National Convention. General Valence was already with Dumourier, and the reſt of the ſtaff officers now crouded into the apartment. Partaking of the opinions of their general as they had partaken of his fatigues, dangers, victories, and defeats, his fate was not to be ſeparated from theirs; and indignation rather than inquietude was expreſſed in their looks. Dumourier ſaw that this temper of mind might break out into violent conſequences, which induced him the more to preſerve the compoſure with which he was determined to act in this critical moment.

Dumourier would be unjuſt if he did not offer the homage of his eſteem and gratitude, to thoſe generous men, who in the midſt of his diſgraces preſerved the conſtancy of their friendſhip to him, and their attachment to principle, by ſacrificing emoluments and honors, to follow him in his retreat. Nor can he forbear here to record the magnanimity of General Valence, who being offered the command of the Armies on condition of arreſting Dumourier, not only ſpurned at the offer without heſitation, but concealed the dangerous temptations laid before him

him by the commiſſioners of the Convention from the knowledge of Dumourier.

Camus ſpoke for the members of this deputation. In a manner that expreſſed ſome degree of irreſolution, he requeſted the general to go into another room with the deputies, and miniſter of war, in order to hear a decree of the Convention reſpecting him. The general anſwered, that as all his actions had ever been public, and as the ſubject of a decree paſſed by ſeven hundred perſons could be no myſtery, he ſaw no reaſon for complying with the requeſt, and thought that the officers who were preſent ought to be witneſſes of whatever ſhould paſs in this interview. Beurnonville, however, as well as the deputies, urged the requeſt with ſuch appearance of reſpect that the General went with them into an inner room, but his ſtaff officers would not permit the door to be cloſed, and General Valence entered the room with him.

Camus preſented the decree to Dumourier; who, having read it with perfect compoſure, returned it, and obſerved, that forbearing within certain limits to condemn a deciſion of the National Convention, he could not but judge this order to be untimely, ſince the Army was diſorganized and diſcontented, and ſince his quitting it in that condition would be followed by its total diſſolution: that it would be prudent to ſuſpend the execution of the decree, till he ſhould have reſtored the Army to its proper footing, when he would be ready to render an account of his conduct; and when it might be decided whether circumſtances required or permitted his appear-

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ance at Paris: that he read in the decree, an article empowering the commiſſioners to ſuſpend him from his functions and appoint another General, in the caſe of his diſobeying the order; that the Convention having charged them with a commiſſion including ſuch ſeverity toward the general, and of ſo delicate a nature with reſpect to themſelves, had certainly relied no leſs on their prudence than on their firmneſs, that therefore he would throw himſelf on their diſcretion and would not poſitively refuſe obedience, but merely demand a delay in the execution of their order: that, in fine, being now judges of all the circumſtances, they could eaſily reſolve on the conduct that became them, and if they were determined upon ſuſpending him, he would meet them half way, by himſelf offering his reſignation to them, which he had ſo often tendered during the laſt three months to the Convention.

Camus replied that the deputies had no authority to receive the General's reſignation; and then ſaid, *But if your reſignation were accepted of, what would be your conduct afterwards? I ſhould act as ſhould become me*, the General anſwered; *but I have no heſitation in declaring to you, I will neither by going to Paris ſubject myſelf to be treated unworthily by fanatics, nor to be condemned to death by a revolutionary tribunal.—Then you do not acknowledge the authority of that tribunal*, ſaid Camus.—*I recogniſe in it*, replied the General, *a tribunal of Blood and of Crimes, to which I will never ſubmit while I have a ſword that will not deceive me. I moreover declare, that had I the power I would aboliſh it, as being a diſhonour to a free Nation.*

The

The other three deputies, who were men of much more temper and moderation than Camus, perceiving that the converſation became intemperate, interpoſed, and endeavoured to convince the general that the Convention had no inimicable deſigns againſt him; that he was loved and eſteemed by every one, and that his preſence in Paris would deſtroy the calumnies of his enemies; that his abſence from the troops would not be long, and that the deputies and miniſter of war would remain with the army till his return. Quinette offered to accompany the general to Paris to be the pledge of his ſafety, and to return with him, making the moſt fervent proteſtations that he would perſonally expoſe himſelf to all danger in the general's defence. After this, the converſation became cool and temperate. Bancal, a man of reading and talent, endeavoured to win the general by his regard for his name, and cited examples of obedience and reſignation to the laws in the moſt celebrated of the Greeks and Romans. *Let us have done with miſtakes, Sir,* ſaid the general; *we degrade the Roman hiſtory; and diſfigure the Roman virtues, that they may ſerve as an excuſe for our crimes. The Romans did not maſſacre Tarquin. The Roman republic poſſeſſed a ſtable government and juſt laws. They neither had a Jacobin club, nor a revolutionary tribunal. We are in a ſtate of anarchy. Ferocious men thirſt for my blood, and I am not willing to give it them. Since you ſeek your examples among the Romans, I tell you that I have often acted the part of Decius but never will that of Curtius.*

The deputies aſſured Dumourier that he had formed

formed an unjuſt idea of the ſtate of Paris; and that indeed he was neither called before the Jacobins, nor the revolutionary tribunal, but to the bar of the National Convention, and that he would ſpeedily return to his poſt.

I paſſed the month of January at Paris, ſaid the general, *and ſurely that city has not become more reaſonable ſince, eſpecially in this moment of public danger. I know, by the moſt authentic of your journals, that the Convention is governed by Marat, the Jacobins, and the tumultuous tribunes filled with the emiſſaries of the Jacobins. The Convention has not the power of ſaving me from the fury of theſe men; and, if it became the reſpect that I owe myſelf to appear before ſuch judges, even my deportment would provoke my death.*

Camus then returned to his categorical queſtion. *You refuſe to obey the decree of the Convention?* The general anſwered that he had already ſtated to the deputies his view of the ſubject. He urged them to take a moderate courſe, and exhorted them to return to Valenciennes, and from thence to make a report to the Convention, ſetting forth the general's reaſons, and ſupporting thoſe, by ſhewing the impoſſibility of taking the general from his army at this inſtant, without incurring the greateſt riſk of diſbanding it.

Dumourier acknowledges that, had they yielded to theſe counſels, he ſhould have been imprudent enough to have permitted their departure. The colleagues of Camus appeared by no means to be unwilling to liſten to reaſon, although on his part, he rudely

rudely repulſed every conciliatory meaſure. *Call to mind*, ſaid one of them, *that your diſobedience in this caſe will cauſe the ruin of the republic.—Cambon ſaid in your tribune amidſt burſts of applauſe*, anſwered the general, *that the fate of the republic reſts not upon any one man. I have, beſide, to obſerve that the name of republic does not belong to us; our condition is an abſolute anarchy. I ſwear to you that I have no deſire to elude enquiry. I promiſe you on my honor, a pledge that is inviolable with military men, that when the nation ſhall have a government, and laws, I will give a faithful account of my actions and motives. I will myſelf demand a trial. At preſent, it would be an act of inſanity in me.*

The conference laſted more than two hours, but this which has been ſtated was the exact purport of it. The deputies retired into another chamber to decide on the courſe they ſhould purſue.

Dumourier was at this period deceived reſpecting the deſigns, and conduct of General Beurnonville; in conſequence of which he has made unjuſt complaints of that miniſter. He learned afterward from a virtuous and impartial man, that Beurnonville was conſtant in his friendſhip to Dumourier; and the groſs accuſations of Marat againſt that miniſter is an additional proof of the fact: and Dumourier is eager to make this public avowal of his error.

It is certain that Beurnonville, being ſeveral times appealed to by Dumourier reſpecting the conduct he would obſerve in this caſe, conſtantly ſaid, *I cannot adviſe you. You know what it becomes you to do.* As

ſoon as the deputies were withdrawn, the general complained that Beurnonville had forborne to give him intelligence of the approach of this important event, at the ſame time however requeſting him to join the army, and again to take upon him the command of the advanced guard. Beurnonville anſwered, *I know that I ſhall fall a ſacrifice to my enemies, but I have reſolved to die at my poſt. My ſituation is terrifying. I ſee you are decided, and that the ſtep you will take is of the moſt deſperate kind. I demand as a favor at your hands that you will not ſeparate my fate from that of the deputies.—Be aſſured that I will not*, anſwered the General. Dumourier was at that moment unjuſt to the magnanimity of Beurnonville, whom he conſidered to be perfidious, or at the beſt, unworthily carried away by circumſtances. May he receive ſome conſolation in this juſtice rendered to him by Dumourier. And may his heart, juſtly offended, be open to receive the atonement of his friend!

Beurnonville, Valence, and Dumourier returned to the officers, who impatiently waited the reſult of this long conference. But their inquietude was not entirely diſſipated, for the general did not then acquaint them with the reſolution he had taken. Theſe officers have ſince told him that, had he conſented to go to Paris, they would have prevented it by violence.

When the deputies firſt arrived at the general's quarters, the regiment of Berchiny was drawn up in the court-yard; and the general had commanded colonel Nordmann to ſelect an officer on whom he could

could rely, together with thirty men, and to hold them in readineſs to execute his orders. The paſſions by which the troops were agitated were forcibly expreſſed in their looks, and the general exerted his influence to moderate them.

In this interval while the deputies were deliberating, Dumourier in walking met doctor Menuret, ſurgeon to the army, and ſaid to him, *Well doctor, what remedy ſhall we apply to this wound?* Menuret anſwered quickly, *the ſame as in the preceding year at the camp of Maulde: a grain of diſobedience.*

In about an hour the deputies returned to the General's room, Camus much agitated, ſaid harſhly, *Citizen General, are you ready to obey the decree of the National Convention, and to go with us to Paris?* The General replied, *Not in this inſtant.*—*Then* ſaid Camus, *I ſuſpend you from your functions. You no longer command the armies. I forbid all perſons to obey you, and command every one to aſſiſt in arreſting you. I will go myſelf and place the ſeals on your papers.*

A murmur of indignation was heard. *Give me the names of thoſe perſons*, Camus cried out rudely, pointing to the officers around him. The General anſwered, *They will themſelves give you their names.*—*I have now other employment*, replied Camus, who no longer knew what he ſaid: *I demand your papers.*

Dumourier now ſaw that the emotion of his officers was at its height and on the point of producing ſome raſh action. He ſaid, in a firm tone, *This is inſufferable. It is time to put an end to ſuch inſolence.* And, in the German language, he commanded the Huſſars to enter. He then ordered the officer of the

huſſars to arreſt the four deputies, and the Miniſter of war, but not to do them any perſonal injury, and to leave Beurnonville his arms.

Camus then ſaid, *General Dumourier, you are about to deſtroy the Republic.—Say, rather it is you, old madman*, the General replied to him.

They were conducted into another chamber; and after having dined were conveyed in their own carriage to Tournay, eſcorted by a ſquadron of the huſſars of Berchiny. Dumourier ſent a letter to General Clairfayt, ſaying that he ſent him hoſtages, who would be reſponſible for the exceſſes that might be committed at Paris. He requeſted General Clairfayt to treat the miniſter of war, with more diſtinction than the reſt.

Such were the facts relative to the arreſt of the Commiſſioners of the Convention, which was a meaſure forced on the General by circumſtances. As to the act of delivering them into the hands of the Imperialiſts, it is to be remembered that Dumourier had no fortreſs in which he could keep them in ſafety, and that the Imperialiſts being as deeply concerned as himſelf in the fate of the priſoners of the Temple, they could not be placed in any hands ſo ſure. They could be detained merely as hoſtages, nor was there any danger to their perſonal ſafety, their detention being ſimply anact of precaution on the part of Dumourier. Beſides, it is to be recollected, that the Pr nce of Cobourg conſented to act on the footing of an auxiliary to General Dumourier, in this war, for the overthrow of the Jacobins, and for the re-eſtabliſhment of the Conſtitu tion

Hence

Hence theſe hoſtages were not really priſoners of the Imperialiſts, but thoſe of General Dumourier, for whom they held them. The deputies and the miniſter of war were ſent to Maeſtricht, where they were kept till a change of circumſtances required their removal.

This event is one more inſtance of the blind precipitation attending upon all the meaſures of the National Convention. It is to be remarked alſo, that Camus, who went poſt from Liege to vote for the death of Louis XVI. had in this laſt inſtance, ſuddenly quitted the frontier, to procure the arreſt of General Dumourier, had himſelf dictated the decree, and had demanded to be charged with its execution. It was therefore that he was ſo unrelenting during the conference, leſt his colleagues ſhould have yielded to perſecution, and ſhould have returned to Valenciennes, as they were counſelled to do by the General.

CHAP. XIII.

Attempt to aſſaſſinate General Dumourier on the 4th of April. Events of the 5th of April. Departure of General Dumourier.

IMMEDIATELY after this important event, Dumourier ſent Colonel Montjoye to acquaint Colonel Mack with the circumſtance; and to appoint a time and place, for a conference between the Gene-

ral and Colonel Mack, for the purpoſe of finally concluding upon the terms of their treaty, and for ſettling the meaſures that ſhould be reciprocally taken, according to the conduct that ſhould be adopted by Dumourier's army after this deciſive period. Being informed that a congreſs of the Miniſters of the Combined Powers would ſpeedily be held at Antwerp, Dumourier ſent General Valence to Bruſſels that he might be nearer the neighbourhood of the Congreſs. During the night, Dumourier compoſed a ſhort manifeſto, which was digeſted and put into form the following day. In this, he drew up a recital of the facts of that day, and expoſed his motives for arreſting the Commiſſioners of the Convention. He particularly inſiſted on the neceſſity of poſſeſſing hoſtages, a regard for whoſe ſafety might prevent the crimes in which the Jacobins might otherwiſe indulge on learning the event.

On the morning of the 3d of April, the General went to the camp, and addreſſed the troops on the part he had acted, who appeared to approve of it with enthuſiaſm. He went afterward to St. Amand, in which place were the corps of artillery, who teſtified the ſame approbation of the General's conduct, as the troops in the camp, although the moſt indefatigable zeal to ſeduce this corps was employed by the emiſſaries of the Jacobins of Valenciennes, and eſpecially by two of Dumourier's ſuperior officers, one of whom, a Lieutenant-colonel named Boubers, had received very particular obligations from the General.

Dumourier

Dumourier deemed it prudent to ſleep at St. Amand, for the purpoſe of marking his confidence in the troops there; and at this place Colonel Montjoye brought him the anſwer of Colonel Mack. It was agreed that the following morning the Prince of Cobourg, the Archduke Charles, and the Baron de Mack ſhould meet General Dumourier, between Bouſſu and Condé, for the purpoſe of reſolving on the movements of the two armies, and reſpecting the direction of the ſuccours that ſhould be granted of Imperial troops in the caſe of Dumourier's having occaſion to demand them.

The whole day of the 3d of April paſſed with as great ſucceſs as the General could expect. The army appeared of one mind, with the exception of ſome murmurs that were heard among ſome of the battalions of volunteers: and a movement which the General prepared to make on the 5th, was calculated to baniſh the ſecret means of intrigue. The General deſigned to take a new poſition with the greater part of his army near Orchies, by which means he would remove the troops from the dangerous neighbourhood of Valenciennes; would deſtroy the leiſure that belongs to a permanent camp, and in which intrigues have the greateſt ſcope for action; and would be able to menace Liſle, Douay, and Bouchain. He acknowledges that, had he adopted this plan immediately on his entering the territory of France, he would probably have been more ſucceſsful. But, at that period he relied on Valenciennes and Condé; and, perhaps, it is to this error that the ſequel is to be attributed.

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It is, however, difficult to determine at preſent what would have happened in that caſe. The character of the events of that period, is ſuch as no prudence could foreſee; ſince they were the ſudden acts of the caprice of the people, which were ſubject to no calculation, and that followed each other with a rapidity to which neither foreſight nor talent could oppoſe any obſtacle. And it muſt be acknowledged that the principle, which ſo abruptly detached the French ſoldiers from a General whom they had previouſly adored, has an aſpect that cannot be regarded without approbation. They were in arms for the liberty of their country. They ſaw their General treat with the enemy. They thought themſelves betrayed, and they paſſed from an eſteem for their General, to the hatred of him. They were not informed of the purport of his negotiations, nor of the care the General had taken in that treaty, of the intereſts, and honor of his country. He had not been able to do more, with reſpect to his troops, than to ſtate to them in general terms the neceſſity of changing the government, and putting an end to anarchy. They applauded the deſign; but, as the General had not aided his plan by ſeductions, nor by terrors, the firſt impreſſion wore eaſily away; and the activity of the Jacobins, more conſtant, more vigilant, and of a nature much more adapted to make impreſſions upon them, was employed with the utmoſt ſucceſs.

The groſſeſt calumny takes root ſpeedily in the minds of men; but, more than in any other time, in a period agitated by the dæmon of anarchy.

Suſpicion

Suſpicion ripens in times of revolution. The word *Traitor* being once pronounced, the multitude endeavoured to find, in the definition of this word, the exact portrait of the General, whom proclamations, but ſtill more the baſer intrigues of corruption, devoted to diſgrace. His prudence was now artifice; his love of the public welfare, perſonal ambition; and a ſilence dictated by his judgment, knavery. One quarter of an hour employed in the concealed labour of falſehood, ſupported by the powerful engine of corruption, effaced all ſober reflection in men, whoſe condition precludes them from much thought, and who delight in barbarous and bloody ſcenes.

If we coolly examine the progreſs of this revolution, we ſhall ſee that the activity of the *Guillotine* is the motive of the high patriotiſm of the French. The ſpectacle of ſevered heads, of torn limbs, carried in proceſſion throughout Paris and other cities, has begotten a terror in ſome, and in the reſt an audacious barbarity; and in both caſes has produced a deciſive effect, leading the former by fear, and the latter by the neceſſity of providing for their impunity, to the endleſs multiplication of murders. The conſequence is, that the blood ſpilt by this dreadful engine has converted the nation into a maſs capable of effecting aſtoniſhing objects.

Frenchmen, do not be led to ſuppoſe that the indulgence with which Dumourier judges you, is an eulogium on your conduct. He deteſts your crimes. He regards the ſpecies of liberty you enjoy, as wild and incompatible with the intereſts of ſociety; and

he would rather periſh on your unjuſt and permanent ſcaffold, than be the apologiſt or partaker of your phrenzy!

This digreſſion faithfully paints the feelings of Dumourier's mind, at the dreadful period which perhaps decided the fate of France. Agitated by the various paſſions ſpringing from his ſituation, but ſtill directed by principles, he reſiſted the temptations of ambition. His juſtice would not permit him to be Cromwell, nor Monk, nor Coriolanus. His power was extreme, but his wiſhes moderate. And it is now a conſolation to him, that he is unfortunate rather than criminal.

Dumourier received various reports every inſtant, reſpecting the diſpoſition of the garriſon of Condé. Previous to his moving with his army to Orchies, he ſaw the neceſſity of aſſuring himſelf perfectly of Condé; in order to arrange the movements of the Imperialiſts, his treaty with whom he dared not avow, till he ſhould have made a declaration to his troops of his ultimate views, and ſhould have commenced his march to Paris.

On the morning of the 4th, he departed from St. Amand for Condé. He had left General Thouvenot at St. Amand, to regulate various details relative to his projected movement, and to watch the public temper. An eſcort of fifty huſſars, which he ordered to attend him, not arriving as he expected, and the time for his conference with the Prince of Cobourg approaching, he left one of his aids-de-camp to follow him with the eſcort, and departed with the Duke de Chartres, Colonel Thouvenot, Colonel Montjoye,

Montjoye, ſome aids-de-camp, and eight huſſars; forming together a company of about thirty perſons.

Dumourier proceeded toward Condé without any apprehenſion, his thoughts being deeply engaged on ſubjects far different from the fatal event which was about to arrive, and of which he had not the leaſt preſentiment.

Being within half a league of Condé, between Freſnes and Doumet, he met an officer diſpatched by General Neuilly, to inform him that the garriſon were in the greateſt fermentation, and that it would not be prudent for him to enter the place, till the commotion ſhould have ended, whether it ſhould be in his favor, or againſt him. Dumourier ſent back the officer with an order to General Neuilly, to ſend the 18th regiment of cavalry to Doumet to eſcort him.

He had a little before overtaken a column of three battalions of volunteers, marching toward Condé, with their baggage and artillery. Surpriſed at this march, for which he had given no orders, he demanded of the officers where they were going. They anſwered to Valenciennes, and he obſerved to them, that they had turned their back on Valenciennes, and were proceeding to Condé. At this time he was in the midſt of them, and had ſtopped by the ſide of a ditch to ſuffer them to paſs. He does not conceive why they did not then arreſt him.

While they were yet in ſight it was that General Neuilly's meſſenger arrived. Then comparing in his mind the tumult of the garriſon of Condé, and the unexpected march of theſe three battalions, he

withdrew an hundred paces from the high road, with a deſign of entering the firſt houſe in Doumet, for the purpoſe of writing a formal order to theſe three battalions, to return to the camp of Bruille, to which they belonged.

At this inſtant, the head of the column ſuddenly quitted the high road, and ran toward him, uttering dreadful cries. He then remounted his horſe, and proceeded at a moderate pace toward a broad ditch, on the other ſide of which was a marſhy ground. Shouts, inſults, reproaches, and above all the words, *ſtop*, *ſtop*, forced him to paſs the ditch. His horſe having refuſed to take it, he was obliged to clear it on foot. He was no ſooner on the other ſide, than a diſcharge of muſkets ſucceeded the former tumultuous cries. The whole column inſtantly was in motion; the head and the centre endeavouring to overtake him, and the rear quitting the high road with equal rapidity, to get between him and the camp of Bruille, which he was endeavouring to regain.

He was now in the moſt imminent danger. He was on foot. The Baron de Scomberg threw himſelf from his horſe, and inſiſted on the general's mounting, though with the certain ſacrifice of his own life. The general refuſed. At length he mounted a horſe belonging to a domeſtic of the Duke de Chartres, who, being extremely active, fled on foot. Dumourier's horſe was taken and led in triumph to Valenciennes. Two huſſars were killed, as well as two of the general's domeſtics, one of whom carried his great coat. Colonel Thouvenot had two horſes killed

killed under him, and ſaved himſelf at laſt by mounting behind the faithful Baptiſte, who alſo loſt two horſes. The unfortunate Cantin, the general's ſecretary, was taken and periſhed on a ſcaffold. This young man poſſeſſed great underſtanding, courage, fidelity, and patriotiſm. The three battalions fired more than ten thouſand ball.

The general, unable to regain his camp, proceeded along the Scheld, and arrived, ſtill purſued though not ſo cloſely, at a ferry, a little diſtance from the village of Wihers, which was ſituated on the Imperial territory. He paſſed the river, accompanied by five other perſons. The remainder gained the camp of Maulde, through a diſcharge of muſketry. As ſoon as the general had paſſed the river, he proceeded on foot through a moraſs, to a neighbouring houſe; where, at firſt, he was refuſed admittance, but on announcing his name was immediately received by the worthy owner. Thence he continued his route on foot to Bury, where was quartered a diviſion of the Imperial regiment of dragoons of la Tour. Here he wrote to Colonel Mack, and took ſome refreſhment, of which he ſtood greatly in need. He was already joined by the faithful Baptiſte, who paſſing through the whole of the camp, had turned by Mortagne, and had every where ſpread an alarm.

Dumourier learnt from Baptiſte, and other perſons during the courſe of the day, that the deſigns of the three battalions were entirely unknown to the troops; that, on the news of their deſertion and attempt to murder the general being ſpread, the

ſtrongeſt

ſtrongeſt indignation was expreſſed by the ſoldiery; and that the eſcort of huſſars and ſome other horſe had purſued the three battalions, who, ſuddenly wheeling, had fled to Valenciennes. Baptiſte added, that the whole camp was in a ſtate of the greateſt inquietude, and importunately demanded the return of the general.

It was now too late to rejoin his army, and it was neceſſary that he ſhould wait for Colonel Mack, to whom he owed an account of the reaſon of his failing in the appointment in the morning. That officer arrived in the evening; and Dumourier having recited to him the attempt which had been made on his perſon, obſerved, that this was the crime of individuals, which far from corrupting the diſpoſition of his troops, would neceſſarily ſtrengthen their attachment to their General, and deſtroy all their remaining connection with the Anarchiſts; that conſequently, far from being diſcouraged, his deſign was to return to his camp by day-break the following morning, to put himſelf at the head of his ſoldiers who loudly demanded his return, and to purſue his plan openly and with the utmoſt vigour.

Colonel Mack, to whom the military virtues were familiar, has ſince acknowledged that this ſpecies of courage then appeared to him more aſtoniſhing than that which is diſplayed in the dangers of a battle. Had he then ſeen all the ſoul of Dumourier, he would have found this apparent ſecurity mingled with apprehenſion, excited by the example and fate of La Fayette. But the general's reſolution was taken. He reſolved to ſacrifice himſelf throughout;

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and would not give his army occaſion to ſay, that the deſertion was on his part, or that, being recalled by his ſoldiers, he had reſiſted their wiſhes.

Dumourier paſſed part of the night in digeſting, with Colonel Mack, the proclamation of the Prince of Cobourg, which appeared on the 5th of April, with that of General Dumourier. The Imperial general in his proclamation declared, that he was now no more than an auxiliary in the war, againſt the Anarchiſts of France; that it was not the intention of his ſovereign to make conqueſts, but to co-operate, in reſtoring peace and order to France, with General Dumourier, whoſe principles, as they were expreſſed in his proclamation, he adopted.

It was again agreed by Colonel Mack, and Dumourier, that, as ſoon as the latter ſhould be maſter of Condé, he ſhould deliver it to the Auſtrians, in order to ſerve as a magazine and place of arms for the Imperial army, in the caſe of aid being demanded by Dumourier; that he ſhould be inſtantly furniſhed with ſuch ſuccours as he ſhould demand; that he ſhould ſpecify the number of infantry and cavalry to be granted him, the mode in which theſe ſhould ſerve, whether by a junction with his troops, or by making one or more ſeparate diverſions in behalf of the cauſe; that, however, Dumourier ſhould not call for ſuccours but in caſe of abſolute need, it being more agreeable to the mutual object of the parties, that he ſhould endeavour to accompliſh it, by his own troops only; and that, in caſe of his being able to do ſo, the Imperialiſts ſhould remain neuter, and ſhould not paſs the frontiers of France.

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The proclamation of the Prince of Cobourg, made in conſequence of this negociation, has been condemned, but unjuſtly. Of what real advantage had it not been to the Imperialiſts, and what ſolid glory had they not acquired, if, by enabling Dumourier to march to Paris, they could by this noble moderation have ſpared the blood and treaſure that will be waſted in this quarrel, for which the towns that may be acquired with infinite difficulty will be no manner of compenſation!

It is to be feared that an avidity for conqueſts among the belligerent powers is the real obſtacle to the termination of this deſtructive war. By this paſſion they were prevented from ſeizing upon the occaſion offered, by the departure of General Dumourier, and the conſequent annihilation of his army, of preſſing forward to Paris. The combined powers have ſince loſt their time in making a methodical war, while the French have been able to recover themſelves, and their armies have become more numerous, and better diſciplined.

On the 5th of April at day-break, Dumourier proceeded with an eſcort of fifty Imperial dragoons to the advanced guard of his camp at Maulde, where he was received with the greateſt joy. He harangued the ſeveral corps, by whom he was anſwered with expreſſions of affection. Notwithſtanding, he remarked that there were ſome indications of a contrary ſpirit, and ſeveral factious groupes aſſembled in different parts.

His next deſign was to go to St. Amand, to prepare for the movement of his troops to Orchies, according

cording to his former plan. As he was entering the city, one of his aids-de camp came toward him on the full gallop, and informed him that during the night the corps of artillery, excited by the emiſſaries of Valenciennes, who had ſpread the report that the general was drowned in the Scheldt in flying to the enemy, had ſent a deputation to Valenciennes, and that on the return of their deputies they had inſtantly roſe upon their generals, driven them from the place, and were preparing to march to Valenciennes.

Dumourier had with him, two ſquadrons of the regiment of Berchiny, a ſquadron of the huſſars of Saxe, fifty cuiraſſiers, and a ſquadron of the dragoons of Bourbon. Yielding to his emotions of paſſion, he reſolved to fall upon St. Amand with this body of cavalry. His officers, however, repreſented the danger and inutility of this ſtep, as he had no infantry at hand, and would ſubject his eſcort to be mown down by the artillery. He gave way to their reaſoning. He learnt ſhortly after that the corps of artillery went to Valenciennes. The money belonging to the army and the equipages of the officers remaining in the city without guard, he commanded them to be conducted to Rumegies, at the diſtance of a league from his camp, on the road to Orchies; that village being protected by a part of his advanced guard cantoned there.

The corps of artillery was the flower and ſtrength of the French army. Feeling its importance, it abounded more than the others in clubs and orators, and indeed might paſs for the Pretorian guard of

the revolution. When its deſertion was known in the two camps, part of the troops followed, and confuſion and diſmay were ſpread among the reſt. Several of the general officers who waited for the opportunity were eager to lead entire diviſions to Valenciennes. Thoſe who ſtill remained attached to the perſon, or principles of Dumourier, inſtead of ſhewing themſelves to their troops, and ſetting an example of courage, were ſtruck with terror, concealed themſelves, or thought only of their own ſafety. General La Marliere had been among the moſt forward of the enemies of Anarchy, and poſſeſſed the entire confidence of General Valence; who, when he departed for Bruſſels, confided the whole of his baggage and effects to him, with a requeſt that he would ſend them after Valence to Tournay. La Marliere appropriated the money, horſes, and property of his general to his own uſe, and deſerted to Valenciennes.

Dumourier was at Rumegies, dictating orders to be iſſued to the different parts of the army, when he heard of the defection of the troops in camp. Nothing was left him now but to provide for his perſonal ſafety. He mounted his horſe, attended by General Thouvenot and his brother the colonel, the Duke de Chartres, Colonel Montjoye, and Lieutenant-colonel Barrois, two or three others of his ſtaff, and ſome Aids-de-Camp, having no eſcort; and retiring to Tournay alighted at the quarters of General Clairfayt. He was followed in about an hour afterward, by fifty Cuiraſſiers, half a ſquadron of the huſſars of Saxe, and the whole of the regi-

ment of Berchiny. Thoſe brave and worthy men brought with them the equipages belonging to the general and the ſtaff officers, excepting the ſaddle horſes of the general, which were ſtolen by one of his grooms, who joined the anarchiſts.

The troops of which we have juſt ſpoken, and a few others that arrived ſhortly afterward, amounting to about ſeven hundred horſe, and eight hundred infantry, followed the General without any ſolicitation on his part; and this circumſtance renders him the more anxious reſpecting the fate of thoſe men, the companions of his former glory, and of his laſt diſgrace.

Dumourier in retiring from France invited no one to follow him. His plan had totally failed, and a few men more or leſs on either ſide would not influence events. The individuals attached to his cauſe had ties of family and of intereſt in France, and he reſolved not to multiply misfortunes without benefit. Thoſe who followed him, therefore, had the real merit of being guided by principle.

In the confuſion that ſucceeded the General's departure, none of the orders that had been iſſued were executed. Lieutenant-general Vouillé, who commanded the advanced guard, did not receive the order of withdrawing it within the camp of Maulde till the 6th, when it was no longer in his power. This General retired to Tournay, as did alſo Major-general Neuilly, who had abandoned Condé, Major-general de Bannes, Second, and de Dumas, and ſome of the principal officers of the battalions of Volunteers; where they were after-

ward joined by Lieutenant-general Maraſſé, Major Generals Ruault and Berneron, and Colonel Arnaudin.

The treaſury of the Army contained two millions of livres in ſpecie. It had been carried from St. Amand to Furnes, between Condé and Valenciennes, by a battalion of Chaſſeurs, who at firſt deliberated reſpecting the dividing of it among themſelves, but afterward being likely to quarrel, in order to avoid the bloodſhed that would enſue, made a merit of their patriotiſm and conducted it to Valenciennes. Soliva, a commiſſary of the army of the Ardennes, purſued theſe troops with a ſquadron of the Dragoons of Bourbon, retook the money on the Glacis of Valenciennes, and led it back to Furnes; but being preſſed by new battalions was again obliged to abandon it. Soliva and the dragoons retired by Mons. They might have brought off the money had they paſſed by Bruille, and Mortagne, but the confuſion of the moment prevented recollection and foreſight. If the treaſury of the army had been ſaved, the General's ſituation had been very different; and the little army that followed his fortunes, would have increaſed rapidly, being in a ſtate to pay them, inſtead of being as he really was, without money. This circumſtance proves, that the pay of the army was not embezzled by him, nor employed as a means of corruption. Dumourier placed little confidence in means of corruption, in which as the leader of a party his conduct was greatly erroneous.

Dumourier

Dumourier had not the qualities that was requiſite for the leader of a party. It is probable that he would have filled the ſtation of a General or an Ambaſſador with ſucceſs, under a ſtable government, whether monarchical, or republican. But the violent ſtate of things in France, deſtructive of all his pre-conceived ideas of juſtice, and injuſtice, threw him entirely out of his ſphere. His activity, ſo greatly ſpoken of even by his enemies, was repreſſed by his dread of committing crimes; and he preferred his own eſteem to ſucceſs. Thus in his firſt reflections, after his retreat among the Imperialiſts, he ſaw the cauſe of his failure in himſelf, but he felicitated himſelf on the fact. To have ſwayed the fortune of France, had undoubtedly given him a noble place in hiſtory; but to have been indebted for it, to the flagitiouſneſs of his conduct, was too ſevere a condition; and he was happy in reſigning one to eſcape the other.

He invites men of high ſtations to examine themſelves with the ſame auſterity; and moraliſts, to ſtudy the influence which character has on events. Cæſar and Pompey, determined a noble quarrel by noble means, and on both ſides were diſplayed greatneſs of mind, virtues, and talents. Had thoſe men been ſurrounded with the loweſt vices of the meaneſt claſſes of ſociety, they would have fled, or would have fallen victims. It demands a Maaniello to conduct the populace. But when a great nation becomes an entire populace, neighbouring nations are thrown into the greateſt embarraſſment; becauſe the electric

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ſpirit ſpreads with more rapidity among the people, than among the higher orders of men.

CHAP. XIV.

Dumourier at Mons.—Eſtabliſhment of the French at Leuze.—Congreſs of Antwerp.--Second proclamation of the Prince of Cobourg.—Departure of the General for Bruſſels.

GENERAL CLAIRFAYT gave orders for the reception of the French troops which might arrive, in the villages round the town of Leuze, which was fixed upon for the reſidence of the French general officers; and Dumourier departed for Mons, accompanied by the Duke de Chartres, Colonel Thouvenot, Colonel Montjoye, and Lieutenant Colonel Barrois, paſſing by Bury, to concert meaſures with the officer commanding the Imperial advanced poſt, for protecting the retreat of ſuch of the French as ſhould join the Imperialiſts.

The Imperialiſts were faithful to their truce. It is certain had they fallen on the French camps on the 5th of April, they might have utterly deſtroyed the army. Their conduct was therefore highly honourable; yet, without incurring the blame of perfidy, perhaps on that day they ought to have made a movement with their army, taking poſſeſſion of the camp of Maulde, and ſhewing themſelves at

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St. Amand: they not only would have found no reſiſtance, but probably would have been joined by ſeveral battalions of the French, which during more than four-and-twenty hours, appeared by their movements to be irreſolute as to the conduct they ſhould purſue. But however this may be, the fidelity of the Imperialiſts to their engagements, is to be applauded. Their motives were moſt worthy, as well as the generoſity with which they received the French refugees, who certainly had been among the braveſt of their enemies.

Dumourier found Colonel Mack at Bury, from which place, they departed together for Mons, in the general's carriage. It was agreed between them, that the Imperialiſts ſhould inſtantly beſiege Condé, and that the place ſhould be ſummoned in the name of General Dumourier, who accordingly wrote the ſummons and ſent it the following day to the Imperial head quarters. It was further agreed that a return ſhould be made of the officers and ſoldiers which accompanied or followed Dumourier; that, conſidering their having unfortunately loſt their military cheſt, they ſhould receive the pay of their reſpective ranks, at the rate that officers of the ſame rank in the Imperial ſervice were paid, and ſhould be placed on the ſame footing; that a commiſſary of war belonging to the Imperial army ſhould be attached to theſe troops, together with a French commiſſary, to certify the juſtice of the returns; that an advance ſhould be made from the Imperial treaſury of 30,000 florins, which ſhould be put into the hands of the French ſtaff officers for the pay of their

their troops; that Dumourier ſhould have the rank, and eſtabliſhment of *Feld-zeugmeiſter* (general of artillery); and that finally, this pay and advance ſhould be only regarded as a loan to the party of Dumourier, and that the general ſhould engage, as ſoon as any progreſs ſhould be made in France, to reimburſe this ſum to the Imperial treaſury.

It is a conſolation to General Dumourier, that the companions of his misfortune continue to enjoy this eſtabliſhment. Indeed they have, ſince that period, been ſubjected to the condition of taking an oath, which was not in the firſt inſtance required; but at that period they were the ſoldiers of a party which no longer exiſts, and it has been ſince deemed neceſſary to demand that ſecurity for their fidelity. Dumourier would himſelf become their pledge with readineſs, having throughout the war tried their fidelity, courage, and reſignation. Let them accept of this teſtimony of the eſteem and affection of their general, and may they be recompenſed for their virtues in contributing to the ſucceſs of the power whom they will faithfully ſerve.

In purſuance of theſe arrangements, Dumourier cauſed, by the order of the Prince of Cobourg, 10,000 florins to be advanced to the French troops at Leuze; unwilling, through motives of delicacy, to take the whole of the money agreed to be advanced, becauſe in penetrating ſpeedily into France this ſum would have ſerved till they could have proceeded further into the interior part of the country; and Dumourier appeals to the Prince of Cobourg, Colonel Mack, and the other principal officers of

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the Imperial army, reſpecting the clearneſs and diſintereſtedneſs of his conduct. It was further decided, that the general, till he ſhould be employed with his troops, ſhould be provided with quarters, near thoſe of the Prince of Cobourg; and the Imperial head quarters being eſtabliſhed at Bouſſu, General Dumourier's quarters were fixed at the abbey of St. Ghiſlain.

Dumourier makes here an avowal of his gratitude to the genaral officers of the Imperial army, by whom he was treated with diſtinguiſhed marks of regard, and more particularly by the Archduke Charles, and the Prince of Cobourg. At this time was formed a friendſhip between Colonel Mack, and Dumourier, which on the part of the latter will never be diminiſhed. Colonel Mack, is an officer of uncommon virtue, and military talents, and the unbounded confidence placed in him by the Imperial army, is the juſt recompence of his ſervices. It is greatly to be hoped, for the intereſt of the Houſe of Auſtria, that the health of this officer will be reſtored.

During two days that Dumourier was at Mons, he was treated by the inhabitants in a manner that is flattering to his own honour; and his reception was the ſame at Tournay, Leuze, and indeed, throughout the whole of that country; theſe worthy people being ſenſible of the ſervices he had rendered them, eſpecially on his return from Holland, and during the retreat of his army to France.

It would be injuſtice not to name an inſtance of the delicate attention of the Prince of Cobourg to

Dumourier's ſituation. The General ſeeing a corps of two hundred chaſſeurs belonging to the emigrants, as they paſſed through Mons, on their route to join the advanced guard of the army, repreſented to the Prince of Cobourg, that this mingling of the emigrants with his troops could not but produce fatal effects, eſpecially on entering France; and the Prince of Cobourg inſtantly gave counter orders to the chaſſeurs; ſending them by Namur, to ſerve in the advanced guard of the Prince of Hohenloe.

The Prince of Lambeſc-Lorraine teſtified alſo to the general his gratitude for the eſſential ſervice rendered to his houſe by Dumourier when he was Miniſter of Foreign Affairs, in preventing an unjuſt confiſcation of his property, and of that of the Princeſs of Vaudemont.

On the 7th of April, the Prince of Cobourg departed, with Colonel Mack, to attend the Congreſs, held at Antwerp; from which place he returned on the evening of the 8th. Dumourier paſſed thoſe two days at Leuze, in the midſt of his comrades, whoſe uneaſineſs he diſſipated by informing them of the eſtabliſhments made for them by the Imperialiſts. General Vouillé took the command of theſe troops; and Dumourier, aſſiſted by General Thouvenot, began to reform them, according to the regulations of the Imperial army; which was the more neceſſary, as the refugees were compoſed only of fragments of the different corps: with the exception of the regiment of Berchiny. Dumourier quitted the companions of his misfortunes on the evening of the 8th, and felt ſome preſentiment that he ſhould not return

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to them. On the morning of the 9th, he arrived at Mons, where he found the Prince of Cobourg, ſetting off for his head quarters. Dumourier went there alſo; and, after treating further on what regarded their mutual intereſts, he went in the evening to the quarters which had been prepared for him at the abbey of St. Ghiſlain.

On the morning of the 10th of April, a proclamation of the Prince of Cobourg was brought to Dumourier, dated the 9th, which entirely annulled the former proclamation of the 5th; and declared expreſsly, that the Prince of Cobourg would thenceforth carry on the war againſt France, in behalf of his ſovereign, and would hold ſuch towns as he might take, by the right of conqueſt, and on the ground of indemnity.

The emigrants have had the imprudence to rejoice in the iſſuing of this latter, and to condemn the former. It might be demanded if theſe emigrants were Frenchmen. But, ſetting aſide the influence of paſſions, by which not only individuals, but alſo the governments intereſted in this war are influenced, it will appear but too true, that the ſecond proclamation of the Prince of Cobourg, in depriving Dumourier's party of all means of acting in concert, and in ſetting forth the belligerent powers as rapacious conquerors, has attached the whole of the French armies to the intereſt of the National Convention, which the greater part of them had previouſly deteſted; has compelled the cauſe of royalty to be forgotten, in the danger of the country; has pointed out the ſalvation of France as reſting on the

exiſtence of the Republic; has rallied the different parties round the ſtandard of the national honour; and has certainly been injurious to the ſucceſs of the campaign, and rendered the iſſue of the war extremely uncertain.

This ſecond proclamation was iſſued at the concluſion of the congreſs at Antwerp, in conſequence of the determination of the miniſters of the combined powers. Dumourier now ſaw that his treaty with the Imperialiſts was entirely deſtroyed; and, without offering uſeleſs complaints of this ſudden change in the counſels of the Imperialiſts, he conſulted only his character, and principles, and reſolved to ſacrifice all his perſonal intereſts.

He repaired inſtantly to the head quarters, and told the Prince of Cobourg frankly, that he came to thank him for the perſonal kindneſſes he had rendered him, and that he hoped to continue to merit his eſteem; that when he entered into a treaty with the Prince of Cobourg, his object was the regeneration of France, and not its diſmemberment; that he would not enter into any diſcuſſion concerning the motives of the combined powers; but that for his part, he could have no ſhare in leſſening the territory of France, or employ either his influence, or his moderate talents, in that taſk; and that therefore he felt himſelf obliged to withdraw from the coalition, and muſt beſeech the Prince of Cobourg to grant him a paſſport.

The Prince of Cobourg could not forbear to expreſs his high eſteem of his delicacy. The Arch Duke Charles, and Colonel Mack, alſo expreſſed

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their eſteem for the general; and he departed for Bruſſels. Dumourier can have no doubt that, after a direct violation of the principles of the treaty that had taken place, and after an open diſavowal of the proclamation iſſued in conſequence of that treaty, his preſence muſt have been embarraſſing to the Imperialiſts, and that they regarded the reſolution he took with pleaſure. But it was not long that he left them in any perplexity, his reſolution was taken the moment he perceived their deſigns.

Before Dumourier quitted the Imperial army, he had the ſatisfaction of knowing that his former companions would be continued in their rank and employments. They are well treated and ſerve in the Imperial army, where aſſuredly they will ſupport their reputation.

Being arrived at Bruſſels, he explained the motives of his conduct to the Count de Metternich, the Emperor's miniſter in the Netherlands, who received him with the greateſt friendſhip, and gave him a paſſport for Germany.

In this place the memoirs of the public life of General Dumourier are concluded. The remainder of his life has been filled up with difficulties, dangers, perſecutions, and calumnies of every kind, of which he may one day render an account to the public. But this hiſtory can only intereſt thoſe who are truly his friends, and they are not many: or, real philoſophers, and ſuch are indeed rare.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Concluſion.

SUCH is the ſeries of events in the three of the moſt diſaſtrous months of General Dumourier's life. In this ſhort period he has experienced all the miſeries, and all the dangers, that the weakneſs and wickedneſs of man can inflict upon a public character. Calumny and injuſtice form the outline of this dark picture, which may ſerve as a leſſon to men of every deſcription, and from which philoſophy alone can extract thoſe conſolatory reflections which propriety of conduct and rectitude of motive ſupply. He hates, neither thoſe who have defamed his character, nor thoſe who have purſued his life, nor thoſe who have refuſed him an aſylum, and whoſe ungenerous and ill founded reſentment perſecutes him wherever he flies. The firſt, are ignorant of the true ſtate of thoſe facts, which, from their very ſingularity, are exceedingly liable to miſrepreſentation. The ſecond, are actuated by that ſpirit of fanaticiſm, which is reaſonable proof. The third, are prejudiced by calumny, and conſider him as a dangerous character.

The Miniſters of foreign courts have given it out, after the Emigrants, that he is a proper object of ſuſpicion, and that they can never be ſure he will not veer about and put himſelf at the head of the French. His proſcription, and his three declarations, ought

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to be a ſufficient pledge of his firmneſs: thoſe three pieces have raiſed him many enemies by the perverſe miſconſtruction given to his expreſſions.

He avows that he paſſionately loves his country, and that he will never heſitate a moment to ſacrifice his life to its welfare; but he declares, at the ſame time, that whilſt it is polluted with crimes, and delivered over to the horrors of anarchy, he will never enter it again: that, proſcribed, as he is, and an outcaſt of ſociety, he prefers all the miſeries and all the dangers he may incur, to the moſt ſplendid ſituation in which the oppreſſors of his countrymen, and the inciters of their mad exceſſes, could place him.

He has been the open enemy of thoſe powers who wiſhed to interfere in the internal affairs of his country, both whilſt he was a miniſter, and whilſt he was a general; becauſe he was moſt firmly perſuaded, that the Revolution, which was doubtleſs, expedient and inevitable, would have been accompliſhed, not only with innocence, but glory, if foreign interference and the open encouragement given to the emigrants, had not exaſperated to madneſs a people by nature impetuous and violent. After licentiouſneſs and anarchy had deſtroyed every thing in France, he wiſhed to avail himſelf of the ſame foreign powers to re-eſtabliſh order, not merely without injury to his country, but with the moſt tender regard for its intereſt and its glory.

When he ſaw that this became impracticable, he formed the plan of a diverſion, by which he conceived he might eſſentially ſerve the cauſe of his country

country and of Europe. Diſtruſt, or other motives, prevented its execution. He grieves at the protraction of the ſufferings of human nature: he ſighs impatiently for the termination of this calamitous war, without foreſeeing the means of its accompliſhment,—for nothing which now takes place in Europe, with reſpect to France, can be reaſoned upon after the common maxims of policy and prudence.

It has been ſaid, that he was bribed over by the Dutch Patriots, and afterward ſold to the Prince of Orange a liſt of the principal conſpirators. This abſurd imputation appears in a German work on the French Revolution, called Minerva, much eſteemed for the beauty of its ſtyle. The author has certainly been deceived in this, as well as in many other circumſtances, of General Dumourier's life, which the natural love of the marvellous has conſtantly magnified and blackened. He declares, that he never poſſeſſed a liſt of the Dutch Patriots, that he knew only a very ſmall party of theſe refugees in France, that he knew theſe only becauſe they formed a Batavian Revolutionary Committee at Antwerp; that he does not know the names of any of thoſe who may entertain the ſame opinions in Holland; that he has never had any communication, either before or ſince, with the Stadtholder's party; that it is even impoſſible ſuch a communication ſhould have exiſted, as that court never forgave the manifeſto which preceded his expedition into Holland; that he never received a bribe; that he is poor, and glories in being ſo.

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He will conclude theſe Memoirs with ſome obſervations on the three claſſes of French emigrants. Foreigners are ſurpriſed, that they ſhould not unite in their diſtreſs, becauſe they are unacquainted with their diſtinguiſhing characters. Their diviſions are a great misfortune, but they are almoſt without a remedy.

The firſt claſs, of which the Princes of the Houſe of Bourbon are the leaders, conſiſts of the old court, the higher order of eccleſiaſtics, the parliaments, and the principal financial department. Allured by the ſeductive influence of this party on the one hand, and terrified by the extravagance of the Jacobins on the other, the lower nobleſſe have been induced to join them in military array. This claſs is compoſed of pure Royaliſts: they wiſh and demand the re-eſtabliſhment of the ancient monarchy, and, of courſe, of abſolute deſpotiſm; and regret the old inſtitutions with all their abuſes, inſtitutions which it is impoſſible ſhould ever re-appear, ſince a new order of things has rendered France no longer the France of former days, but a new nation, requiring as a new nation, a new moral and political conſtitution, to re-eſtabliſh on the broad baſis of general utility the ſecurity of the government, and the confidence of the people.

The ſecond claſs, of which Fayette is the apparent leader, conſiſts of the conſtitutional monarchiſts, men who deſire a great reformation, or rather a total regeneration in the principles and forms of the old government. The greater part of this claſs were

employed in the firſt National Aſſembly in the great work of forming the New Conſtitution; but falling, as they ſoon did, a ſacrifice to the cabals of the people of Paris, and above all to the frantic exceſſes of the Jacobins, paid dearly for the propagation of thoſe principles of Liberty and Equality, which, having been originally laid down by themſelves without any modification, and taken up by the people in too groſs and literal a ſenſe, were puſhed to that extravagant extent, which has brought about the ſubverſion of all the eſtates, and the general anarchy of France.

The third claſs, which is ſcarcely diſtinguiſhable from the former, but by the later date of their defection, conſiſts of the military who followed General Dumourier; and all the nobles proſcribed on this occaſion, who could eſcape from their country. This claſs includes alſo thoſe members of the National Convention who had the courage to vote in favour of Louis XVI. and againſt all the abominations which reſulted from his execution; and who, having atteſted their wiſhes in a proteſt, had the good fortune to eſcape.

The firſt claſs, the moſt numerous, the moſt ſplendid, the moſt diffuſed over Europe, and the moſt favoured by its attentions—by little effectual aid, but great promiſes, and ſtill oftener by humiliations and caprice, poſſeſſes the moſt decided averſion to the two others; and confounds them in its ignorant preſumptions with the Jacobins themſelves. The unjuſt impriſonment of Fayette excites in their boſoms

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no mercy for that unfortunate General. But againſt General Dumourier, they level all their rage; and the zeal with which they calumniate his character, augment his diſtreſſes, and encourage his univerſal proſcription, is truly ſurpriſing.

This claſs has preſerved all its pride and all its pretenſions. It will have every thing or nothing. The laſt ucceſs of the Combined Armies fills them with frantic joy; and nothing is heard but offenſive ſchemes of revenge and perſonal ambition. If the operations of the ſame armies ſlacken for a ſeaſon—they are betrayed, they are deſerted, they are undone—and this moment the King of Pruſſia and his Generals, and the next the Emperor's, are aſſailed with their loud and unſeaſonable reproaches. Always extravagant and always diſguſtful to the people where they reſide, who coolly obſerve their motions, and conclude, with ſome plauſibility, that ſelfiſhneſs is their ſole leading principle, they have the preſumption to think that all Europe is only armed for their ſakes, and that when they re-enter their country, where they will recognize nothing—not even the veſtiges of their demoliſhed villas, they ſhall take poſſeſſion again of their town-manſions, their country cottages, their elegant luxuries, their domeſtics, their dependents, and above all their power and their credit.

The intolerance of this claſs of emigrants towards the two others, precludes that union which is ſo eſſentially neceſſary in their preſent unfortunate ſituation, were it only to excite the attention and compaſſion of the ſeveral States where they have fled for

protection, and rove without a ſettlement. There are notwithſtanding in this claſs, ſome few individuals of ſenſe borne away in the general maſs by their unlucky ſituation, and the prejudices of their birth, who form an exception to the general rule, and ſincerely reprobate the extravagance of the reſt, but they are little attended to. This claſs is divided too, within itſelf, into factions as active, as intriguing, as full of bickerings and jealouſies, as when it glittered at Paris or Verſailles. It is a court itinerant, which has loſt nothing of its occupation, though deprived of its ſtability.

The other two claſſes of emigrants are infinitely more moderate and reaſonable, and might ſoon be brought to coaleſce. Fayette and Dumourier, if they met in any other place than a priſon, would ſoon underſtand each other; and the ſhades of difference, which have hitherto only ſeparated them, perhaps for want of a due explanation, would melt away, and vaniſh before the common intereſt of their country, and the common ſufferings of themſelves. For theſe two chiefs, and theſe two claſſes have both been ſtrenuous for the eſtabliſhment of liberty in their country, and the reformation of abuſes. They have ſupported, with firmneſs the great cauſe of human nature, and, if they have differed in the means, they have agreed in the principle.

General Dumourier declares to the emigrants of every deſcription, whom force or inclination has ſeparated from their country, that it is only by a well cemented union they can acquire that conſide-

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ration, which alone can better their ſituation at the cloſe of the war, whether they ſucceed in returning to their country, or whether they are doomed to relinquiſh it for ever: that it is the advantage of misfortune to purify the mind, and to temper it for the hardier virtues: that it is time to renounce the language of prejudice, ſince it is no longer underſtood in France: that, that country is more different from the France of 1788, than from Gaul in Julius Cæſar's time; that it even changes every ſix months; and, that unfortunately the Jacobins have been more prudential in the gradations of their crimes, than the emigrants, who, without giving themſelves the trouble to examine the progreſs of the national genius, build all their ſchemes on the ſtate of France at the point of time that they left it.

Their unfortunate ſituation may continue a long time, it may become utterly without a remedy: the worſt ſhould always be ſuppoſed, that we may not be miſled by fallacious expectations. If they don't reform themſelves, if they don't perſiſt in ſhaking off their arrogance, their extravagance, their imprudence, their internal diſcord, they will ſoon diſguſt the people who give them ſhelter, and whoſe temper will infallibly be ſoured on a thouſand occaſions by the war; their minds will not be fortified to bear the triumphs of ſucceſs, or the deſperation of a failure: in the firſt caſe, they will abuſe their return, and be driven into a baniſhment more hopeleſs than their preſent one; in the ſecond, they will become

become the moſt wretched men upon the face of the earth.

Baniſhment, like every other condition of human nature, has its advantages. It gives us objects of compariſon, of which we ſhould never otherwiſe have an idea; it gives us information; it calls forth our energies by its difficulties; it renders us indulgent and ſociable; it excites between ourſelves and our protectors a reciprocation of ſenſibility and benevolence. The upright man, the man of wiſdom and reflection, brings back from this involuntary pilgrimage, a ſtore of thoſe hardy and of thoſe gentle virtues, which qualify him better to benefit his country, and lead to that univerſal philanthropy which diminiſhes the diſmal effects of national partialities.

General Dumourier gives them another piece of advice, which he carefully obſerves himſelf——to be indulgent to their countrymen, and not to revile a whole nation by too indiſcriminate reproaches. It is *imprudent*, at leaſt, to brand as rebels twenty millions of men who riſe againſt a hundred thouſand. Theſe twenty millions form ſuch an immenſe majority, that the hundred thouſand are more deſerving of the name of rebels. The emigrants of every deſcription, who love their country, and are worthy of returning to it, may fairly —under the diſmal apprehenſion, leſt anarchy ſhould produce the total ſubverſion and diſorganization of the empire—may fairly deteſt five or ſix hundred ſcoundrels who lead that amiable people aſtray,

aſtray, and hurry them beyond the reaſonable bounds of true liberty, of true patriotiſm, of feaſible equality, and of the poſſible means of public happineſs and order; but they ſhould ſurely preſerve, in misfortune eſpecially, that love for their country which maintains their title to its bleſſing.

They ſhould never calumniate the nation at large: they may juſtly lament that the French are blindfolded, and led through crimes into every extravagance. But there is one point of view which is conſolatory to a true Frenchman: he ſees through all this anarchy, a moſt determined courage, and the greateſt frankneſs of opinion. With theſe qualities the French may be brought back from their errors; but it is by reaſon, and not by reproaches, that this can be accompliſhed. Let thoſe among the emigrants whoſe ſituation, whoſe influence, and whoſe knowledge, may one day call them to the important duty of re-eſtabliſhing order in France, let theſe men fit themſelves for reclaiming public opinion, by inſtantly ſacrificing their reſentment, of whatever nature or however juſt, and ceaſing to exaſperate by invectives the whole people of France. The character of that people may be eclipſed for a time, but will never be entirely obliterated; and what is crime in ſome few individuals, is energy in the nation at large.

The hiſtory of the world does not preſent an inſtance of a nation aſſailed by ſo many enemies

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at once, leſs terrified at the thunder of the charge, or keeping them at bay in every quarter with ſuch obſtinate reſolution. The laſt campaign, which was enough to have cruſhed them at once, only diſplayed one general maſs of valour; and if they yield, the next campaign, they will be ſubdued, but they will not be degraded. It is greatly the intereſt of the emigrants that the French ſhould not be deſpiſed; for whatever their nation may ſuffer in the eſtimation of Europe, will be a loſs to themſelves. They have already, for the laſt two years, been guilty of a great miſtake in repreſenting to foreign powers that the French armies were contemptible, and utterly incapable of making any reſiſtance. This miſtake, which has proved ſo fatal to the Pruſſians, has taken away all credit from their reports. Let us never hear ſuch miſrepreſentations again—they are much too ſerious.

The French nation, collectively taken, will always be amiable. She is labouring at this moment under a moral diſtemper, whoſe dreadful convulſions only render her a greater object of alarm. Foreigners may employ the ſword, but her emigrant offspring ſhould only approach her with the ſoothing accents of perſuaſion:—it is their intereſt to do ſo: their deſign of ſuperinducing order on that confuſion which has driven them from their country, will, otherwiſe, every month and every week, become more perfectly hopeleſs.

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This advice is not the reſult of baſe compliance, or perſonal intereſt, or ambition. General Dumourier declares, and his Memoirs will prove, that he reprobates the preſent ſtate of things in France; that he ſees in them only the ſubverſion of every rational principle, and the utter impracticability of promoting public happineſs; he declares, that he will never warp to ſuch an order of things; and that he would chuſe beggary, proſcription, wretchedneſs, and perpetual exile, in preference to any re-eſtabliſhment in his country that muſt be purchaſed by the ſacrifice of his moral principles;——but he declares, too, that he loves his countrymen, and that, were he poignarded in their delirium tomorrow, he would breathe out his laſt accents, in a lamentation of their errors, and a benediction to his country.

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